

CONSUMER LAW 2009 UPDATE

THE JUDGE'S GUIDE TO FEDERAL AND NEW YORK STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES

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Thomas A. Dickerson]

By Justice Thomas A. Dickerson¹

¹ Thomas A. Dickerson is an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Department of the New York State Supreme Court. Justice Dickerson is the author of Class Actions: The Law of 50 States, Law Journal Press, 2009; Travel Law, Law Journal Press, 2009;; Article 9 [New York State Class Actions] of 3 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice CPLR, Lexis-Nexis (MB), 2009; and over 280 articles and papers on consumer law issues, many of which are available at www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2/justice_dickerson.shtml www.classactionlitigation.com/library/ca_articles.html www.consumerlaw.org/links/#travel_articles

Ever since my days as a City Court Judge I have kept track of reported consumer law cases in New York State Courts. Causes of action alleging the violation of one or more Federal and/or New York State consumer protection statutes are frequently asserted in civil casesⁱ. This Paper, prepared annually for New York State Civil Court Judges and the Town & Village Courts Resource Center discusses those consumer protection statutes most frequently used in New York State courts.

The Methodology Of This Paper

This Paper reports on recent consumer law cases in New York State Courts and categorizes them by the New York State or Federal consumer protection statutes invoked. For example, the most popular consumer protection statute is New York State General Business Law § 349 [G.B.L § 349] which prohibits deceptive and misleading business practices. Under this category there is a description of many of those cases in which have

G.B.L. 349 has been successfully and unsuccessfully invoked. Other consumer protection statutes are described within the context of product and service categories such as Cars, Loans and Retail Sales. There also tables of both New York State and Federal consumer protection statutes invoked in the aforesaid cases.

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2] **Table Of Federal Consumer Protection Statutes**

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[D] **15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq** [Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act];

[E] **47 U.S.C. § 227** [Federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act Of 1991];

[F] **12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq** [Regulation Z].

[3] **General Business Law 349**

[A] **The Scope Of GBL 349**

General Business Law (GBL) 349 prohibits deceptive and misleading business practices and its scope is broad, indeed (see Karlin v. IVF America, Inc., 93 NY2d 282, 290 (GBL 349... "on (its) face appl(ies) to virtually all economic activity and (its) application has been correspondingly broad ...The reach of (this) statute 'provides needed authority to cope with the numerous, ever-changing types of false and deceptive business practices which plague consumers in our State'"); see also the dissenting opinion of Justice Graffeo in Matter of Food Parade, Inc. v.

Office of Consumer Affairs, 7 NY3d 568, 574 ("This Court has broadly construed general consumer protection laws to effectuate their remedial purposes, applying the state deceptive practices law to a full spectrum of consumer-oriented conduct, from the sale of 'vanishing premium' life insurance policies ...to the provision of infertility services...We have repeatedly emphasized that (GBL § 349) and section 350, its companion ...' apply to virtually all economic activity, and their application has been correspondingly broad...The reach of these statutes provide[s] needed authority to cope with the numerous, ever-changing types of false and deceptive business practices which plague consumers in our State '...In determining what types of conduct may be deceptive practices under state law, this Court has applied an objective standard which asks whether the 'representation or omission [was] likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances '...taking into account not only the impact on the 'average consumer' but also on 'the vast multitude which the statutes were enacted to safeguard-including the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but are governed by appearances and general impressions'"); Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 94 NY3d 330 ("encompasses a significantly wider range of deceptive business practices that were never previously condemned by decisional law "); State of New York v. Feldman, 2002 W.L. 237840

(S.D.N.Y. 2002)(GBL § 349 "was intended to be broadly applicable, extending far beyond the reach of common law fraud"]].

