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NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
Committee on Professional Ethics
Opinion #681- 02/09/1996 (28-95)
Topic: Withdrawal of Assigned Counsel; Confidences and Secrets
of Client
Digest: Lawyer assigned by court to represent client who
misrepresented financial eligibility for assigned counsel may not
disclose client confidences or secrets in support of motion to withdraw,
but may disclose client secrets if ordered by the court to do so.
Code: DR 4-101; 2-110; 7-102; EC 5-1; 7-1;7-6
QUESTION
May a lawyer assigned by a court to represent an indigent client
withdraw from the representation after learning that the client has the
means to retain counsel if such withdrawal can only be effected by
disclosing client confidences or secrets?
OPINION
The withdrawal of a lawyer from representation is governed in the
first instance by DR 2-110. DR 2-110(C), which pertains to
permissive withdrawal, provides that a lawyer may withdraw from
representation if the withdrawal can be accomplished without material
adverse effect on the interests of the client or if the client
"[p]ersists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that
the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent." DR
2-110(C)(1)(b). Similarly, the lawyer may withdraw if "[t]he
lawyer's continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a
Disciplinary Rule." DR 2-110(C)(2). Withdrawal under DR
2-110(C) is conditioned upon compliance with DR 2-110(A) [permission of
tribunal if required] and the interplay of DR 7-102(B)(1) [fraud on the
tribunal] with DR 4-101 [preservation of confidences and secrets of a
client].
Questions of law are outside the scope of this Committee’s
jurisdiction. Yet, as in this instance, the resolution of a
lawyer's ethical dilemma will often depend on the legality of the
client's conduct because a fundamental tenet of legal ethics is that all
of a lawyer's obligations to a client must be exercised "within the
bounds of the law." See EC 5-1, 7-1; DR 7-102(A)(3), (4); N.Y.
State 562 (1984). A lawyer can not properly "assist the client in
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal." DR
7-102(A)(7). The lawyer, in deciding whether withdrawal is
permissible pursuant to DR 2-110, must determine whether the ongoing
actions of the client are criminal or fraudulent, whether permission of
the tribunal is required and whether confidences or secrets may be
revealed.
Although the lawyer must independently determine whether the client's
conduct is criminal, the Committee notes that conduct similar to that of
the subject client has been characterized by a sister state bar
committee as the "theft of free legal services" that would justify
withdrawal and, if necessary, the revelation of client confidences and
secrets. Oregon State 1991-34. An examination of the New
York Penal Code concerning larceny and other theft offenses suggests
that the client’s actions may not necessarily be criminal in New
York because New York law apparently does not recognize legal services
as "property" that is within the larceny statute or a type of service
that, if wrongfully taken or appropriated, can give rise to criminal
liability. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 155.00 & 165.15
(McKinney's 1988 & Supp. 1995). In the event that the client
filed an affidavit as to financial resources in connection with the
assignment of counsel, the client may have committed a crime, either of
a completed or continuing nature.
Regardless of the legal determination of the criminal effect of the
client's actions, it appears that the client may be using the lawyer's
services to perpetuate a fraud on the tribunal. Definition 9 of
the Code states:
"Fraud" does not include conduct, although characterized as
fraudulent by statute or administrative rule, which lacks an element of
scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, or knowing failure to correct
misrepresentations which can be reasonably expected to induce
detrimental reliance by another.
Here the client led the court to believe that he or she is eligible
for assigned counsel when this is not the fact. The client
misrepresented his or her means to the court to obtain assigned
counsel. The client should have reasonably expected the court and
the lawyer to rely on this misstatement to their detriment.
Although the client's misrepresentation is in the past, the client
continues to accept legal services from assigned counsel under false
pretenses resulting from his or her prior misrepresentation. DR
7-102(B)(1) requires that the lawyer remonstrate with the client in an
attempt to persuade the client to rectify his or her fraudulent
actions. If the client refuses to correct misrepresentations after
they have been called to his or her attention by the lawyer, the
client’s conduct may be deemed fraudulent under the Code
definition of fraud because it involves a knowing failure to correct the
misrepresentations. This fraud therefore provides the lawyer with
a basis for permissive withdrawal under DR 2-110(C). See N.Y.
State 126 (1970); N.Y. City 1994-8; N.Y. City 214 (1932).
As a practical matter, however, having a basis for permissive
withdrawal may not allow the lawyer to withdraw. The lawyer must also
satisfy DR 2-110(A)(1), which states:
If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules
of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a
proceeding before that tribunal without its permission.
If the tribunal does not require assigned counsel to obtain the
court's permission to withdraw or if the lawyer is not required to state
specific reasons for the motion to withdraw, the lawyer will be able to
withdraw pursuant to DR 2-110(C)(1)(b), provided the lawyer also
complies with the requirement of DR 2-110(A)(2) to take “steps to
the extent reasonably practicable to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
rights of the client.” However, in the event that the
tribunal requires that assigned counsel obtain permission for withdrawal
and, further, requires the lawyer to state the reasons for the
withdrawal, DR 4-101’s prohibition on disclosure of client
confidences and secrets will be implicated.
