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- New York State Bar Association
Environmental Law Section
- Friday, January 28, 2005
- TOXIC TORTS TODAY – IT’S A REAL GAS
- Section Chair
Virginia C. Robbins, Esq.
- Program Co-Chairs
Stanley N. Alpert, Esq.
Walter E. Mugdan, Esq.
Cheryl P. Vollweiler, Esq.
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- New York State Bar Association Environmental Law Section
- Matthew Traister, P.E.
- O’Brien & Gere
- 5000 Brittonfield Parkway
- Syracuse, NY 13221
- January 28, 2005
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- Description of the VI problem
- Historical Considerations
- Key VI Drivers
- Program Elements
- VI Program Uncertainties
- Where is New York headed?
- Recommendations
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- Revised Toxicity + Unexpected Empirical Data = The “Perfect Storm” …
- and, possibly, a new environmental paradigm!
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- Site Screening
- GW, Soil Vapor, Indoor Air Sampling
- Mitigation System Design, Construction, Installation
- Rigorous QA/QC
- Data Management
- Public Relations
- Ambient Air Modeling, Monitoring
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- Subslab Depressurization - Basement
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- Special Design and Construction Issues
- Dirt floors
- Sumps
- Slab and wall penetrations/cracks
- Accessible crawl spaces
- Inaccessible spaces (heated and unheated)
- Laid-up stone walls
- Open-top block foundation walls
- ACMs
- Condensation
- HVAC ductwork
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- Depressurization system costs dependent on:
- Number of systems being installed as part of overall project
- Program support requirements
- Data management
- Public relations
- Sampling
- Ability of subslab conditions to “communicate” pressure gradient
- Size and complexity of structure being mitigated
- “Typical” system cost ranges from $3,000 to $20,000 ($20k for new HVAC
installations)
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- See state agencies for guidance/standards
- Lack of consensus
- Based on exposure and toxicity assumptions that may not be consistent
with current science
- Based on toxicity criteria, which are subject to change
- OSWER guidance based on residential chronic exposure
- RBCs assume 350 days, 30 years, etc.
- Cancer risk of 10-6, 10-5 (for EIs), or 10-4
- Workplace
- OSHA PELs: for industrial/commercial settings with existing OSHA
programs for the specific compounds
- State/EPA guidance: for all other settings
- OSHA and EPA currently “playing hot potato”
- Background is a big issue
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- Draft guidance for re-opening sites issued November 22, 2004
- Other guidance still being developed:
- Introduction
- Investigating the pathway
- Protocols for testing and analysis
- Data evaluation
- QA/QC
- Comparison criteria
- Recommended actions
- NYSDOH Indoor air sampling and analysis guidance - currently available
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- Corporate and State Approaches are Diverse
- Develop a strong team of resources (consultants, legal counsel, public
relations and analytical)
- Be proactive!
- Public meetings/dissemination of project details are an important part
of any VI program.
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- Risk Depends on Toxicity and Exposure
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- The evaluation of scientific information on the hazardous properties
of chemicals, the dose-response relationship, and on the extent of
human exposure to those agents. The product of the risk assessment is
a statement regarding the probability that populations or individuals
will be harmed and to what degree.
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- Determination of whether a chemical is or is not linked causally to
particular adverse effect (toxicity).
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- The determination of the quantitative relationship between
- the exposure to a chemical
- and
- the incidence or severity of the
effect.
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- ALL CHEMICALS ARE POISONS.
- THERE IS NONE WHICH IS NOT A
POISON.
- THE RIGHT DOSE DIFFERENTIATES A
POISON FROM A REMEDY.
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- Threshold Dose
- Range of Observation (Points of Departure)
- Range of Extrapolation
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- The dose below which an adverse health effect is not expected is the
threshold.
- Effects with threshold: effects expected at and above threshold dose
- Effects without threshold: effects expected at all doses above zero
- A chemical can cause effects with a threshold and effects without a
threshold.
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- An estimate
- with uncertainty spanning an order of magnitude
- of an ambient air level (mg/m3)
- for the human population (including
sensitive subgroups)
- that is likely to be without risk of deleterious effects during a
lifetime of continuous exposure.
