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Landmark Election Case Changes Voter
Registration By: Joseph
J. Savino and Daniel S. Szalkiewicz
On August 18, 2010, the Appellate
Division, Second Department handed down a landmark 5-0 decision,
redefining the Election Law in New York State[1]. The
decision allows voters to register and enroll with a new party upon
moving to a new county. The case involved Debra Ortutay, a candidate for
the New York Independence Party State Committee, and whether she was
required to wait until after the November general election in order to
register to vote and enroll in a new party.
The Supreme Court, relying on precedent,
held when a voter relocates from one county to another, a change in
party enrollment will not take effect until after the next general
election. Faga Savino, LLP, on behalf of Ms. Ortutay appealed the
Supreme Court decision to the Appellate Division, setting the grounds
for a judgment that would drastically change party enrollment
procedures.
To avoid the practice known as
“party raiding”, the New York State Legislature enacted
delay provisions for those enrolling with a new party. These sections
provide that upon moving from one address in a county to another within
the same county, the voter must wait until after the general election
for his change of enrollment to take effect. Another provision requires
that a voter be a resident of a county for at least thirty days before
they are able to register to vote.
Prior to 1992, a voter had the right to
transfer his registration from one county to another. The law defined
the term “move” as a physical relocation of the
voter’s residence, regardless of whether the relocation was done
inter- or intra-county. In the often cited case of Leemhuis v. Scranton[2], the
petitioner moved from Schenectady County to Saratoga County, and
immediately applied to change his voter registration. The Board of
Elections approved the change of enrollment, but required that the delay
provision apply, thereby making the change effective only after the
November 1988 election. The Supreme Court agreed with the Board of
Elections.
In 1996, as a response to the
implementation of the federal National Voter Registration Act (NVRA),
New York State made sweeping reforms to its Election Law. The NVRA
contemplated the treatment of counties within a state as separate units
of registrar jurisdiction. When New York incorporated the NVRA in the
Election Law, one of the keystone changes was the elimination of
transfer of registration between counties. As such, the election law now
defines transfer of enrollment and registration as only occurring
“in the city or county” of the registered voter. Section
5-400(1) was further amended to mandate that a voter’s
registration is cancelled if he or she “moved his residence
outside the county in which he is registered.”
Under the Election Law, a registered
voter has the ability to “change his enrollment” from one
party to a different party or from a “blank” to a party.
However, the change will be effective only after the next general
election.
B. Coopersmith v. Ortutay
and the non-existent transfer of registration
between counties.
In 1993, Debra Ortutay, under her maiden
name “Threet,” registered to vote in Kings County as a
“blank.” She voted in several elections, the latest being
the November 2009 election. In February 2010, Ms. Ortutay and her
husband, Michael Ortutay, moved to Rockland County, and in June 2010,
Ms. Ortutay registered to vote with the Rockland County Board of
Elections. At the time she filled out the New York State Voter
Registration Card, she used her legal name, Debra Ortutay, her new
Rockland County address, and included her date of birth and the last
four digits of her Social Security Number. She did not include the last
year she voted, her previous address, county, and that she was
previously registered under the name Debra Threet. Because of this
omission, the New York City Board of Elections was not notified of Ms.
Ortutay’s change in voter registration and, therefore, her Kings
County registration remained in an active status.
Ms. Ortutay proceeded to enroll with the
Independence Party, and circulated designating petitions for herself and
her husband to be the Male and Female member of the Independence Party
State Committee from the 94th Assembly District. She also
witnessed the petitions for her husband, a job that can only be done by
an enrolled member of the Independence Party.
Marsha Coopersmith and Cesar Perez
brought a Petition in New York State Supreme Court, under the Election
Law, seeking to invalidate the Ortutays’ designating
petitions. Coopersmith contended that, pursuant to the Election
Law, Ms. Ortutay’s registration as a member of the Independence
Party constituted a change of party enrollment and therefore was not in
effect until after the next General Election.
Through her lawyer, Joseph J. Savino, a
partner in the law firm Faga Savino, LLP, Ms. Ortutay argued that,
pursuant to Section 5-400(1) of the Election Law, a voter’s
registration is cancelled when she moves her residence outside the
county in which she is registered. By virtue of her move to Rockland
County, Ms. Ortutay’s Kings County registration should have been
cancelled by operation of law, allowing her to register anew in
Rockland, and then immediately become a member of the Independence Party
with all the rights and privileges of an enrolled
member.
