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New York State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics
Opinion #812 –
05/03/2007
Topic: Communication
with a represented party.
Digest: Unless prohibited by
state or local law, DR 7-104(A)(1) permits a lawyer representing a
private party before a town planning board to communicate with
individual planning board members about pending determinations
provided: (a) the proposed communications solely concern
policy issues; and (b) the lawyer gives planning board counsel
reasonable advance notice of the proposed communications.
Code: DR 7-104(A)(1); EC
7-15, 7-18.
QUESTION
- Over the objection of counsel
representing a town planning board, may in-house counsel for a real
estate development company communicate privately, separately, and
informally about the developer’s pending applications with
individual members of the board who support the developer’s
proposed project?
OPINION
- The inquirer is in-house counsel to a limited
liability company engaged in the business of shopping center
development. In that capacity, the inquirer is the “public
face” of the developer and represents the developer before various
government bodies to secure required land use permits and
approvals.
- The inquiry concerns a development project for which
a State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) review
and site plan and subdivision approvals are pending before a
seven-member town planning board. The project is controversial and
has engendered substantial public opposition. The town board,
which has no jurisdiction over the determinations to be issued by the
planning board, is said to support the shopping center project.
However, a majority of the members of the planning board, including the
planning board chair, are said to oppose the project.
- The planning board is represented with respect to the
shopping center project by outside counsel. The developer has also
secured outside counsel to “formally” represent the
developer before the planning board, limiting in-house counsel’s
role to communicating “separately and informally” on behalf
of the developer with the “more receptive” minority of
planning board members who support the project. The inquirer
states that these communications are “not in the nature of legal
advice or assistance” and are “not designed to supplant
guidance provided to the board by their own legal counsel.”
Rather, the separate communications “are confined to the provision
and receipt of factual information and the discussion of state and local
environmental and land use issues and polices” and are intended
“to ensur[e] that supportive members of the planning board have
the information they need to counter the opposition’s efforts to
derail the project, and are able to share facts and strategies with the
developer.” The developer thus seeks to create an even
playing field with “[m]embers of the public who oppose the project
[and who] communicate and strategize freely with like-minded members of
the planning board, without going through the board’s legal
counsel.”
- Counsel for the planning board has objected to the
separate, private communications regarding the project with individual
members of the planning board, and has directed that the inquirer limit
his communications to written submissions addressed to the planning
board secretary for distribution to the entire board and for inclusion
in the administrative record.
- Against this background, the inquirer asks whether he
may ethically persist in the “informal communications” with
individual members of the planning board.
- The inquiry is governed by DR
7-104(A)(1), known as the “no-contact” rule, which
provides:
During the course of the representation of a client a
lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate on the
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless the lawyer has the prior
consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by
law to do so.
See also EC 7-18.
- Because consent has clearly not been given, and
because the planning board is represented with respect to the matter,
the proposed communications are prohibited under the
“no-contact” rule unless within the meaning of DR
7-104(A)(1): (a) planning board members are not
“parties”; or (b) the communications are otherwise
“authorized by law.” We address each question in
turn.
1. Are
Planning Board Members “Parties”?
- The answer to this question is
controlled by application of the standard set forth by the New York
Court of Appeals for determining the “party” status of
employees of corporations and other entities for DR 7-104(A) purposes in
Niesig v. Team I:
The test that best balances the competing interests,
and incorporates the most desirable elements of the [various]
approaches, is one that defines “party” to include corporate
employees whose acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are
binding on the corporation (in effect, the corporation’s
“alter egos”) or imputed to the corporation for purposes of
its liability, or employees implementing the advice of counsel.[1]
- We have held the Niesig
test to be applicable to governmental units.[2] Thus, DR 7-104(A)(1), as interpreted by Niesig, prohibits “only communications
with government officials who have authority, individually or as part of
a larger body, to bind the government or to settle a litigable matter,
or whose act or omission gave rise to the matter in
controversy.”[3] Here, as the
planning board is invested with the power to issue binding SEQRA, site
plan and subdivision determinations with respect to the matter before
it, the Niesig “party” test is
satisfied.
- Are the Proposed Communications with the
Planning Board “Authorized by Law”?