[B] **Goods, Services & Misconduct**

The types of goods and services to which G.B.L. § 349 applies include, *inter alia*, the following:

Apartment Rentals [Bartolomeo v. Runco 162 Misc2d 485 (landlord can not recover unpaid rent for illegal apartment) and Anilesh v. Williams, New York Law Journal, Nov. 15, 1995, p. 38, col. 2 (Yks. Cty. Ct.)(same); Yochim v. McGrath, 165 Misc. 2d 10, 626 N.Y.S. 2d 685 (1995)(renting illegal sublets)];

Apartment Leases [Sorrentino v. ASN Roosevelt Center, LLCⁱⁱ ("Here, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants continued to market and advertise their apartments, and continued to enter into new lease agreements and renew existing lease agreements even after discovering the water infiltration and mold-growth problems in the Complex without disclosing these problems to potential renters...plaintiffs allege that they have suffered both financial and physical injury as a result of the defendant's deceptive acts...the Court finds that plaintiffs have plead the elements necessary to state a claim under GBL 349")];

Attorney Advertising [Aponte v. Raychukⁱⁱⁱ](deceptive attorney advertisements ["Divorce, Low Fee, Possible 10 Days, Green Card"] violated Administrative Code of City of New York §§ 20-70C et seq)];

Aupair Services [Oxman v. Amoroso, 172 Misc2d 773 (misrepresenting the qualifications of an abusive aupair to care for handicapped children)];

Auctions; Bid Rigging [State of New York v. Feldman, 2002 WL 237840 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (scheme to manipulate public stamp auctions comes "within the purview of (GBL § 349)"]];

Automotive; Contract Disclosure Rule [Levitsky v. SG Hylan Motors, Inc., New York Law Journal, July 3, 2003, p. 27., col. 5 (N.Y. Civ.)(violation of GBL § 396-p "and the failure to adequately disclose the costs of the passive alarm and extended warranty constitute a deceptive action (*per se* violation of GBL § 349); Spielzinger v. S.G. Hylan Motors Corp., New York Law Journal, September 10, 2004, p. 19, col. 3 (Richmond Civ. 2004) (failure to disclose the true cost of "Home Care Warranty" and "Passive Alarm", failure to comply with provisions of GBL § 396-p and GBL § 396-q; *per se* violations of GBL § 349); People v. Condor Pontiac, 2003 WL

21649689 (used car dealer violated GBL § 349 and Vehicle & Traffic Law [VTL] § 417 in failing to disclose that used car was “previously used principally as a rental vehicle”; “In addition (dealer violated) 15 NYCRR §§ 78.10(d), 78.11(12),(13)... fraudulently and/or illegally forged the signature of one customer, altered the purchase agreements of four customers after providing copies to them, and transferred retail certificates of sale to twelve (12) purchasers which did not contain odometer readings...(Also) violated 15 NYCRR § 78.13(a) by failing to give the purchaser a copy of the purchase agreement in 70 instances (all of these are deceptive acts)“)];

Automotive: Repair Shop Labor Charges [Tate v. Fuccillo Ford, Inc., 15 Misc3d 453 (While plaintiff agreed to pay \$225 to have vehicle towed and transmission “ disassembled...to determine the cause of why it was malfunctioning “ he did not agreed to have repair shop install a re-manufactured transmission nor did he agree to pay for “flat labor time” national time standard minimum of 10 hours for a job that took 3 hours to complete [“defendant’s policy of fixing its times to do a given job on a customer’s vehicle based on a national time standard rather than being based upon the actual time it took to do the task without so advising each customer of their method of assessing labor costs is ‘a deceptive act or practice directed towards consumers and that such...practice

resulted in actual injury to a plaintiff'")]];

Automotive: Improper Billing For Services [Joyce v. SI All Tire & Auto Center, Richmond Civil Ct, Index No: SCR 1221/05, Decision Oct. 27, 2005("the invoice (violates GBL § 349). Although the bill has the total charge for the labor rendered for each service, it does not set forth the number of hours each service took. It makes it impossible for a consumer to determine if the billing is proper. Neither does the bill set forth the hourly rate")]];

Automotive: Defective Ignition Switches [Ritchie v. Empire Ford Sales, Inc., New York Law Journal, November 7, 1996, p. 30, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.)(dealer liable for damages to used car that burned up 4 ½ years after sale)]];

Automotive: Defective Brake Shoes [Giarrantano v. Midas Muffler, 166 Misc2d 390 (Midas Muffler fails to honor brake shoe warranty)]];

Automotive: Motor Oil Changes [Farino v. Jiffy Lube International, Inc., New York Law Journal, August 14, 2001, p. 22, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup), aff'd 298 AD2d 553 (an "Environmental Surcharge" of \$.80 to dispose of used motor oil after every automobile oil change may be deceptive since under Environmental Conservation Law § 23-2307 Jiffy was required to accept used motor oil at no charge)]];