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- Identify most sensitive effect, critical study, relevant species
- Identify NOEL, LOEL, or BMD (mg/kg/day or mg/m3)
- Select Uncertainty Factor (UF) - used to compensate for inadequate
knowledge about the toxicity of the chemical
- Divide NOEL, LOEL or BMD by UF
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- Upper-bound estimate of the probability of a response per unit intake of
a chemical over a lifetime (a slope, the change in risk with a change in
dose).
- Used to estimate upper-bound probability of an individual developing
cancer as a result of a lifetime of exposure to a particular level of a
potential carcinogen.
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- Determination of the amount, duration and frequency of actual or
estimated exposure of people to a chemical that can adversely affect
health.
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- Estimation:
- Obtain data on measured or estimated levels of chemicals in the
environment (e.g., indoor air data).
- Apply data on contact rates, behavior, body mass, etc.
- Estimate dose levels.
- Measurement:
- Biomonitoring (e.g., exhaled breath, blood, urine samples).
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- Man-made chemical pollutants
- petroleum spills - may attenuate
to some extent
- solvents - e.g. trichloroethylene, tetrachloroethylene - don’t readily
attenuate, very mobile
- Naturally occurring pollutants
- radon
- water vapor
- methane
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- Indoor Air Sampling
- Provides direct evidence of the presence of a contaminant.
- Snapshot in time.
- Potential interference of other indoor sources.
- When to sample (e.g., heating season vs. summer).
- Where to sample (e.g., basement vs. living space).
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- Modeling
- Should require confirmatory sampling.
- Screening tool: may be useful for suggesting the potential for vapor
intrusion concerns.
- Site-specific applicability.
- Not applicable in all situations (certain site- and building specific
limitations).
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- The process of organizing, evaluating, and communicating information
about the nature, strength of evidence, and the likelihood of adverse
health effects from particular
exposures.
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- Depends Upon:
- State versus federal causes of action or claims
- Perceived value of state court juries
- Perceived value of pre-trial motion practice and value or detriment to
multiple appeals in New York State courts
- Perceived value of federal court supervision of discovery
- Perceived value of multi-district federal litigation
- Genuine availability of federal claims, recently expanded by MDL judge
in MTBE litigation
- References:
- In re MTBE Litigation, 2004 WL 515535 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Scheindlin, J.)
- Finding federal officer jurisdiction over oil companies in MTBE cases
- In re MTBE Litigation, 2004 WL 1969121 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Scheindlin,
J.)
- Finding no federal officer jurisdiction in non-federal mandate states,
but asserting federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
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- RCRA – Resource Conservation & Recovery Act
- CERCLA – Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation &
Liability Act
- There may be others – most federal environmental statutes have citizen
suit provisions but they usually deal with permit violations and they
provide for civil penalties to the government as the prime remedy,
though injunctive relief may be available. See Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
Toxic Substances Control Act, etc.
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- Citizen Suits Provision
- RCRA, 42 U.S.C.6972(a)(1)(B), provides that injunctive relief may be
issued against:
- any person * * * including any past or present generator, past or
present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a
treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment.
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- “Plaintiffs need not show actual harm to health or the environment. It is enough to show that such an
endangerment may exist. Interfaith Community Org. v. Honeywell Int'l,
Inc., supra, 188 F.Supp.2d at 503 (citing 3 S. Cooke, The Law of
Hazardous Waste, § § 15.01[3][e]
at 15-11 n. 45-47 (2001)). See
also
- Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., supra, 516 U.S. at 486, 116 S.Ct. 1251
(imminence "implies that there must be a threat which is present
now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until
later");
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- “In Price v. United States Navy, supra, 39 F.3d at 1019, the Ninth
Circuit stated:
- A finding of "imminency" does not require a showing that
actual harm will occur immediately so long as the risk of threatened
harm is present: "An
'imminent hazard' may be declared at any point in a chain of events
which may ultimately result in harm to the public." Imminence refers "to the nature
of the threat rather than identification of the time when the
endangerment initially arose."
