Committee on Professional Ethics
Opinion 904
(1/30/12)
Topic: Communication with subject
of investigation known to be represented by counsel.
Digest: Under New York Rule 4.2(a), a
lawyer representing the victim of an alleged crime for purposes of
seeking restitution may not communicate with the subject of a criminal
investigation into the same facts if the victim’s lawyer knows
that the subject is represented by counsel with respect to the criminal
investigation unless the victim’s attorney has the prior consent
of that counsel, is authorized by law to communicate with the subject
directly, or the criminal defense attorney, upon inquiry, disavows
representation with respect to the restitution claim.
Rules: 1.0(k) &
(l), 4.2(a)
QUESTION
1. When an attorney is seeking restitution
for a client who is the victim of an alleged financial crime, may the
attorney communicate with the subject of a criminal investigation into
the same conduct, if the attorney knows that the subject is represented
by counsel with respect to that criminal investigation, without the
prior consent of that counsel?
OPINION
2. The inquiring attorney is representing
an investor (the “Investor”) who lost money in a particular
investment. The Investor believes that the investment manager
(the “Subject”) caused the loss by engaging in criminal
conduct. The Investor complained to authorities, who commenced a
criminal investigation of the Subject. The Subject has not yet
been indicted or arrested, but public news reports indicate that the
Subject is represented by legal counsel in the criminal
investigation. The inquirer does not question these reports, so we
assume the inquirer “knows” the Subject is represented by
counsel – at least in the criminal investigation – within
the meaning of Rule 1.0(k) (defining “knows” to denote
actual knowledge, but adding that knowledge “may be inferred from
circumstances”).
3. The Investor has asked the inquiring
attorney to contact the Subject directly – not through the
Subject’s counsel in the criminal matter – in an attempt,
outside the criminal process, to secure restitution of the
Investor’s losses. May the Investor’s lawyer
communicate with the Subject outside the presence of and without the
prior consent of the Subject’s counsel?
A.
Rule 4.2(a) (the
“no-contact” rule)
4. The relevant provision in the New York
Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Rules”) is Rule 4.2
(“Communication with Person Represented by Counsel”),
commonly called the “no-contact” rule. Rule
4.2(a) provides as follows:
In representing a client, a
lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate about the
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
prior consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by
law.
5. Thus, under Rule 4.2(a), if a lawyer
“knows” that a person is a represented “party”
in the same “matter” on which the lawyer represents a
client, then communicating with that person about that matter
(i.e., communicating about the “subject of the
representation”) is prohibited unless the lawyer either (i) has
the prior consent of the represented party’s counsel or (ii) the
communication is authorized by law. Neither exception applies
here.
B. Is the Subject
known to be represented “in the matter”?
6. In applying Rule 4.2(a), the first
question is whether the inquirer’s direct communication with the
Subject of the criminal investigation to discuss possible restitution
would be about the same “matter” in which the Subject is
represented by counsel. At a minimum, the Investor knows that
the Subject is represented in the criminal investigation. If the
question of civil restitution were deemed the same matter as the
criminal investigation, then discussing that matter with the Subject
would be prohibited by Rule 4.2(a).
7. The term “matter” is defined
in Rule 1.0(l) as follows:
‘‘Matter’’ includes any litigation,
judicial or administrative proceeding, case, claim,
application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract,
controversy, investigation, charge, accusation,
arrest, negotiation, arbitration, mediation or any other
representation involving a specific party or parties. [Emphasis
added.]
8. Thus, the term “matter”
expressly includes an “investigation” and a
“claim.” Here, the prosecutor’s criminal
investigation and the inquiring attorney’s civil claim for
restitution are inextricably intertwined.[1] Yet they also differ in some ways because the
criminal investigation involves parties, processes and issues peculiar
to determinations of criminal responsibility. For example, the
prosecutor is a party to the criminal but not the civil matter while the
Investor is a party to the civil but not the criminal matter.
Because the two matters are not the same, and for the reasons discussed
in paragraph 12 below, the criminal investigation and the civil
restitution claim should be considered two related matters rather than a
single unitary matter.
9. Given that the civil and criminal
matters are distinct, the next question is whether the Subject’s
attorney in the criminal investigation also represents him in the civil
restitution matter. (The public news reports mentioned above
apparently do not address that question, and even the discussions that
gave rise to the attorney-client relationship between the Subject and
his attorney may not have addressed it.) The inquiring attorney
has strong reason to believe that – if the question were presented
to the Subject and his attorney – the scope of the representation
would include both the criminal matter and the civil restitution
matter. As noted above, the civil and criminal aspects are closely
related. Perhaps most important, the Subject’s chosen
approach to the civil restitution matter could, in various ways,
substantially affect his prospects in the criminal matter. For
example, if the Subject makes substantial restitution, he may be less
likely to be prosecuted on criminal charges. On the other hand, if
he is prosecuted despite making restitution, his conduct or words in the
course of making restitution might be used against him in the criminal
matter.
10. Given the close relationship between the
matters and the strong possibility that the scope of representation by
the criminal attorney also includes the civil restitution matter, the
inquiring attorney may not ignore the no-contact rule or assume it to be
inapplicable. Our prior opinions make clear that “when
a lawyer has a reasonable basis to believe that a party may be
represented by counsel, then the lawyer has a duty of inquiry to
ascertain whether that party is in fact represented by counsel in
connection with a particular matter. The necessary extent of such
an inquiry will depend on the circumstances of a particular
matter.” N.Y. State 768 (2003) (citing N.Y.
State 735 (2001), N.Y. State 728 (2000), and N.Y. State 663
(1994)). One of the precedents – N.Y. State 728 – is
particularly apposite, given the similarity between its facts and those
presented by the current inquiry.