Although the lawyer's conclusion that the client committed a fraud on
the tribunal makes applicable the mandate of DR 7-102(B)(1) that "the
lawyer shall reveal the fraud to the . . . tribunal,” that rule
provides an explicit exception from the obligation to report the
client’s fraud “when the information is protected as a
confidence or secret." DR 7-102(B)(1). Hence the
lawyer’s ability to disclose the reasons for withdrawal turns on
the application of DR 4-101.
DR 4-101(A) defines "confidence" and "secret”:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client.
It is settled law in New York that "[t]he attorney-client privilege
extends only to confidential communications made to an attorney for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice." Hoopes v. Carota, 74 N.Y.2d
716, 717, 543 N.E.2d 73, 73, 544 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (1989); see also
Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 69, 409 N.E.2d 983, 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d
511, 514 (1980). If the client revealed the extent of his or her
assets to the lawyer confidentially to obtain legal advice concerning
the disposition of the assets in the client's pending proceeding –
the proceeding for which the lawyer was assigned as counsel – the
information regarding the client's assets is a “confidence”
within the meaning of DR 4-101(A) and protected by the attorney-client
privilege. If the information is gained in the professional relationship
from sources other than the client, but the client has requested that
the information be held inviolate, or regardless of any such request the
disclosure of the information would be embarrassing or would likely be
detrimental to the client, the information is a “secret”
within the meaning of DR 4-101(A).
Even though the relevant information is a confidence or secret within
the meaning of DR 4-101(A), the information may nonetheless not be
"protected" from disclosure if it is excepted under DR 4-101(C).
The circumstances of this inquiry arguably invoke two of these
exceptions. DR 4-101(C), in pertinent part, states that the lawyer
may reveal:
2. Confidences or secrets when permitted under
Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order. [or]
3. The intention of a client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime.
Whether disclosure is authorized by the exception in DR 4-101(C) for
communications respecting a client’s intention to commit a crime
may turn on whether the fraud constitutes a continuing crime, see, e.g.,
N.Y. State 674 (1995), a legal determination outside the scope of this
Committee’s jurisdiction. The exception authorizing
disclosure “when permitted under Disciplinary Rules” does
not appear applicable, as the most pertinent rule, DR 7-102(B)(1),
explicitly forbids disclosure of information protected under DR 4-101 as
a confidence or secret. Similarly, the exception in DR 4-101(C)
for disclosure “required by law” may not be apposite, as we
are not aware of any “law” that would mandate disclosure in
these circumstances (though we note that any such determination is,
again, outside our jurisdiction). Consequently, the assigned
counsel who seeks to withdraw is likely to be barred by DR 4-101 from
disclosing in the motion papers filed with the court the basis for the
requested withdrawal to the extent that information qualifies as either
a client confidence or secret. We do not believe that compliance
with DR 4-101 precludes assigned counsel from filing a motion for leave
to withdraw, however, provided no client confidence or secret is
disclosed in the motion papers. See N.Y. State 592 (1988)
(attorney compelled to withdraw from representation of two clients in
unrelated litigations because of event creating conflict may not
disclose client secrets but “should simply opine that the
continued representation ... would violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility”).
Disclosure may ultimately be permissible in connection with a
lawyer’s motion for leave to withdraw if the disclosure is
“required by ... court order.” In light of that
exception in DR 4-101(C), a lawyer who files a motion for leave to
withdraw without stating the facts identifying the grounds for the
requested withdrawal may be ordered by the court to disclose such
grounds. If the responsive information qualifies as a
“secret,” the lawyer will be permitted to disclose it in
compliance with the court’s order. If the lawyer believes
that the information is protected as a “confidence,”
however, the lawyer may have an ethical obligation to appeal the
court’s ruling rather than comply with a trial court’s order
to disclose what the lawyer believes in good faith is a communication
governed by the attorney-client privilege. N.Y. State 528
(1981). (court “order” compelling disclosure is one
“not subject to further review”). See generally Matter
of Balter v. Regan, 63 N.Y.2d 630, cert. denied 469 U.S. 934 (1984)
(duty of lawyer to follow a court order despite the fact the order is
premised upon an erroneous view of conflict of interest provisions of
the Code).
In light of the possibility that client secrets may be required to be
disclosed once an application for withdrawal has been filed, the lawyer
would be well advised to inform the client in advance of the filing of
such an application that the disclosure of client secrets may result, so
that the client can determine if he or she wishes to discharge the
assigned counsel. Finally, if the court does not order any
disclosure and rejects the application for failure to set out
sufficiently the grounds for the requested withdrawal, assigned counsel
will be obligated to continue the assigned representation.
CONCLUSION
Assigned counsel may not reveal client confidences or secrets to
support a motion for leave to withdraw from a court-appointed
representation, but may disclose a client secret if ordered to do so by
the court. A lawyer is not prohibited by the Code from applying to a
tribunal for leave to withdraw from a court-appointed representation
without setting forth facts supporting the request where such facts are
protected from disclosure by the Code.
Related Files
Opinion 681 (Adobe PDF File)
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