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NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Opinion #826 –
09/12/2008
Topic: Conflicts of interest;
multiple representation
Digest: No per se rule
prohibits a lawyer from representing plaintiffs in declaratory judgment
actions against an insurance carrier and simultaneously defending that
carrier against other insureds in other declaratory judgment actions, or
from obtaining advance waivers of the conflict. Where the
actions involve related issues of law, however, whether the clients can
validly consent depends on, among other things, potential
“positional conflicts,” the possibility that the lawyer may
need to cross-examine employees of a client, and the possibility that
confidential information derived from one representation may be of use
in another.
Code: DR 4-101(B)(2); DR 5-101(A); DR
5-105(A) and (C); EC 5-15
QUESTION
- May a lawyer agree to defend an insurance company in
coverage disputes arising out of construction accidents while
simultaneously representing other insureds in other coverage cases
against that insurance company arising out of unrelated construction
accidents?
OPINION
- The inquirer is a member of a law firm that regularly
represents property owners and construction managers who are defendants
in construction accident cases and who were denied insurance
coverage. The firm represents these clients, as plaintiffs, in
actions filed against the insurance carriers for declaratory relief
invalidating the coverage disclaimers and enjoining the carriers to
defend and indemnify them, on grounds that the plaintiffs are
“additional insureds” in subcontractor liability
policies. The firm has been approached by one of the defendant
insurance companies to represent it as a defendant in other, unrelated
declaratory judgment and injunction actions brought by other
insureds. The inquirer asks whether the firm may take on these
engagements.
- A lawyer may not take on or continue the concurrent
representation of multiple clients if the representation would
“involve the lawyer in representing differing interests” or
if “the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of
a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected,” unless
the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client affected by the
conflict “after full disclosure of the implications of the
simultaneous representation and the advantages and risks involved”
and “a disinterested lawyer would believe that the lawyer can
competently represent the interest of each.”[1] “Differing interests” are defined broadly by
the Code to “include every interest that will adversely affect
either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it
be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse or other interest.”[2]
- Here, there clearly is a conflict with respect to the
matters involving the carrier that the lawyer or law firm proposes to
defend. If the lawyer or law firm takes on those matters, the
lawyer or firm will be representing in the existing actions one client
– the insurance company – adverse to another client –
the insureds – and can proceed only if the conflict is consentable
and all clients involved provide informed consent.[3] In considering whether the conflict is consentable and
the nature of the disclosure required in obtaining consent, the
situation in this inquiry presents particular issues.
- First, because of the standardized nature of many
insurance policies, there is a significant probability that a lawyer or
law firm representing the carrier may be called upon to take the
opposite side of an issue that the lawyer is simultaneously litigating
on behalf of a declaratory judgment plaintiff in another case –
for example, the outer time limit for timely notice of claim, the
required specificity for a valid notice of disclaimer, or the scope of
coverage afforded by a particular clause. This type of
“positional” or “issue conflict” does not
present an automatic bar to the multiple representation. EC 5-15
states, “[A] lawyer may generally represent parties having
antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different
cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely
affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such
positions in cases pending in different trial courts.”[4]
- Even where there is a risk of creating an adverse
precedent, such conflicts are generally subject to consent if the client
is adequately informed of the issues involved.[5] There may be
circumstances, however, in which the lawyer’s effectiveness on
behalf of one client may be impaired by the representation of the other
client, as for example, where the lawyer’s own advocacy of the
contrary position may be used against the lawyer in the representation
of one of the clients, or where the lawyer will feel constrained by the
position he or she has taken in one case from arguing vigorously for the
contrary position. In such cases, it will generally not be
possible to meet the requirement of DR 5-105(C) that “a
disinterested lawyer would believe that the lawyer can competently
represent the interest of each.”
- A second consideration is whether the lawyer may need
to cross-examine an employee of the carrier client in the representation
of an insured. There is nothing in the abstract that prevents an
adequately advised client from consenting to be sued by the
client’s lawyer in unrelated matters, particularly if the client
is a sophisticated consumer of legal services, as are most insurance
companies. But depending on such questions as the seniority of the
employee, the importance of the testimony, and the nature of the
cross-examination, it may be impossible to meet the disinterested-lawyer
test where such a suit would require cross-examination of an insurance
carrier employee. Similar considerations would be presented if the
lawyer were required to cross-examine an expert that the lawyer might
have used or be using in a case for the other side.
- Third, the firm that seeks to represent both the
carriers and the declaratory judgment plaintiffs in coverage disputes
should be mindful of DR 5-101(A), which concerns conflicts arising from
a “lawyer’s own financial, business, property or personal
interests.” To the extent there may be a significant
disparity in the fees likely to be generated by the owners and
construction managers on the one hand, and the carrier on the other
hand, there may be an “inclination . . . to ‘soft
peddle’ or de-emphasize certain arguments or issues – which
otherwise would be vigorously pursued – so as to avoid impacting
the other case.”[6]
- In addition, a lawyer may not use for the benefit of
the insureds any confidential information that the lawyer has learned in
the course of representing the carrier.[7] If in a particular
case for an insured, for example, the practices of the carrier or of
individual employees of the carrier with respect to a certain issue may
be called into question, it may well not be possible for the lawyer to
avoid using confidential information derived from a prior representation
of the carrier regarding those practices.[8] In such cases,
again, the lawyer might not be able to satisfy the “disinterested
lawyer” test.