Automotive: Extended Warranties [Kim v. BMW of Manhattan, Inc., 11 Misc3d 1078, *affirmed as modified* 35 AD3d 315 (Misrepresented extended warranty; "The deceptive act that plaintiffs allege here is that, without disclosing to Chun that the Extension could not be cancelled, BMW Manhattan placed the charge for the Extension on his service invoice, and acted as though such placement have BMW Manhattan a mechanic's lien on the Car. Such action constituted a deceptive practice within the meaning of GBL § 349...As a result of that practice, plaintiffs were deprived of the use of the Car for a significant time and Chun was prevented from driving away, while he sat in the Car for several hours, until he had paid for the Extension")]];

Automotive: Refusal To Pay Arbitrator's Award [Lipscomb v. Manfredi Motors, New York Law Journal, April 2, 2002, p. 21 (Richmond Civ. Ct.)(auto dealer's refusal to pay arbitrator's award under GBL § 198-b (Used Car Lemon Law) is unfair and deceptive business practice under GBL § 349)]];

Bait Advertising [In Cuomo v. Dell, Inc.^{iv} the Attorney General commenced a special proceeding alleging violations of Executive Law 63(12) and GBL article 22-A involving respondent's practices " in the sale, financing and warranty servicing of computers ". On respondent's motion to dismiss the Court held that Dell's " ads

offer such promotions such as free flat panel monitors...include offers of very attractive financing, such as no interest and no payments for a specified period (limited to) ' well qualified ' customers...' best qualified ' customers (but) nothing in the ads indicate what standards are used to determine whether a customer is well qualified...Petitioner's submissions indicate that as few as 7% of New York applicants qualified for some promotions...most applicants, if approved for credit, were offered very high interest rate revolving credit accounts ranging from approximately 16% up to almost 30% interest without the prominently advertised promotional interest deferral...It is therefore determined that Dell has engaged in prominently advertising the financing promotions in order to attract prospective customers with no intention of actually providing the advertised financing to the great majority of such customers. Such conduct is deceptive and constitutes improper 'bait advertising'"];

Baldness Products [Karlin v. IVE, 93 NY2d 283, 291 (reference to unpublished decision applying GBL § 349 to products for treatment of balding and baldness); Mountz v. Global Vision Products, Inc., 3 Misc3d 171 ("Avacor, a hair loss treatment extensively advertised on television...as the modern day equivalent of the sales pitch of a snake oil salesman"; allegations of misrepresentations of "no known side effects of Avacor is refuted

by documented minoxidil side effects”)];

Budget Planning [People v. Trescha Corp., New York Law Journal, December 6, 2000, p. 26, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup.)(company misrepresented itself as a budget planner which “involves debt consolidation and...negotiation by the budget planner of reduced interest rates with creditors and the cancellation of the credit cards by the debtors...the debtor agrees to periodically send a lump sum payment to the budget planner who distributes specific amounts to the debtor’s creditors”)];

Cable TV: Charging For Unneeded Converter Boxes [In Samuel v. Time Warner, Inc., 10 Misc3d 537, a class of cable television subscribers claimed a violation of GBL § 349 and the breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing because defendant allegedly “is charging its basic customers for converter boxes which they do not need, because the customers subscribe only to channels that are not being converted ...(and) charges customers for unnecessary remote controls regardless of their level of service”. In sustaining the GBL § 349 claim based, in part, upon “negative option billing” (“negative option billing ‘(violates) 47 USA § 543(f), which prohibits a cable company from charging a subscriber for any equipment that the subscriber has not affirmatively requested by name, and a subscriber’s failure to refuse a cable operator’s proposal to provide such equipment is not deemed to be an affirmative

request”) the Court held that defendant’s “disclosures regarding the need for, and/or benefits of, converter boxes and...remote controls are buried in the Notice, the contents of which are not specifically brought to a new subscriber’s attention...a claim for violation of GBL § 349 is stated”];

Cable TV: Imposition Of Unauthorized Taxes [Lawlor v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 15 Misc3d 1111 (the plaintiff claimed that his monthly bill for Internet service “ contained a charge for ‘Taxes and Fees’ and that Cablevision had no legal rights to charge these taxes or fees and sought to recover (those charges)...The Agreement for Optimum Online for Commercial Services could be considered misleading”); Lawlor v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 20 Misc3d 1144 (complaint dismissed)];