Relying on Leemhuis, the Lower
Court agreed with Coopersmith and invalidated the Ortutays’
designating petitions. The Court held when a voter who is already
registered to vote seeks to change his or her enrollment from one party
to another, either by deleting his or her enrollment in a party or by
enrolling in a party when previously not enrolled, the change does not
become effective until the first Tuesday following the next general
election. Also relying on Espada v. New York City Board of
Elections[3], the lower court held that the cancellation of a
voter’s enrollment was not automatic. The Lower Court found that
the Election Law set forth the procedure for cancellation of a
voter’s registration and specifically that no such cancelation may
occur until the voter is notified by the Board of Elections of its
intention to cancel and given an opportunity to be heard.
- The Second Department’s
Decision
Attorney Savino brought an emergency
appeal before the Second Department, in an effort to remedy the errors
of the Supreme Court. On appeal, Mr. Savino argued that the
court’s reliance on Leemhuis was misplaced, because the
Election Law no longer allows a voter to transfer her registration from
one county to another. Mr. Savino further posited that the ruling would
deny Ms. Ortutay her constitutionally guaranteed right to vote. If she
were to return to Kings County to vote in the election, she would be
committing a felony because she was no longer a resident. Alternatively,
she was unable to vote in Rockland County because the lower court ruled
that she was not and cannot become a registered voter until after the
November 2010 election.
In their landmark decision, the Second
Department agreed with Mr. Savino. The Second Department held that when
Ms. Ortutay changed her residence from Kings County to Rockland County
and registered to vote, she moved outside the county in which she was
registered, and was no longer eligible to vote in Kings County. Thus,
Ms. Ortutay’s registration in Rockland County must be deemed a new
registration or re-registration, rather than a transfer of registration
and enrollment, and therefore not subject to the waiting period imposed
for change of enrollment.
- Effect of the Second Department
Decision and Changes to the Current Election Law.
The ruling in Coopersmith v.
Ortutay has a widespread effect on the Election Law throughout New
York State.
First, the holding negates twenty two
years of precedent by definitively overruling Leemhuis, and
stating that a voter is no longer able to transfer his registration
between counties.
Second, the court held that a voter is
only required to fill in the pertinent sections of the voter
registration card in order to be considered a register voter. Although
Ms. Ortutay voted in the 2009 general election under a different name
and different address, this omission from the card did not deny her to
right to register in Rockland County. As long as she provided the Board
of Elections with all required information, and two identifiers (her
date of birth and last four digits of her Social Security Number), there
is no bad faith on her behalf and she will still be considered an
enrolled voter.
Third, the decision stands for the
principle that a delay in administrative procedures cannot deny a person
the right to vote. Although Ms. Ortutay was still in the poll records as
being a registered voter in Kings County, this did not prevent Rockland
County from likewise including her name on their poll records, and
allowing her to vote in her new county.
Finally, notice that a previous voter
registration has been cancelled need not be given to the voter before
they are able to enroll in a new party. Ms. Ortutay did not receive a
notice from the New York City Board of Elections that her Kings County
registration was cancelled when she changed her residence. Solely by
operation of law, a voter’s registration is immediately and
automatically cancelled when they permanently change their residence
from one county to another.
Joseph J. Savino, Esq. and Daniel S.
Szalkiewicz, Esq. represented Debra and Michael Ortutay, the Appellants
in Coopersmith v. Ortutay and are associated with the law firm
Faga Savino, LLP., where Mr. Savino is a partner and Mr. Szalkiewicz is
of counsel. Faga Savino, LLP is a full service law firm that represents
clients in many different practice disciplines, throughout the Federal,
State and local justice systems in New York State.
[1] Coopersmith v. Ortutay, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2010 WL 3257640 (N.Y.A.D. 2
Dept.), 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 06437 (August 18, 2010). This is
incidentally the second time in three years that Mr. Savino and lawyers
from Faga Savino, LLP have worked on a matter redefining New York
State law. In May 2007, in a paternity law decision, Bronx Supreme
Court Justice Ellen Gesmer decided the case of Penny D. Taylor v. Joseph
Rosa, Case # 76026-04, a landmark ruling which materially affects the
application of the legal doctrine known as “Paternity by
Estoppel”.
[2] Leemhuis v.
Scranton, 141 Misc.2d
548 (NY Sup Ct. 1988).
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