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- “RCRA is not only concerned with threats to human health. Suit may also be brought where there
may be "an imminent and substantial endangerment to * * * the
environment." 42 U.S.C.
6972(a)(1)(B); PMC, Inc. v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir.1998) (imminent and
substantial danger where toxic wastes were buried and posed a
"constant danger to the groundwater * * *"); Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136
F.Supp.2d 81, 115 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (imminent and substantial endangerment
under RCRA based on harm to environment, even though plaintiffs conceded
no harm to human health); Raymond K. Hoxsie Real Estate Trust v. Exxon
Educ. Found., 81 F.Supp.2d 359, 367 (D.R.I.2000) (liability under RCRA
may be based solely on contamination of groundwater and/or soil at the
site in levels "exceeding state standards" because "the
statute clearly speaks of endangerment to the 'environment' "
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- United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2001):
- Not precisely on point, and a criminal case, but highly persuasive. After a three-and-a-half-week trial, a
jury convicted Elias of four RCRA criminal offenses, the most serious of
which was disposing of hazardous waste without a permit, knowing that
his actions placed others in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
6928(e).
- “Elias ordered four of his employees to enter a tank and wash
cyanide-laced sludge out a valve opening in the end, without safety
equipment. One issue was whether
the waste was “hazardous” (as opposed to merely a “solid waste”), under
the hazardous waste definition of “reactivity.”
- The Court stated: “If a sample from one part of the tank contains wastes
reactive enough to cause brain damage to someone, there can be no
conceivable purpose in sending other people into the tank to extract
more samples. Indeed, under
these circumstances, retrieving additional samples would actually
disserve RCRA's objectives.
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- “The district court concluded that it would be preferable to have some
numerically-quantified, test-based standard for determining whether a
substance releasing cyanide gas should be deemed hazardous but that this
is not possible given the variety of situations and circumstances in
which cyanide may exist and pose a hazard.”
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- Interfaith Community Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d 796
(D.N.J. 2003):
- “The Court finds that a straightforward reading of RCRA compels a
finding that only active human involvement with the waste is subject to
liability under RCRA §
7002(a)(1)(B). In this
regard, RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B)
provides that liability may attach only if a person "has
contributed or is contributing to the handling, storage treatment,
transportation or disposal of a solid or hazardous waste that may pose
an imminent or substantial endangerment to human health or the
environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
The ordinary meaning of "contribute" is "to act as a
determining factor." Webster's II New Riverside University
Dictionary (1998). Thus, Congress
intended to impose liability only where a person is shown to have
affirmatively acted as a determining factor over the waste management
activities listed in RCRA 7002(a)(1)(B).
No other reading is possible as the phrase "has contributed
or is contributing to" in §
7002(a)(1)(B) modifies the specified waste management activities
of "handling," "treatment,"
"transportation," "storage" and "disposal"
in that provision.
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- Sampling Program to Delineate the Problem
- Vapor filtration systems in the buildings
- Removal of the solid or hazardous wastes, through pump and treat, soil
excavation, or other means
- Other viable remediation techniques
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- By Stephen G. Schwarz, Esq.
- Faraci & Lange, LLP
- Rochester, New York
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- Negligence
- Trespass
- Private Nuisance
- Public Nuisance
- All require different levels of culpable conduct. Only strict liability in NY on
limited statutory claims (e.g. oil spill)
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- Landowner who engages in activities that may cause injury to persons on
adjoining premises surely owes those persons a duty to take reasonable
precautions to avoid injuring them.” (see, e.g., Weitzmann v Barber
Asphalt Co.
- Must be some physical injury to person or property. 535 Madison Ave. v. Finlandia
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- Beck v FMC Corp.
- Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v FMC Corp.
- Explosion at FMC plant. Dunlop
plant physically damaged by debris.
Chevrolet plant 1 mile away closed due to power
interruption. Dunlop can recover
for property damage, employees (Beck et al., ) of Chevrolet plant cannot
sue for lost wages.