Cell Phones [Naevus International, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 2000 WL 1410160 (N.Y. Sup. 2000)(wireless phone subscribers seek damages for “frequent dropped calls, inability to make or receive calls and failure to obtain credit for calls that were involuntarily disconnected”); But see Ballas v. Virgin Media, Inc.^v (consumers charged the defendant cell phone service provider with breach of contract and a violation of GBL 349 in allegedly failing to properly reveal “ the top up provisions of the pay by the minute plan “ known as “Topping up (which) is a means by which a purchaser of Virgin’s cell phone (“Oystr”), who pays by the minute,

adds cash to their cell phone account so that they can continue to receive cell phone service. A customer may top up by (1) purchasing Top Up cell phone cards that are sold separately; (2) using a credit or debit card to pay by phone or on the Virgin Mobile USA website or (3) using the Top Up option contained on the phone “. If customers do not “top up” when advised to do so they “ would be unable to send or receive calls“. The Court dismissed the GBL 349 claim “because the topping-up requirements of the 18 cent per minute plan were fully revealed in the Terms of Service booklet“)];

Checking Accounts [Sherry v. Citibank, N.A., 5 AD3d 335 (“plaintiff stated (G.B.L. §§ 349, 350 claims) for manner in which defendant applied finance charges for its checking plus ‘accounts since sales literature could easily lead potential customer to reasonable belief that interest would stop accruing once he made deposit to his checking account sufficient to pay off amount due on credit line’“)];

Clothing Sales [Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory, 175 Misc2d 951 (refusing to refund purchase price in cash for defective and shedding fake fur)];

Computer Software [Cox v. Microsoft Corp., 8 AD3d 39 (allegations that Microsoft engaged in purposeful, deceptive monopolistic business practices, including entering into secret agreements with computer

manufacturers and distributors in inhibit competition and technological development and creating an 'applications barrier' in its Windows software that...rejected competitors' Intel-compatible PC operating systems, and that such practices resulted in artificially inflated prices for defendant's products and denial of consumer access to competitor's innovations, services and products"]];

Credit Cards [People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc., 27 AD3d 104_ (misrepresenting the availability of certain pre-approved credit limits; "solicitations were misleading...because a reasonable consumer was led to believe that by signing up for the program, he or she would be protected in case of an income loss due to the conditions described"), mod'd 11 N.Y. 3d 105, 894 N.E. 2d 1 (2008); People v. Telehublink, 301 AD2d 1006 ("telemarketers told prospective customers that they were pre-approved for a credit card and they could receive a low-interest credit card for an advance fee of approximately \$220. Instead of a credit card, however, consumers who paid the fee received credit card applications, discount coupons, a merchandise catalog and a credit repair manual"); Sims v. First Consumers National Bank, 303 AD2d 288 ("The gist of plaintiffs' deceptive practices claim is that the typeface and location of the fee disclosures, combined with high-pressure advertising, amounted

to consumer conduct that was deceptive or misleading"); Broder v. MBNA Corporation, New York Law Journal, March 2, 2000, p. 29, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup.), aff'd 281 AD2d 369 (credit card company misrepresented the application of its low introductory annual percentage rate to cash advances)];

Currency Conversion [Relativity Travel, Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 13 Misc3d 1221 ("Relativity has adequately alleged that the Deposit Account Agreement was deceptive despite the fact that the surcharge is described in that agreement. The issue is not simply whether the Deposit Account Agreement was deceptive, but whether Chase's overall business practices in connection with the charge were deceptive...Viewing Chase's practices as a whole including the failure to list the surcharge on the Account Statement or on Chase's website and the failure to properly inform its representatives about the surcharge are sufficient, if proved, to establish a prima facie case... Relativity's allegation that it was injured by having been charged an undisclosed additional amount on foreign currency transactions is sufficient to state a (GBL § 349) claim ")];

Customer Information [Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 188 Misc2d 616 (CVS acquired the customer files from 350 independent pharmacies without

customers' consent; the "practice of intentionally declining to give customers notice of an impending transfer of their critical prescription information in order to increase the value of that information appears to be deceptive");

Defective Dishwashers [People v. General Electric Co., Inc., 302 AD2d 314 (misrepresentations "made by...GE to the effect that certain defective dishwashers it manufactured were not repairable " was deceptive under GBL § 349)];

