 |
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
Committee on Professional Ethics
Opinion #832
(12/03/2009)
|
Topic: Attorney’s
provision of nonlegal services
|
|
Digest: [A1] Where a lawyer sells
shelf corporations (a nonlegal service) to people he regards as
non-clients, and provides no legal services in connection with those
nonlegal services, but the lawyer’s status as a lawyer is visible
to the public, then absent a disclaimer or other steps, the recipients
of the nonlegal services could reasonably believe there is an
attorney-client relationship and thus the Rules of Professional Conduct
would apply.
|
|
Rules: 5.7
Comments: Comments 1
& 3 to Rule 5.7
|
|
|
QUESTION
1. A sole practitioner would like to provide what the
lawyer describes as a “nonlegal service” to
non-clients. The “nonlegal service” is the sale of
“shelf corporations.” (The term “shelf
corporation” means a company that has had no recent activity or
that was created to be “put on the shelf” to age.
Shelf corporations are often sold to investors who want to start a
company but do not want to go through the incorporation process.)
Do the New York Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”)
relating to advertising and solicitation apply to the sale of shelf
corporations to non-clients?
OPINION
2. Rule 5.7
contains rules relating to nonlegal services provided by lawyers. (The
Appellate Divisions adopted new Rules of Professional Conduct effective
April 1, 2009.) The first two
subparagraphs – Rule 5.7(a)(1) and (a)(2) -- apply if an attorney
is providing both legal and nonlegal services to clients. Under Rule
5.7(a)(1) if the nonlegal services are “not distinct” from
the legal services provided by the lawyer to the client, then the Rules
apply to both the legal and the nonlegal
services. Under Rule 5.7(a)(2), if the
nonlegal services and the legal services provided by the lawyer to the
client are “distinct” from each other, then the Rules apply
to both the legal and nonlegal services only “if the person
receiving the services could reasonably believe that the nonlegal
services are the subject of an attorney-client
relationship.”
3. Rule
5.7(a)(4) addresses whether a person receiving nonlegal services
“could reasonably believe that those services are the subject of
an attorney-client relationship.” Specifically, the rule states that even where the legal and
nonlegal services provided to the client are distinct from each other,
it is “presumed that the person receiving nonlegal services
believes the services to be the subject of a client-lawyer
relationship unless the lawyer or
law firm has advised the person receiving the services in writing that
the services are not legal services and that the protection of a
client-lawyer relationship does not exist with respect to the nonlegal
services ….” (Emphasis added.) However,
the specified writing only serves to reverse the presumption, not to
prove conclusively that the services are not legal
services. As we noted in N.Y. State 755
(2002):
We are not suggesting by this opinion
that the mere statement, even in writing, to that effect is an automatic
safe harbor, and DR 1-106 does not say so. The writing serves to reverse
the presumption against the lawyer that would otherwise exist. It is
possible that in certain circumstances, such as where the client is
unsophisticated and has had a long relationship with the lawyer and
where, despite the existence of a separate entity, the nonlegal services
are not completely separated from the rendition of legal services, the
writing would be insufficient to disabuse the client of a reasonable
belief that the lawyer would be acting to protect the client.
Id. at
5; see also Rule 5.7, cmt.
3.
4. The lawyer’s
intention to sell shelf corporations only to people he regards as
non-clients (and not to clients) appears to assume that he would not
provide legal advice to the non-client purchasers of the
corporations. That assumption may not
be warranted. To test that assumption, we consider below three different
ways in which the shelf corporations might be sold.
Scenario One: Lawyer Provides Legal Services
5. We first consider the possibility that the lawyer
provides legal advice about shelf corporations to the purchasers, such
as giving a prospective purchaser the attorney’s views about (i)
the legality of shelf corporations in general, (ii) the validity of a
specific corporation, (iii) the advantages, rights, or benefits of shelf
corporations, or (iv) the tax consequences of purchasing or owning a
shelf corporation. The Rules do not
define legal services, and many services do not fall neatly into the
category of legal services because they may legally be undertaken by
both lawyers and nonlawyers. However,
“when such services are performed by a lawyer who holds himself
out as a lawyer, they constitute the practice of law and the lawyer, in
performing them, is governed by the Code.” N.Y. State 557 (1984) at p. 2.
6. Thus, despite the
fact that a nonlawyer might be entitled to provide some advice about a
shelf corporation without committing the unauthorized practice of law,
when a lawyer provides such advice it becomes the provision of legal
services. Thus, if the lawyer provides legal advice about shelf
corporations to purchasers, the lawyer would be providing legal services
to them. In that situation, the
Rules of Professional Conduct – including the rules regarding
lawyer advertising and solicitation – would apply both to the
legal advice and to the sale of the
corporations. Moreover, because the
lawyer would actually be rendering legal services, the disclaimer in
Rule 5.7(a)(4) would not be effective.