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- “Trespass is an intentional harm at least to this extent: while the trespasser, to be liable,
need not intend or expect the damaging consequence of his intrusion, he
must intend the act which amounts to or produces the unlawful invasion,
and the intrusion must at least be the immediate or inevitable
consequence of what he willfully does, or which he does so negligently
as to amount to willfulness.” Phillips
v. Sun Oil Co.
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- “[O]ne is subject to liability for a private nuisance if his conduct is
a legal cause of the invasion of the interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land and such invasion is
- (1) intentional and unreasonable;
- (2) negligent or reckless, or
- (3) actionable under the rules governing liability for abnormally
dangerous conditions or activities”
Copart v. Consolidated Edison,
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- A public, or as sometimes termed a common, nuisance is an offense
against the State and is subject to abatement or prosecution on
application of the proper governmental agency. It consists of conduct or omissions which
offend, interfere with or cause damage to the public in the exercise of
rights common to all. Copart Industries Inc. v. Consolidated Edison
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- Public nuisance claims can be brought as private actions by aggrieved
parties, but only if they can show that they suffered a particular harm
not common to the public at large.
Burns Jackson v. Linder
- The fact that multiple persons are injured does not make the nuisance
such a common one as to exclude redress by a private individual
- When the class harmed in the same way ‘becomes so large and general as
to include all members of the public who come in contact with the
nuisance… the private action must fail.’” NAACP v. Acusport, Inc.
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- These cases arose out of a building collapse and a crane accident in
Manhattan which each shut down businesses for a number of blocks in
midtown.
- Court of appeals said that purely economic loss suffered by businesses
and individuals was common damage and not “particular harm required”.
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- The general rule in New York is that the measure of damages for injury
to real property is the lesser of the repair costs or the diminution of
market value. Jenkins v. Etlinger,
- There is no requirement that the plaintiff prove both measures of
damage. In Jenkins v. Etlinger,
55 NY2d 35 (1982), the Court of
Appeals held that when claiming damage to real property, the plaintiff
need establish the amount of damages under only one measure, even though
others may also be appropriate.
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- Discomfort and inconvenience -“It is well settled that discomfort and
inconvenience caused by a disturbance to real property are valid grounds
of recovery in an action to recover damages for a nuisance” Taylor v. Liardi
- Emotional injuries “There is some authority that damages may be awarded
for emotional distress caused by the nuisance” Mehlenbacher v. Azko Salt Inc,
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- Damages for personal injury can be recovered under all theories.
- Medical Monitoring Damages - Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp.
- Stigma Damages - controversial
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- By: Cheryl P. Vollweiler, Esq.
- Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP
- 150 East 42 Street
- New York, New York 10017
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- 2001: Timely Adventures, Inc. v.
Coastal Mart, Inc. – Texas jury awards $102 million award ($2m
compensatory; $100m exemplary damages) for “potential harm” from a gas
pool 30 feet underground with a potential for vapors to migrate
vertically (no evidence of intrusion)
- 2004: Colorado jury awarded over
$1 million against a Denver company held responsible for causing vapor
intrusion into homes in a residential neighborhood after spending $10
million + remediating groundwater plume believed to be the source of the
vapor, testing 700+ homes and installing remediation systems in 300+
homes
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- 2004: absentee landlord in
Indiana notified by EPA that indoor air sampling at nearby homes and
businesses found levels of hazardous chemicals in amounts higher than
IDEM sub-chronic action levels.
Chemicals consistent with dry cleaning chemicals (former tenant
was a dry cleaner).
- EPA sought voluntary response activities to determine nature/extent of
contamination and stop/control migration of chemicals. Estimated response cost $800,000.
- EPA issued administrative order under CERCLA sec. 106 directing landlord
to give notice of intent to comply or face civil penalties up to $32,500
per violation per day plus punitive damages up to treble response costs
- Landlord complied.
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- EPA
- DEC
- Department of Health (may have statutory authority to require the
facility to address the contamination)
- Citizen Suits (?)