- In N.Y. State 404 (1975) we recognized an
“implicit exception” to the broad no-contact prohibition of
DR 7-104(A)(1) where a “public body is involved,” based on
the “overriding public interest [which] compels that an
opportunity be afforded to the public and their authorized
representatives to obtain the views of, and pertinent facts from, public
officials representing them.” Accordingly, we opined that
private counsel could, without the consent of school district counsel,
properly communicate about a controversy with an individual member of a
school board who disagreed with the school board decision being
contested by the lawyer’s client. This sentiment –
that the literal application of the “no-contact” rule must
be tempered by constitutional considerations where the First Amendment
right to petition government is implicated – is shared by most
authorities.[4]
- This concern for protecting the First Amendment
interests of citizens to contact governmental decision makers has also
led to specific no-contact rule exceptions in California and the
District of Columbia.[5]
- The issue of whether a lawyer who is representing a
private party in a controversy may communicate about the matter with
responsible government officials without the prior consent of government
counsel has been comprehensively addressed by the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
in ABA 97-408. Noting the “tension between a citizen’s
right of access and the government’s right to be protected from
uncounselled communications by an opposing party’s
lawyer,”[6] the ABA Committee interpreted Model Rule 4.2, the functional
equivalent of DR 7?104(A)(1),[7] to allow unconsented
contacts with government officials that would otherwise have been
prohibited by the no-contact rule, but subject to three
conditions. First, the official to be contacted must have
authority to take or recommend action in the controversy. Second,
the sole purpose of the communication must be to address a policy
issue. Third, advance notice of the proposed communications must
be given to the lawyer representing the government official in the
matter so as to afford government counsel the opportunity to advise his
or her client with respect to the communication, including whether even
to entertain it.[8]
- Insofar as set forth in this opinion, we adopt the
approach taken in ABA Formal Op. 97-408 and here conclude, on the facts
presented, that the proposed communications fall within the protection
of the First Amendment right to petition. They are, therefore, not
prohibited by DR 7-104(A)(1), provided that counsel for the planning
board is given reasonable advance notice that such communications will
occur.[9] Although the precise parameters of the constitutional
right to petition are beyond our jurisdiction, we note that
communications directed to government officials who do not have the
authority to take or recommend action in the matter, or communications
that are intended to secure factual information relevant to a claim (for
example, mere witnesses to government misconduct), should both be fully
subject to the no-contact rule as, in each of these situations, there
are no First Amendment considerations at play.[10]
- Our resolution of this inquiry comes with several
important caveats. First, we do not opine on whether additional
“private,” “separate” or “informal”
communications with board members may violate a state statute or local
ordinance that governs planning board procedures, or whether such
communications may implicate a locally adopted ethics code.
Second, we do not here address ex parte communications with an
adjudicatory government body, such as a zoning board of appeals, which
present different considerations.[11] Third, the inquirer
may not deliberately elicit information that is protected by
attorney-client privilege or as attorney work product.[12] Fourth, the inquirer should cease contact with a
planning board member if the member so requests.[13]
CONCLUSION
- Absent the application of state or
local ordinances that prohibit or regulate the practice, and subject to
the qualifications set forth in this opinion, DR 7-104(A)(1) permits a
lawyer representing a private party before a town planning board to
communicate with individual planning board members about pending SEQRA,
site plan and subdivision determinations provided: (a) the proposed
communications solely concern municipal development policy issues; and
(b) the lawyer gives planning board counsel reasonable advance notice of
the proposed communications.
(37-06)
[1] 76
N.Y.2d 363, 374; 558 N.E.2d 1030, 1035; 559 N.Y.S.2d 493, 498
(1990).
[2] N.Y.
State 652 (1993); see also N.Y. State 768
(2003).
[3] N.Y.
State 652 (citing N.Y. City
1991-4 and Ohio Opinion 92-7).
[4] See, e.g., American Canoe Ass’n
Inc. v. St. Albans, 18 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (the right
to contact and communicate with government officials is a right of
citizenship); ABA Formal Op. 97-408 (1997) (Model Rule 4.2
“does not prohibit a lawyer representing a private party in a
controversy with the government from communicating directly with
government officials who have authority to take or recommend action in
the matter, provided the communication is solely for the purpose of
addressing a policy issue, including settling the controversy.”);
Alabama Opinion 2003-03 (lawyer defending employees and
officials of state board of education in suit by county board of
education may communicate directly with county board of education
members to discuss settlement); Kansas Opinion 00-06 (lawyer for zoning
applicant may contact city officials about client’s application
despite city attorney’s contrary directive because “a
citizen must always have access to his or her government”); Utah
Opinion 115 (1993) (lawyer may contact any employee of a represented
government agency after advising the employee of the matter in question
and of the lawyer’s representation therein); see also Restatement of Law
Governing Lawyers (Third) § 101(1), at 102 (2000) (“Unless otherwise provided by
law . . . the
prohibition . . . against contact with a represented
non-client does not apply to communications with employees of a
represented government agency or with a governmental officer being
represented in the officer’s official
capacity.”).
[5]
California Rule of Professional Conduct 2-100(C)(1) (providing that the
general no-contact rule “does not apply to communications with a
public officer, board, committee or body”); District of Columbia
Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2(d) (providing that the
District’s no-contact rule does not prohibit “communications
by a lawyer with government officials who have the authority to redress
the grievances of the lawyer’s client”).
[6] ABA
Formal Op. 97-408, at 7.
[7] Model
Rule 4.2 (Communication with Person Represented by Counsel)
provides: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless
the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so
by law or a court order.”
[8] ABA
Formal Op. 97-408, at 7-8.
[9] Cf. N.Y. State 768 (2003) (lawyer
representing government agency may be present and counsel the
lawyer’s own client at a meeting with a person known to be
represented in that matter without opposing counsel’s consent,
provided lawyer gives reasonable advance notice to opposing counsel of
lawyer’s intention to attend and does not communicate with
opposing party).
[10]
See ABA Formal Op. 97-408, at
8-9.
[11]
See EC 7-15 (“The nature and purpose of
proceedings before administrative agencies vary widely. The
proceedings may be legislative or quasi-judicial, or a combination of
both.”).
[12]
See N.Y. State 785
(2005).
[13]
Cf. EC 7-18 (“A lawyer who advises a client
with respect to communications with a represented person should also
advise the client against engaging in abusive, harassing or unfair
conduct.”).
Related Files
Opinion 812 (Adobe PDF File)
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