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New York State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics
Opinion #817 – 11/02/2007
Topic:
Lawyer’s participation in residential real estate purchase and
sale closing that includes a “seller’s concession” and
“grossed up” sale price.
Digest: Participation in
residential real estate transaction that includes a
“seller’s concession” and “grossed up”
sale price is prohibited unless the transaction is entirely lawful, the
gross-up is disclosed in the transaction documents and no parties are
misled to their detriment.
Code: DR
1-102(A)(3), (4), (5); DR 7-102(A) (7).
QUESTION
1. Following written agreement between buyer and seller of real
estate as to terms, the purchaser requests that the agreed actual sale
price be increased by 3% to cover the purchaser’s anticipated
closing costs, and that the seller grant purchaser a
“seller’s concession” in an equal amount. The
buyer thereby obtains a mortgage loan based upon an increased amount,
the actual purchase price plus the buyer’s closing
costs.
2. Seller’s counsel is advised by the lender that this type of
seller’s concession is “done all the time” by lenders,
and it is apparently authorized in the lender’s underwriting
manual.[1] Moreover, the lender advises
seller’s counsel that the practice is also acceptable to the
Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (“Freddie Mac”), who are
among the major purchasers of residential mortgage
loans.
3. Seller’s counsel is unaware whether the lender’s
underwriting guidelines, or those of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, discuss
a price “gross up” and is concerned that there is no
assurance that the “ultimate purchaser of the loan” would be
aware of the selling price “gross up” used to offset the
seller’s concession. Moreover, counsel is concerned that the
reporting of a “grossed up” selling price on the
purchaser’s mortgage application and the HUD-1 Settlement
Statement may violate federal law, and in particular 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1001, 1010, and 1012 (which criminalize fraud in certain
transactions concerning the federal government).
4. Counsel asks whether participation in this transaction, as
seller’s attorney, will violate New York’s Code of
Professional Responsibility.
OPINION
5. It is clear that DR 1-102(A)(3) prohibits an attorney from
engaging in “illegal” conduct; and DR 7-102(A) provides that
“[i]n the representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . (7)
counsel or assist the client in conduct the attorney knows to be illegal
or fraudulent.” Therefore, if the conduct at issue is
unlawful or fraudulent, it is per se
unethical. We do not opine on issues of law, however, so we
cannot determine whether it is criminal or fraudulent.
6. This Committee does construe the Code, however. DR
1-102(A)(4) prohibits “conduct involving dishonesty
. . . deceit, or misrepresentation.” While we have
not previously addressed the specific question raised here,[2] two other
state ethics opinions have considered closely related
questions.
7. First, in North Carolina Formal Ethics Opinion 12
(2001),[3] a developer
sold a lot for a certain purchase price, giving an early buyer a credit
at closing. The developer, hoping to maintain the price of future
sales, wanted the lawyer to obtain deed tax stamps based upon the higher
price recited in the purchase agreement. The ethics committee of
the North Carolina Bar, applying provisions substantially the same as
the applicable New York Code provisions, determined that such conduct
would be barred as involving dishonesty and misrepresentation, at least
in part because the deed recordation concealed (and was intended to
hide) from subsequent purchasers of nearby lots, the fact that the
credit had been given.
8. Still more closely on point, in Opinion 710 (2006),[4] the New Jersey Supreme Court Advisory Committee on
Professional Ethics considered facts like those presented here. In
that opinion, the practice was described as follows:
A contract for the sale of residential property has
been prepared by a realtor and signed by both seller and buyer for a set
purchase price with a mortgage contingency. Either during attorney
review or thereafter, the lawyers for the seller and the buyer are
required to amend the contract by increasing the purchase price and the
mortgage contingency amount in like amounts. In addition, the
attorneys are asked to amend the contract to provide that the seller
give a credit to the purchaser at closing in the same amount, calling it
a “seller’s concession” or “seller’s
payment of purchaser’s closing costs.” The inquirer
states that the amendments are calculated to increase the size of the
purchaser’s mortgage loan and “is a fraudulent practice
perpetrated on the ultimate investor.”