Door-To-Door Sales [New York Environmental Resources v. Franklin, New York Law Journal, March 4, 2003, p. 27 (N.Y. Sup.) (misrepresented and grossly overpriced water purification system); Rossi v. 21st Century Concepts, Inc., 162 Misc2d 932 (selling misrepresented and overpriced pots and pans)];

Educational Services [Drew v. Sylvan Learning Center, 16 Misc3d 838 (parents enrolled their school age children in an educational services program which promised "The Sylvan Guarantee. Your child will improve at least one full grade level equivalent in reading or math within 36 hours of instruction or we'll provide 12 additional hours of instruction at no further cost to you". After securing an \$11,000 loan to pay for the defendant's services and eight months,

thrice weekly, on one hour tutoring sessions the parents were shocked when “based on the Board of Education’s standards, it was concluded that neither child met the grade level requirements. As a result plaintiff’s daughter was retained in second grade”. The Court found fraudulent misrepresentation, unconscionability and a violation of GBL 349 in that “defendant deceived consumers...by guaranteeing that its services would improve her children’s grade levels and there by implying that its standards were aligned with the Board of Education’s standards” and (3) unconscionability [“There is absolutely no reason why a consumer interested in improving her children’s academic status should not be made aware, prior to engaging Sylvan’s services, that these services cannot, with any reasonable probability, guarantee academic success. Hiding its written disclaimer within the progress report and diagnostic assessment is unacceptable”]; People v. McNair, 9 Misc2d 1121 (deliberate and material misrepresentations to parents enrolling their children in the Harlem Youth Enrichment Christian Academy); Andre v. Pace University, 161 Misc2d 613, rev’d on other grounds 170 Misc2d 893 (failing to deliver computer programming course for beginners); Brown v. Hambric, 168 Misc2d 502 (failure to deliver travel agent education program)]; Cambridge v. Telemarketing Concepts, 171 Misc2d 796)];

Electricity Rates [Emilio v. Robinson Oil Corp., 28 AD3d 418 (“the act

of unilaterally changing the price (of electricity) in the middle of the term of a fixed-price contract has been found to constitute a deceptive practice... Therefore, the plaintiff should also be allowed to assert his claim under (GBL § 349) based on the allegation that the defendant unilaterally increased the price in the middle of the renewal term of the contract"); Emilio v. Robison Oil Corp., 28 A.D. 3d 418 (2d Dept. 2009)(Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached its contract by "unilaterally adjusting alleged fixed-price electrical supply charges mid-term"; certification granted)];

Employee Scholarship Programs [Cambridge v. Telemarketing Concepts, Inc., 171 Misc2d 796 (refusal to honor agreement to provide scholarship to employee)];

Excessive & Unlawful Bail Bond Fees [McKinnon v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 182 Misc2d 517 misrepresentation of expenses in securing bail bonds)];

Excessive Modeling Fees [Shelton v. Elite Model Management, Inc., 11 Misc3d 345 (models' claims of excessive fees caused "by reason of any misstatement, misrepresentation, fraud and deceit, or any unlawful act or omission of any licensed person stated a private right of

action under GBL Article 11 and a claim under GBL § 349)];

Exhibitions and Conferences [Sharknet Inc. v. Techmarketing, NY Inc., New York Law Journal, April 22, 1997, p. 32, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.), aff'd __Misc2d__, N.Y.A.T., Decision dated Dec. 7, 1998 (misrepresenting length of and number of persons attending Internet exhibition)]];

Extended Warranties [Dvoskin v. Levitz Furniture Co., Inc., 9 Misc3d 1125 (one year and five year furniture extended warranties; “the solicitation and sale of an extended warranty to be honored by an entity that is different from the selling party is inherently deceptive if an express representation is not made disclosing who the purported contracting party is. It is reasonable to assume that the purchaser will believe the warranty is with the Seller to whom she gave consideration, unless there is an express representation to the contrary. The providing of a vague two page sales brochure, after the sale transaction, which brochure does not identify the new party...and which contains no signature or address is clearly deceptive”); Kim v. BMW of Manhattan, Inc., 11 Misc3d 1078 (misrepresented extended warranty; \$50 statutory damages awarded under GBL 349(h)); Giarrantano v. Midas Muffler, 166 Misc2d 390 (Midas would not honor its brake shoe warranty unless the consumer agreed to pay for additional

repairs found necessary after a required inspection of the brake system; “the Midas Warranty Certificate was misleading and deceptive in that it promised the replacement of worn brake pads free of charge and then emasculated that promise by requiring plaintiff to pay for additional brake system repairs which Midas would deem necessary and proper”); Petrello v. Winks Furniture, New York Law Journal, May 21, 1998, p. 32, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.)(misrepresenting a sofa as being covered in Ultrasuede HP and protected by a 5 year warranty)];

