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NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATIONCommittee on
Professional Ethics Opinion #541 - 03/29/1982 (8-82)
Topic: Judges; appearance of integrity and impartiality of
judiciary
Digest: Judge may not hear cases involving law firms with which he is
discussing employment
Code: EC 9-4; Rules Governing Judicial Conduct: Rule 100-3(c)(1),
100-5(c)(1)
QUESTION
May a judge participate in cases involving law firms with which he is
negotiating, directly or indirectly, for employment?
OPINION
The Rules Governing Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 100) require a
judge to perform the duties of the office impartially and to avoid any
appearance of impropriety, in order to maintain public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Under Rule 100.3 (c)(1)
(preamble), a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding if his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Further, Rule 100.5(c)(1)
provides that a judge "shall refrain from financial and business
dealings that tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality "See also 28
U.S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. 1980).
Although these rules give specific instances in which the
impartiality of a judge reasonably might be questioned, they do not
address the situation of a judge who is contemplating leaving the bench
and who is, directly or indirectly, in contact with a law firm
concerning private employment. Nevertheless, it seems clear that
impartiality and the appearance of impartiality could be jeopardized if
lawyers whose firms were discussing a possible affiliation with the
judge appeared as advocates before him. In such a case, there is a
significant likelihood that the public would perceive the judge to be
biased.
As noted in EC 9-4, "the very essence of the legal system is to
provide procedures by which matters can be presented in an impartial
manner so that they may be decided solely upon the merits." A judge
should not negotiate for private employment, either himself or through
others, with any lawyer or law firm appearing before him because of the
real possibility that the judge's actions in the proceeding might appear
to be influenced by the hope of employment.
Although we have found no direct precedents addressing the situation
of a judge leaving the bench and seeking private employment, several
ethics opinions are relevant by analogy. In N.Y. State 289 (1973), the
Committee held that campaign contributions could not be solicited or
accepted by a judicial candidate from a lawyer with a case pending
before the candidate. Similarly, it would not be at all conducive to
public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial system to have a
judge rule on matters where a law firm with which he is negotiating
regarding future employment is counsel. A judge also should weigh
carefully entering into discussions with a lawyer or law firm that has
come before him so recently that the acceptance of employment might give
the appearance of use of the judicial office for personal gain. "A judge
should studiously avoid wherever possible every situation that might
reasonably give rise to the impression on the part of litigants or of
the public that his decisions were influenced by favoritism." ABA 200
(1940). See also N.Y. State 511 (1979).
A useful analogy may also be drawn from 18 U.S.C. § 208(a)
(Supp. 1979), which prohibits an employee of the executive branch of the
government from participating personally and substantially in any matter
in which "any person or organization with whom he is negotiating or has
any arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a financial
interest." Although this statute does not cover judicial personnel, it
otherwise clearly would apply to the situation of a judge presiding over
a matter involving a lawyer or law firm with which the judge is
discussing employment.
If a judge decides not to join a particular firm, the fact that the
judge at some time in the past consulted with that firm with a view
toward private employment should for a reasonable period of time be
disclosed to all parties on the occasion of subsequent appearances
before the judge by the firm, and perhaps may require his recusal.
In situations in which the impartiality or objectivity of a judge
might reasonably be questioned, it is for the judge to disqualify
himself from sitting on the matter. See N.Y. State 511 (1979). "The
responsibility is on the judge not to sit in a case unless he is both
free from bias and from the appearance thereof." ABA 200 (1940).
For the foregoing reasons, the question posed is answered in the
negative.
Related Files
Opinion 541 (Adobe PDF File)
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