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New York State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics
Opinion #824 – 07/02/2008
Topic:
Conflicts of interest – lawyer’s own interest; providing
legal services without compensation
Digest: An attorney may,
without compensation, provide a service of monitoring or reviewing a
client’s investments to identify any potential claims, even though
the attorney may later be considered to handle, with compensation, any
resulting litigation.
Code: DR
1-106; 2-103; 5-101.
QUESTION
1. May an
attorney, at the request of a client, review the client’s
investment portfolio in order to identify any potential securities fraud
claims that the client might have in connection with its investments,
without charging the client a fee for this service?
FACTS
2. A law firm
regularly represents plaintiffs in the field of securities fraud
litigation. As part of its practice, the firm monitors the
investment portfolios of existing institutional, pension fund
clients. The service involves the client retaining a law firm to
monitor the client’s investments. The lawyer agrees to
notify the client when the lawyer identifies a potential securities
fraud claim that, in the opinion of the lawyer, might be pursued by the
client. Once notified, the client is free to take no action, hire
another lawyer to represent it in connection with the claim, or hire the
monitoring lawyer to handle the matter. The monitoring lawyer does
not charge any fee to the client for the monitoring service.
Should the client select the monitoring firm to represent it, the
subsequent litigation is handled pursuant to a separate retainer
agreement entered into between the client and the lawyer after the
client has made the decision to pursue the matter.
OPINION
3. There is
nothing in the Lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting an attorney from providing legal services without
compensation. The fact that the reviewing attorney would be
considered to handle any resulting litigation does not change that
conclusion. We note that the arrangement to provide a monitoring
service creates an attorney-client relationship, with all rights,
responsibilities and obligations that apply whenever an attorney-client
relationship is established. Among those responsibilities and
obligations under the Disciplinary Rules are those pertaining to
conflicts of interest and confidences of clients.
4. DR 5-101
provides that “[a] lawyer shall not accept or continue employment
if the exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the client will be
or reasonably may be affected by the lawyer’s own financial,
business, property, or personal interests.” We do not
believe that a lawyer’s interest in being hired to pursue any
potential securities fraud claim he or she may uncover creates a
conflict under this clause. It is inherent in the attorney-client
relationship that a lawyer may benefit from a recommendation that legal
services are needed with respect to a particular
problem.
5. Because the
described monitoring services are legal services involving the
professional judgment of a lawyer, the provisions of DR 1-106, relating
to the provision of legal and non-legal services by a lawyer or law
firm, are not relevant to the inquiry. We note that, while it
would be prudent to prepare an engagement letter or retainer agreement
with respect to the free monitoring service, none is required by the New
York engagement letter rules, because the monitoring lawyer is not
expected to charge $3,000 or more for the service.[1] The practitioner considering undertaking such an
arrangement must, however, assure compliance with the rules prohibiting
solicitation.[2] This opinion does not address issues of substantive
law.
CONCLUSION
6. A lawyer may
accept retention by a client, without compensation, to review the
client’s investment portfolio in order to identify any potential
securities fraud claims that the client may have, under the
circumstances described above, even though the client may retain the
lawyer, on a paying basis, to handle any resulting
litigation.
(8-08)
[1]
22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1215.2(1).
[2]
DR 2-103.
Related Files
Conflicts of interest (Adobe PDF File)
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