The Committee notes that in recent years residential
mortgage lending has, through the secondary market, become a major
category of finance in this country. As a result of federal
programs, those who originate loans may earn financing fees at the
closing and then convey those loans to entities such as the Government
National Mortgage Association (known as Ginnie Mae), the Federal
National Mortgage Association (known as Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Association (known as Freddie Mac). These programs,
in turn, after buying the mortgages from the originators, then issue
“mortgage-backed bonds” to investors, who receive the
periodic payments of principal and interest from the
borrowers.
This secondary market enables the originating lender
to sell the loan, and to originate more loans and financing fees with
the sales proceeds. In addition, the secondary market has created
an investment market for low risk mortgage based securities, and
attracts investment dollars into the residential mortgage
business.
On the facts set forth in the inquiry, it appears that
the sales contract as amended is submitted to the original mortgage
lender, or broker, with the sale price increase and corresponding credit
expressly stated, but without any assurance that assignees in the
secondary market would be aware of the device employed to increase the
size of the mortgage loan.
9. Based upon this description, New Jersey
Op. 710 determined that the practice violated the prohibitions
contained in New Jersey’s Rules of Professional Conduct against
counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is
illegal, criminal or fraudulent, and engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation:
By manipulating the sales price in the manner
described by the inquirer, either the originating lender or the
secondary investors may be deceived as to the true market price of the
house. The deception is the credit to the buyer given by the
seller to offset the increase in purchase price. The credit is not
justified by any additional property or rights to be sold to purchaser,
or by a legitimate charge against the seller on account of any actual
costs assumed by it and otherwise payable by the buyer.
In the present inquiry, it would seem that the
originating lender would have the opportunity to uncover the ruse upon a
close reading of the contract and the loan application, and to protect
itself before completing the transaction, but it is less clear that
persons investing in the secondary market would have the same
opportunity, or would have recourse against the assignor in the event a
later default occurs and a loss is suffered as a result of the enhanced
sales price.
The opinion concludes that a lawyer’s
participation in the increase in the purchase price and offsetting
credit was improper because it “involves a deceit, intending that
the mortgage loan investor will rely on the misrepresentations in the
contract in determining the size of the mortgage loan.” The
advisory committee also said that the conduct “compromises the
integrity of the underwriting of the loan because it exposes the lender
and those who purchase the resulting loan to a greater risk of loss than
is knowingly accepted.”
10. New Jersey Op. 710 provoked requests for clarification
from the Mortgage Bankers Association of New Jersey and the North
Central Jersey Association of Realtors.[5] They
asserted that New Jersey Op. 710 was based on a misunderstanding of
mortgage lending practices and was leading New Jersey attorneys to
refuse to work on mortgage loans containing seller’s concessions
of any kind. The mortgage bankers association said that
seller’s concessions made to permit financing of closing costs
serve a salutary purpose because low-income and first-time buyers often
do not realize at the time of contract that they will not have
sufficient cash to cover the closing costs.[6] The
realtor association asked whether the opinion covered, for example,
closing credits for repairs to resolve problems uncovered by the home
inspection process.[7]
11. A week after the original issuance, the New Jersey committee
clarified that New Jersey Op. 710 “address[ed] fictional and
deceptive increases in purchase prices unrelated to the actual
circumstances or costs of closing, and contrary to the expectations of
the lender or the ultimate holder of the mortgage.” The
clarification stated that the opinion was meant to bar only those
seller’s concessions not premised on “a legitimate charge
against the seller on account of any actual costs assumed by it and
otherwise payable by the buyer,” and did “not implicate a
contract of sale that explicitly states that the seller shall provide
the buyer with a credit against legal and legitimate costs or expenses