11. When the lawyer not only has a
reasonable basis to believe that the party is represented by counsel,
but also has a way of ascertaining the name of that counsel, then
ordinarily the inquiry must be to the other party’s putative
counsel rather than to the party directly.[2] That is the case here. The inquiring attorney
should initially contact the Subject’s criminal defense attorney,
not the Subject. If the criminal defense attorney says he does not
represent the Subject on the civil matter, then Rule 4.2 does not apply
and the inquiring attorney may contact the Subject directly regarding
the restitution matter. But if the criminal defense attorney says
he does represent the Subject as to the question of civil restitution,
then Rule 4.2 would apply. Our conclusion is supported by the
policy underlying the no-contact rule, because the Subject could suffer
significant harm in the criminal investigation if he were to make
unguarded statements or admissions to the Investor’s lawyer about
the underlying facts.
12. The fact that the scope of criminal
defense counsel’s representation may or may not include the civil
matter is one reason for our conclusion that the civil and criminal
matters, while closely related, should be deemed two distinct matters
for purposes of Rule 4.2. If they were considered the same
matter, and yet the criminal attorney did not represent the subject as
to civil restitution, then it might be impossible for the
Investor’s attorney to engage in any discussion with the Subject
about civil restitution – even if desired by the Subject –
because to comply with Rule 4.2(a) the inquiring attorney would have to
seek “prior consent” from an attorney who lacked authority
to provide it. Of course the Subject may not wish to have
such discussions with the inquiring attorney, but the rules of legal
ethics should leave that choice in the hands of the Subject and his
counsel (if any) in the restitution matter.
C. Is
the Subject a “party” within the meaning of Rule
4.2?
13. The remaining question in applying Rule
4.2(a) is whether the Subject of the criminal investigation is a
“party,” within the meaning of Rule 4.2, to the civil
restitution matter about which the Investor’s attorney seeks to
communicate. In the narrowest sense, the term “party”
means a plaintiff or defendant (or the equivalent) in pending
litigation. But this Committee has never read the term
“party” so narrowly. Rather, in civil matters, the
definition of “party” as used in Rule 4.2 – and in the
definition of “matter” in Rule 1.0(l) – is not
limited to formal parties to litigation. In N.Y. State 735 (2001),
which addressed “noncriminal matters,” we stated that the
no-contact rule “applies to one who retains counsel in connection
with a dispute even prior to the filing of a lawsuit; and during a civil
lawsuit it applies to represented witnesses, potential witnesses and
others with an interest or right at stake, although they are not nominal
parties to the lawsuit.”
14. In N.Y. State 607 (1990), we made clear
that formal commencement of an adversarial proceeding in a civil matter
is not necessary to trigger an attorney's ethical duties under Rule 4.2.
There, the inquirer represented a party injured in a
car accident. The inquirer wished to write a letter about the
accident to the driver that collided with his client, but did not know
if the driver was represented by counsel at that pre-litigation
stage. We opined that the term “party” encompassed a
potential litigant and that “the absence of a formal commencement
of adversarial proceedings did not vitiate” the no-contact
rule. The Third Department echoed this view and cited N.Y. State
607 in McHugh ex rel. Kurtz v. Fitzgerald, 719 N.Y.S.2d 785 (3d
Dep’t 2001), which stated that “commencement of the
litigation is not the criteria for determining whether communication
with an adverse party is in derogation of” the no-contact rule.
Rather, the McHugh court expressly stated that a lawyer can
violate the no-contact rule even where litigation has not commenced. In
light of these authorities, we conclude that the Subject is a
“party” to the restitution matter for purposes of Rule
4.2(a) whether or not formal litigation seeking restitution has
commenced.
15. Our opinion does not address the
conduct of prosecutors and criminal defense counsel and in particular
does not decide who qualifies as a “party” in criminal
matters. Our opinion addresses only lawyers representing clients
in civil matters.
CONCLUSION
16. An attorney representing the victim of
an alleged crime for purposes of seeking restitution may not contact the
subject of a criminal investigation into the same facts if the
attorney for the victim knows that the subject is represented by counsel
with respect to the criminal investigation unless (a) the attorney for
the victim has the prior consent of that counsel; (b) the attorney is
authorized by law to communicate with the subject directly; or (c) the
criminal defense attorney, upon inquiry, disavows representation with
respect to the restitution claim.
(73-09)
[1] The criminal investigation and the
civil restitution claim are closely related in several ways.
First, they arise out of the same facts and have one party in common
(the Subject). Second, the Investor is both a claimant seeking
civil restitution and the complaining witness whose report led to the
criminal investigation. Third, the question of restitution to the
Investor may arise in the potential criminal case as well as in any
private discussions between the inquiring attorney and the
Subject.
[2] See N.Y. County Lawyers 708 (1995)
(where
inquiring attorney knew that plaintiff had previously been represented
by counsel in the matter, inquirer had an “independent duty”
under the no-contact rule “to verify that plaintiff was no longer
represented. It would not have been sufficient to rely on the word
of plaintiff alone”); Matter of Searer, 950 F. Supp. 811 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
(lawyer was disciplined for meeting with criminal defendant based on
defendant’s statement that his lawyer consented to the meeting
when in fact his lawyer had not consented); N.Y. City 2009-1
(“while consent may be inferred from the conduct or acquiescence
of the represented person’s lawyer, a lawyer communicating with a
represented person without securing the other lawyer’s express
consent runs the risk of violating the no-contact
rule”).
Related Files
Ethics Opinion 904 (Adobe PDF File)
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