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- Negligence
- Trespass
- Public Nuisance
- Private Nuisance
- CERCLA
- RCRA
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- Cost of corrective action
- Diminution in property value
- Stigma damages
- Medical monitoring
- Punitive damages
- Costs of litigation
- Equitable and injunctive relief
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- Potential claim splitting
- If a P recovers for “fear of”/cancerphobia but develops a disease years
later, can P sue again for actual injury?
- Courts are split
- PA – can’t recover for distress damages in anticipation of cancer, but
can sue if future illness develops Simmons v. Pacor 674 A.2d 222 (Pa.
1996)
- 5th Circuit: can
recover distress damages but can’t sue again for later developing
illness/injury Gideon v. Johns-Manville 761 F.2d 1129 (5th
Cir,. 1985)
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- Kentucky: if P recovers for
medical monitoring, cannot sue for later illness Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Labs, 82 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 2002)
- Florida: can recover medical
monitoring and sue a second time for developing the feared
illness/injury Petito v. A.H. Robins, 750 So. 2d 103 (Fl. App. 2000)
- U.S. Supreme Court: under FELA P cannot recover medical monitoring
without a showing of some actual disease Metro-North Railroad v.
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1999)
- In a class action, could be huge future exposure long after all other
aspects are resolved and closed
- Absent a definitive statement from a high court, Defendants may never be
able to buy their peace
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- New scientific theory on how particular toxins cause a gene’s expression
to change on a cellular and molecular level
- Based on DNA microarrays or chips which simultaneously monitor a gene’s
expression
- Could be used to determine whether a particular gene sequence has
changed in a way that is associated with cancer or other disease(s)
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- Possible uses:
- Prove or disprove causation in all types of toxic tort exposure cases
- Negate causation by showing a genetic predisposition or expression
consistent with exposure to some other product or toxin
- Show cancer or illness pre-dated exposure to toxin
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- Very new theory and reliability has not yet been established
- Critics argue that testing 1 or 2 genes ignores environmental factors
that can contribute to onset of disease
- Stress and other external factors can affect gene expression
- Some changes in gene expression have nothing to do with toxicity (e.g.,
apparently, eating Brussels Sprouts and exposure to Dioxin have same
impact on gene expression)
- Requires expert testimony and will have to pass Daubert requirements
before it can be a useful tool
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- Despite $100 million exemplary damages award in Texas soil vapor
intrusion suit in 2001, U.S. Supreme Court 2003 decision in State Farm
v. Campbell limits amount of
punitive damages that will pass constitutional muster
- In addition to applying BMW v. Gore guideposts, Court opined that a
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of 4:1 is “close to the line”
and an award with a ratio greater than single digits (9:1) would rarely,
if ever, be appropriate
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- Carter v. Monsanto Corp., 575 S.E.2d 342 (W.V. 2002)
- P commenced class action on behalf of property owners abutting a creek
downstream from 2 landfills alleging private nuisance
- Ds were responsible for contaminating landfill with dioxin which spread
to adjacent waterways and downstream to creek
- P attempted to recover monitoring costs for future property damage
because creek water potentially deposited toxins on Ps property
- Ps argued that landfill owners and polluters should pay to quantify
amount of dioxin on P’s property plus monitoring for future damage based on evidence of “a
well-founded fear” of future property damage , which shifted the burden
to Ds to test/monitor
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- Court rejected the argument opining that “Fear alone is not enough to
recover under private nuisance law”.
(Id.)
- Distinguished from medical monitoring cases based on absence of any
exposure to a hazardous substance here
- P ordered to pay own costs for evidence-gathering for the nuisance claim
- Court did not specifically foreclose potential for property monitoring
if P can establish exposure plus reasonable fear
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- Statue of limitations
- Standing (issue if citizen suits are permitted)
- Venue
- Historically, federal court is D’s preferred venue
- Recent decisions may temper this:
- MTBE MDL - Judge Scheindlin
decisions re: federal officer jurisdiction – Ps argued that even though
Ds used MTBE at the direction of EPA, use of MTBE in states outside the
federal Reformulated Gasoline (RFG) program (CA, FL, IN, IO, KS, LA,
VT, VA and WV) were not subject to federal jurisdiction and should be
remanded
- Judge ruled Federal officer jurisdiction existed for CA, IN, VT and VA
but not for FL, IO, KS, LA and WV), but kept jurisdiction based on
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction
- Had a D not been insolvent, effect would have been to dismantle a piece
of the MDL and send it back to 5 other state courts for further
proceedings
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- December 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cooper Industries v.