related to the sale, which would otherwise be absorbed by the buyer,
such as actual closing costs.”[8]
12. The clarification thus addressed, and found permissible, some
shifting of costs otherwise borne by buyers, but continued to find
impermissible an increase in the purchase price and an offsetting credit
to permit the buyer to finance closing costs.[9]
13. This Committee is neither a legislative, nor a judicial
body. Just as we cannot opine on matters of law nor can we
“find facts.” Thus, while we recognize the evidence
that the practice of grossing up the price post-contract has become
common, we find the concerns expressed in North Carolina Op. 12 and New
Jersey Op. 710 of considerable weight.[10]
14. The issue is whether the lawyer’s participation in such a
transaction facilitates deception or misrepresentation. It seems
obvious that there is potential deception implicit in the transactions,
but we cannot determine whether or in what circumstances actual
deception will occur. Thus we hold that a lawyer may not ethically
participate in such a “gross up” of the actual purchase
price and concomitant seller’s concession unless there is neither
deception nor misrepresentation at work in the transaction and its
predictable consequences. At a minimum this means that the
gross-up (and not merely the grossed-up purchase price) must be
disclosed in the transaction documents. We are persuaded that
merely reporting “a seller’s concession” may imply
either that the seller has agreed to reduce the purchase price he or she
would otherwise have obtained or that the reported sales price is the
actual price of the property, less certain costs the seller has agreed
to pay. If neither of these is the case, then reporting a
concession, without more, is misleading under DR 1-102.
CONCLUSION
15. On the facts presented here, and for the reasons above, we
conclude that participation in such transactions is unethical unless
there is no unlawful conduct, and there is full disclosure in the
transaction documents of the substance and effect of the
transaction.
(11-07)
[1] According to
the inquirer, the manual appears to approve of seller’s
contributions up to a maximum of 6% of the selling price (where there is
a 10% deposit; if the deposit is less than 10%, the maximum
seller’s concession allowed is 3%). The lender has also
provided seller’s counsel with a redacted HUD-1 Settlement
Statement from a transaction the bank recently closed, showing the
grossed-up contract price on Lines 101 and 401, and the
“Seller’s Concession” as reductions on Lines 215 and
515.
[2] In N.Y. State 545 (1982) we held that it was
improper for a lawyer to execute a Real Property Transfer Report that
set forth a purchase price that excluded the cost of a number of
“extras.” The Committee presumed that the conduct
violated the Real Property Law, and was therefore barred by
DR 7?102(A)(7), and did not reach the question of
“dishonest . . . deceit, or
misrepresentation.”
[5] Mary Pat
Gallagher, Ethics Ban on Seller’s Concessions at Closings Limited,
187 N.J.L.J. 1 (Jan. 1, 2007).
[8] Notice to the
Bar, Clarification of Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion
710 (Dec. 22, 2006).
[9] While New
Jersey Op. 710 was thereafter approvingly cited as supporting the
imposition of civil liability and professional discipline against
attorneys participating in transactions that include seller’s
concessions, see Dodge, Creative
Financing, 43 Arizona Attorney 8 (June 2007), it has
also been strenuously criticized in some quarters, see
Schonberger, Real Estate Attorneys Miscast as Mortgage-Market
Watchdog, 187 N.J.L.J. 1123 ( March 26, 2007) (“[T]he advisory
committee failed to understand that the secondary mortgage investor is
not unknowingly buying risk . . . . Perhaps more
important is the existence, and actions, of professionals [such as
appraisers] between the mortgagor and ultimate secondary market
buyer.”).
[10] This
Committee has long recognized that the lawyer’s obligation under
DR 1?102(A)(4) not to engage in conduct involving deception
extends to deception of both clients and non-clients. See N.Y. State 626 (1992) (holding that the
lawyer must provide non-client borrower with information to judge
whether the lawyer’s fee is or is not excessive); N.Y. State 796
¶ 6 (2006) (noting that statements made to third parties
“can become a matter of ethical concern” under
DR 7?102(A)(5), which bars a lawyer from “[k]nowingly
mak[ing] a false statement of law or fact”).
Related Files
Lawyer's participation in residential real estate purchase and sale closing that includes a "seller's concession: and "grossed-up" sale price. (Adobe PDF File)
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