Food : Nutritional Value [Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 396 F. 3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005)(misrepresentation of nutritional value of food products)];

Furniture Sales [Petrello v. Winks Furniture, New York Law Journal, May 21, 1998, p. 32, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.)
(misrepresenting a sofa as being covered in Ultrasuede HP and protected by a 5 year warranty); Walker v. Winks Furniture, 168 Misc2d 265 (falsely promising to deliver furniture within one week); Filpo v. Credit Express Furniture Inc., New York Law Journal, Aug. 26, 1997, p. 26, col. 4 (Yks. Cty. Ct.)(failing to inform Spanish speaking consumers of a three day cancellation period); Colon v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 276 A.D. 2d 58, 716 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (1st Dept. 2000)(rent-to-own furniture; “an overly inflated cash

price“ for purchase may violate GBL § 349)];

Giftcards [In two class actions purchasers of gift cards challenged the imposition of dormancy fees by gift card issuers. Gift cards, a multi-billion business, may “ eliminate the headache of choosing a perfect present (but) the recipient might find some cards are a pain in the neck. Many come with enough fees and restrictions that you might be better off giving a check. Most annoying are expiration dates and maintenance or dormancy fees “ [Gift-Card Gotchas, Consumer Reports, December 2006, at p. 8]. In Lonner v. Simon Property Group, Inc., 55 AD3d 100 a class of consumers challenged the imposition of gift card dormancy fees of \$2.50 per month setting forth three causes of action seeking damages for breach of contract, violation of GBL 349 and unjust enrichment. Within the context of defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the Court found that the Lonner plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to support causes of action for breach of contract based upon a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and a violation of GBL 349. And in Goldman v. Simon Property Group, Inc., 58 AD3d 208 a class of consumers also challenged dormancy fees and the Court found that there was no private right of action under GBL 396-I and that CPLR 4544 applies to business gifts which involve a consumer transaction. The Court also restored claims for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment and allowed plaintiffs to plead unjust enrichment and money had and received as alternative claims to the breach of contract cause of action)];

Guitars [In Wall v. Southside Guitars, LLC, 17 Misc3d 1135 the claimant, “ a vintage Rickenbacker guitar enthusiast... purchased the guitar

knowing that there were four changed tuners, as represented by the advertisement and the sales representative. What he did not bargain for were the twenty or so additional changed parts as found by his expert. Defendants claim that the changed parts do not affect this specific guitar as it was a 'player's grade' guitar...While determining how much can be replaced in a vintage Rickenbacker guitar before it is just a plain old guitar may be intriguing, this court need not entertain it because an extensively altered guitar was not one that claimant saw advertised and not one that he intended to buy"; violation of GBL 349 found)];

Hair Loss Treatment [Mountz v. Global Vision Products, Inc., __Misc2d__, 770 N.Y.S. 2d 603 ("marketing techniques (portrayed) as the modern day equivalent of the sales pitch of a snake oil salesman", alleged misrepresentations of "no known side effects" without revealing documented side effects "which include cardiac changes, visual disturbances, vomiting, facial swelling and exacerbation of hair loss"; GBL § 349 claim stated for New York resident "deceived in New York")]];

Home Heating Oil Price Increases [Matter of Wilco Energy Corp., 283 AD2d 469 ("Wilco solicited contracts from the public and, after entering into approximately 143 contracts, unilaterally changed their terms. This was not a private transaction occurring on a

single occasion but rather, conduct which affected numerous consumers...Wilco's conduct constituted a deceptive practice. It offered a fixed-price contract and then refused to comply with its most material term-an agreed-upon price for heating oil");