Aviall Services, Inc., 125 S.Ct. 577 (2004)
- Contribution issue – court held that a liable party cannot sue another
for contribution toward cleanup costs for a CERCLA contaminated site
without first being involved in a civil action or settlement with the
EPA
- Reversed a 5th Circuit decision that permitted Aviall to sue
Cooper under CERCLA sec. 113(f) even though no civil action had been
commenced by EPA under sec. 106 or 107
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- Aviall purchased 4 airplane engine maintenance facilities in TX from
Cooper in 1981. While operating
the facilities, petroleum and other hazardous substances from spills and
leaky USTs contaminated the groundwater.
- Pollution continued while Aviall operated sites, but Aviall discovered
it in a few years and reported it to the Natural Resource Conservation
Commission.
- NRCC sent out notices of violation but never contacted Aviall or
designated the facilities as contaminated sites
- In 1984, Aviall began a decade-long multi-million dollar remediation
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- Aviall sued Cooper in Texas federal court seeking contribution under
CERCLA 107(a)
- Amended complaint to assert contribution claim under 113(f)(1) which
provides that “any person may seek contribution from any other person
potentially liable under 107… during or following any civil action under
106 or 107.”
- Savings clause of sec. 113 provides:
- “nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to
bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under
Section 106 or 107.”
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- U.S. Supreme Court in 7-2 vote held that section 113(f)(1) does not
authorize Aviall’s contribution suit nor does the savings clause give
Aviall a cause of action against Cooper Adopted a narrow interpretation
that 113 authorizes contribution claims only “during or after a 106 or
107 civil action”.
- Court refused to address whether Aviall could recover cleanup costs
under 107(a)(4)(B) even though it is a PRP; or whether Aviall has an
implied right to contribution under 107
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- Dissenting Justices Ginsberg and Stevens opined that Key Tronic v. U.S.,
511 U.S. 809 (1999) specifically held that a cause of action for
contribution exists for PRPs to seek recovery of cleanup costs and 5th
Circuit properly viewed sec. 107 to give Aviall a cause of action, and
sec. 113(f)(1) to provide the procedural framework
- Questionable effect – if a D voluntarily remediates before EPA commences
an action, Aviall decision suggests possible forfeiture of right to
contribution under federal law (Aviall does not impact any state cause
of action for contribution)
- Should a D wait to be sued by EPA to preserve contribution right rather
than acting voluntarily to remediate?
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- Standing - Supreme Court has
adopted liberal view of who has standing to commence a citizen action so
need to address it realistically and avoid unnecessary motion practice
- P must allege cognizable injury in fact caused by unlawful activity and
injury must be redressable (requires more than just an interest that
all citizens have in lawful and constitutional governance) See, Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
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- Adequate Notice – federal courts strictly enforce 60 day notice
requirement as a mandatory prerequisite for commencement of citizen
action Hallstom v. Tillamook, 493 U.S. 20 (1989)
- Not all states adhere to the equivalent state notice requirements for
citizen suits
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- Civil penalties: P can seek civil
penalties of the violation is not substantially corrected before the
citizen action is filed (not concluded) Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
- No jurisdiction for wholly past violations
- If violations corrected before suit ends, can defend on showing of no
ongoing violation or imminent threat of harm
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- Citizens cannot sue if the state or federal government has commenced and
is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal court action to correct
the violation
- D cannot collaborate with state agencies to hasten a lawsuit just to
avoid a citizen suit, but quickly moving along a state enforcement
action to conclusion may avoid a citizen suit
- Spilt in the Circuit Courts as to what is a sufficient state action (3rd
Cir. Says administrative enforcement action is adequate; 2nd,
5th and 9th Circuits require actual civil or
criminal court action) to bar a citizen action
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88
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- Effective and efficient defense of a citizen suit requires prompt and
accurate analysis of the likelihood of P’s success and early resolution
effort if it appears that P has sustainable claim
- Mediation may be a good option to avoid liability and civil penalties
even before a citizens suit is commenced
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89
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- Early internal and external coordination of resources is critical
- Document D’s story early and thoroughly by collecting documents and
interviewing witnesses long before first round of discovery responses
are due to establish a clear defense strategy early
- Crisis management may be advisable at early stages to coordinate
multiple legal, commercial, news media, science, public relations,
government relations, industry-wide relations that co-exist and operate
simultaneously
- Realistically assess D’s most reasonable and cost effective resolution
strategy as early as possible and move toward that goal (alternate
dispute resolution? Settlement?)