- To the extent that the lawyer concludes that a
conflict is consentable, the lawyer should advise the clients of these
considerations in obtaining that consent. The lawyer’s
disclosure should address, as necessary in a particular case and
depending on the sophistication of the client, questions such as the
possibility that advocating a favorable legal position in one
client’s case may be prejudicial to a client in another case, the
possibility that the lawyer or a lawyer in the firm may need to
cross-examine an employee of the carrier, and any other considerations
that may reasonably be thought to affect the lawyer’s independent
professional judgment or the vigor of the lawyer’s representation
of the clients.
- A further consideration is whether the lawyer or law
firm seeking to represent a carrier in a series of actions while
continuing to bring actions by insureds against that carrier may seek an
advance waiver of conflicts with respect to future cases the lawyer or
law firm may take on. If the conflicts are otherwise consentable,
there is sufficient disclosure of the nature of the conflicting
representations that may arise and the client is capable of
understanding the waiver, a lawyer or law firm generally may ethically
request and rely upon the advance waiver of a future
multiple-representation conflict.[9] The extent of the
disclosure necessary, and potentially the scope of the advance waiver,
may depend on, among other things, the sophistication of the
client.[10] For example, where
a client is relatively unsophisticated in legal matters, an advance
waiver is more likely to be enforceable if it is limited to lawsuits on
behalf of the carrier of the same general kind as the lawyer or law firm
is then prosecuting, as opposed to a more open-ended
waiver.
- The lawyer should review the validity of such an
advance waiver both when the waiver is given and when it is
triggered. For example, the lawyer would not be able to rely on an
advance waiver by an insured broadly permitting the lawyer or firm to
represent the carrier defendant in other construction-accident suits
against other insureds if the lawyer or firm thereafter wishes to take
on a lawsuit on behalf of the carrier that would require the lawyer or
firm to argue for a position that would limit the lawyer’s
effectiveness in arguing for the insured.
CONCLUSION
- There is no per se rule that would disqualify a
lawyer from representing certain declaratory judgment plaintiffs against
the insurance carrier and simultaneously defending the carrier against
other declaratory judgment plaintiffs in coverage disputes. The
possibility of positional conflicts, however, will require careful
consideration in each case of the nature of the issues presented and the
effect on the representation of other clients of the positions taken on
behalf of one. In some cases, considerations such as the identity
of the likely witnesses and whether the lawyer has confidential
information derived from representation of the carrier that may be of
use in the representation of the insured may also limit the
lawyer’s ability to obtain informed consent to the conflict.
For these reasons, the burden of satisfying the “disinterested
lawyer” test in these cases will often be a high one.
(17-07)
[3]
Under the Code, individual lawyers have the conflict, but pursuant to DR
5-105(D) their conflict is imputed to every lawyer in their
firm.
[4]
See also Model Rule 1.7 cmt. 24 (“The mere fact that
advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create
precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer
in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A
conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk
that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the
lawyer's effectiveness in representing another client in a different
case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a
precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the
other client.”); ABA 93-377 (“[I]f the two matters are being
litigated in the same jurisdiction, and there is a substantial risk that
the law firm’s representation of one client will create legal
precedent, even if not binding, which is likely materially to undercut
the legal position being urged on behalf of the other client, the lawyer
should either refuse to accept the second representation or (if
otherwise permissible) withdraw from the first, unless both clients
consent after full disclosure of the potential ramifications of the
lawyer continuing to handle both matters.”); Restatement (Third)
of the Law Governing Lawyers § 128(f) (2000) (“A lawyer
ordinarily may take inconsistent legal positions in different courts at
different times. . . . However, a conflict is presented when there is a
substantial risk that a lawyer’s action in Case A will materially
and adversely affect another of the lawyer’s clients in Case B. .
. . If a conflict of interest exists, absent informed consent of the
affected clients . . . , the lawyer must withdraw
from one or both of the matters.”).
[5]
See, e.g., Model Rule 1.7 cmt. 24 (“If there is
significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent
of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the
representations or withdraw from one or both matters.”) (emphasis
added); sources cited in the preceding footnote.
[7]
DR 4-101(B)(2) bars a lawyer from knowingly using “a confidence or
secret of a client to the disadvantage of the client.”
[8]
See N.Y. City 2005-2 (“There are situations, however, where
information that the lawyer has in his or her mind from the first
representation is so material to the second representation that the
lawyer cannot avoid using the information.”).
[9]
See N.Y. City 2006-1.
Related Files
Ethics Opinion 826 (Adobe PDF File)
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