Scenario Two: Lawyer Does Not Provide Legal Services
7. We next consider the possibility that the lawyer
provides no legal advice whatsoever to the purchasers about the shelf
corporations. For the assumption that
the lawyer provides no legal advice to remain true, the lawyer could not
answer the kinds of questions a prospective customer might ask that are
likely to call for legal advice (e.g., What are the
tax consequences? How long may I leave the corporation on the
shelf? Do
I have to notify the state if I buy a shelf
corporation? Is the corporation validly
formed?). For example, if the shelf
corporations were sold over the Internet, and the attorney was not
identified anywhere on the web site as a lawyer, and any information
about the corporations was provided only in writing (e.g., via FAQs or links to articles),
and purchasers never communicated with the lawyer directly and had no
opportunity to ask for advice, then the lawyer would not be giving legal
advice to purchasers. In that case the Rules would
not generally apply to those sales.
8. Even where the lawyer would be generally exempt
from the application of the Rules with respect to the sales, however,
the exemption would not be absolute. Some Rules of Professional Conduct, such as Rule 8.4(c)
(prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation), would still apply. Thus, the lawyer could not engage in dishonest, fraudulent, or
deceptive conduct relating to the advertising or solicitation of the
nonlegal services.
Scenario Three: Lawyer’s Status as a Lawyer Is Visible to the
Public
9. Finally, we
consider the possibility that the attorney does not provide any legal
advice to the purchaser of the shelf corporation but the
attorney’s status as a lawyer is visible to the public
(e.g., the attorney uses a law office
name or letterhead, or advertises the sales on the lawyer’s web
site, or puts “Esq.” or “J.D.” after the
lawyer’s name). In that case there is a
substantial risk that the purchaser of the shelf corporations will be
misled as to whether an attorney-client relationship
exists. The risk is great because the
client may be confused about the nature of the attorney’s
role. In speaking about the need for
the lawyer to avoid potential confusion between legal and nonlegal
services provided to an individual, Comment 1 to Rule 5.7 notes that
avoiding confusion is essential
so that the person for whom the nonlegal services are
performed understands that the services may not carry with them the
legal and ethical protections that ordinarily accompany a client-lawyer
relationship. The recipient of the
nonlegal services may expect, for example, that the protection of client
confidences and secrets, prohibitions against representation of persons
with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain
professional independence apply to the provision of nonlegal services
when that may not be the case.
10. The same
concerns are relevant when the attorney sells to customers who are aware
of the attorney’s status as a lawyer. Even if the attorney merely identifies himself as a lawyer when
selling shelf corporations but does not promise or provide legal
services, the risk of confusion is great and purchasers could reasonably
believe that they had an attorney-client relationship with the
seller.
11. Where the attorney’s status as a lawyer is
visible, one way for a lawyer to avoid application of the Rules to the
sale of nonlegal services would be to give the purchaser in writing the
Rule 5.7(a)(4) disclaimer stating that the no legal services are being
rendered and that the protection of an attorney-client relationship does
not exist. We emphasize, however, that
even if the lawyer provides the disclaimer specified in Rule 5.7(a)(4),
it would not be effective if the lawyer actually provided legal advice
or other legal services to the customer of the nonlegal
business.
CONCLUSION
12. Where a
lawyer provides legal services to a client, the Rules of Professional
Conduct apply to the legal services. Where a lawyer provides nonlegal services to non-clients, the
Rules generally are not applicable to the provision of the nonlegal
services although some Rules of Professional Conduct would still
apply. Where the attorney provides no
legal services in connection with the provision of nonlegal services
such as those here – the sale of shelf corporations – but
the attorney’s status as a lawyer is visible to the public, then
absent a disclaimer or other steps, the recipients of the nonlegal
services could reasonably believe there is an attorney-client
relationship, and thus the Rules would apply.
28-08 (12/3/09)
[A1]1. Separating the digest from the facts makes this opinion sound
extremely broad. It would mean a lawyer selling flowers would need a disclaimer
if the lawyer’s status as a lawyer is disclosed. This needs to be limited to
the kind of services provided, which are close to legal services so that
someone could think that the lawyer was doing something
legal. That is
the reason for the suggestion to add the facts here and in the
conclusion.
2. The first two sentences of
the digest were really just part of our reasoning and were confusing
when set forth separately in the digest. They were not really talking
about the situation the opinion is addressing. I suggest collapsing them
into the final sentence as shown.
Related Files
Attorey's provision of nonlegal services (Adobe PDF File)
|