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90
|
- Work with the government where possible to resolve issues
- Use PR tools to educate the public/ consumers who are potential class
action Ps
- Keep litigation costs down (e.g.,
MDLs or state consolidations where possible, early intervention to
address pre-litigation claims, early settlements at reasonable figures
that will not encourage additional claims)
- Insurers are not your enemies
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91
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- WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER LLP
- 150 East 42 Street
- New York, NY 10017
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92
|
- Michele Schroeder
- michele.schroeder@zurichna.com
- Assistant Vice President
- and Counsel
- Zurich Environmental and Design Professional
|
|
93
|
|
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94
|
- Sites
- Environmental Impairment Liability and Cleanup*
- Real Estate Environmental Liability
- Remediation Stop Loss aka Cost Cap
- Post Remediation Care (Institutional Controls)
- Asbestos and/or Lead In Place
- Lender Collateral Protection
- Storage Tank Liability*
- Services
- Contractors Pollution Liability
- Professional Environmental Consultants
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|
95
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- Claims made coverage
- Unknown pollution - fortuitous risk
- First party discovery trigger (selected site policies)
- governmental authority requirement
- cleanup costs only, except costs to confirm pollution
- Third party claim trigger (all policies)
- demand
- bodily injury, property damage, cleanup, nrd
- Known pollution
- cost cap - capitate costs above SIR for remediation plan
- re-openers - remedy failure
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96
|
- Pollution event - inorganic
- “...discharge, dispersal, release or escape of any solid, liquid,
gaseous or thermal irritant, contaminant or pollutant, including,
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste…”
- Example of common vapor intrusion contaminants
- chlorinated solvents, methane
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97
|
- Microorganisms including fungus, bacteria,viruses, protozoa, chlamydiae,
rickettsiae, including any other disease or biogenic structure caused or
produced directly or indirectly by a microorganism
- Common cold, flu or allergy-like symptoms
- Legionnarie’s disease
- Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
- Public Health concern vs. Environmentally regulated material
- *policy contains naturally occurring materials and microbial matter
exclusion
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98
|
- Indoor air quality - monitoring and mitigation systems
- Trespass/nuisance/tort - odor, bodily injury (tangible and intangible)
- Devaluation of Property (perception)
- Explosive nature (venting) - ie: methane - property damage
- Mitigation - install, operate and monitor engineering controls
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99
|
- Bodily Injury
- “physical injury, sickness,
disease, mental anguish, or emotional distress sustained by any
person, including death resulting therefrom.
- ???Coverage??
- Bodily injury
- Intangible damages - Fear of future injury - “cancerphobia”
- Recovery for medical monitoring costs
|
|
100
|
- Property Damage
- “physical injury to or destruction of tangible property including the
resulting loss of use thereof; loss of use of tangible property that
has not been physically injured or destroyed; cleanup costs; natural
resource damages”
- ???Coverage???
- Investigation; remediation; monitoring; engineering controls ie:
caps; mitigation systems, ie: soil vapor gas collection systems and
other technologies
- Re-engineer - remedy and/or institutional controls
- Intangible damages
- Interference with property rights - odor, noise, light; Diminution
in property value; Stigma damages
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