Home Inspections [In Carney v. Coull Building Inspections, Inc., 16 Misc3d 1114 the home buyer alleged that the defendant licensed home inspector "failed to disclose a defective heating system" which subsequently was replaced with a new "heating unit at a cost of \$3,400" although the "defendant pointed out in the report that the hot water heater was 'very old' and "has run past its life expectancy". In finding for the plaintiff the Court noted that although the defendant's damages would be limited to the \$395.00 fee paid and no private right of action existed under the Home Improvement Licensing Statute, Real Property Law 12-B, the plaintiff did have a claim under GBL 349 because of defendant's "failure...to comply with RPL Article 12-B" by not including important information on the contract such as the "inspector's licensing information"); Ricciardi v. Frank d/b/a InspectAmerica Engineering, P.C., 163 Misc2d 337, mod'd 170 Misc2d 777 (civil engineer liable for failing to discover wet basement; violation of GBL 349 but damages limited to fee paid)];

In Vitro Fertilization [Karlin v. IVF America, Inc., 93 NY2d 282

(misrepresentations of in vitro fertilization rates of success)];

Insurance Coverage & Rates [Gaidon v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 94 NY2d 330 (misrepresentations that “out-of-pocket premium payments (for life insurance policies) would vanish within a stated period of time”); Batas v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 281 AD2d 260 (GBL 349 and 350 claims properly sustained regarding, inter alia, allegations of failure “to conduct the utilization review procedures...promised in their contracts”, “misrepresentation of facts in materials to induce potential subscribers to obtain defendants’ health policies”); Batas v. The Prudential Insurance Company, 37 AD3d 320 (certification denied); Monter v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 651 (misrepresentations with respect to the terms “Flexible Premium Variable Life Insurance Policy”); Beller v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 310 (“Here, the subject insurance contract imposed a continuing duty upon the defendant to consider the factors comprising the cost of insurance before changing rates and to review the cost of insurance rates at least once every five years to determine if a change should be made...we find that the complaint sufficiently states a (GBL § 349) cause of action”); Skibinsky v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 6 AD3d 976 (misrepresentation of the coverage of a “builder’s risk” insurance policy); Brenkus v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 309 AD2d 1260 (misrepresentations by insurance agent as to amount of life insurance coverage); Makastchian v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 270 AD2d 25 (practice of terminating health insurance policies without providing 30 days notice violated terms of policy and was a deceptive business practice because subscribers may have believed they had health insurance when coverage had already been canceled)];

Insurance; Provision Of Defense Counsel [Elacqua v. Physicians' Reciprocal Insurers, 52 AD3d 886 ("This threat of divided loyalty and conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured is the precise evil sought to be remedied...hence the requirement that independent counsel be provided at the expense of the insurer and that the insurer advise the insured of this right. Defendant's failure to inform plaintiffs of this right, together with plaintiffs' showing that undivided and uncompromised conflict-free representation was not provided to them, constituted harm within the meaning of (GBL) 349")]];

Insurance Claims Procedures [Shebar v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 23 AD3d 858 ("Allegations that despite promises to the contrary in its standard-form policy sold to the public, defendants made practice of 'not investigating claims for long-term disability

benefits in good faith, in a timely fashion, and in accordance with acceptable medical standards... when the person submitting the claim...is relatively young and suffers from a mental illness', stated cause of action pursuant to (GBL) § 349"); Makuch v. New York Central Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 12 AD3d 1110 ("violation of (GBL § 349 for disclaiming) coverage under a homeowner's policy for damage caused when a falling tree struck plaintiff's home"); Acquista v. New York Life Ins. Co., 285 AD2d 73 (allegation that the insurer makes a practice of inordinately delaying and then denying a claim without reference to its viability""may be said to fall within the parameters of an unfair or deceptive practice"); Rubinoff v. U.S. Capitol Insurance Co., New York Law Journal, May 10, 1996, p. 31, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.)(automobile insurance company fails to provide timely defense to insured)];

Internet Marketing & Services [Zurakov v. Register.Com, Inc., 304 AD2d 176 ("Given plaintiff's claim that the essence of his contract with defendant was to establish his exclusive use and control over the domain name 'Laborzionist.org' and that defendant's usurpation of that right and use of the name after registering it for plaintiff defeats the very purpose of the contract, plaintiff sufficiently alleged that defendant's failure to disclose its policy of placing newly registered domain names on the 'Coming Soon' page was material" and constitutes a deceptive act under GBL § 349); People v.

Network Associates, 195 Misc2d 384 (“Petitioner argues that the use of the words ‘rules and regulations’ in the restrictive clause (prohibiting testing and publication of test results of effectiveness of McAfee antivirus and firewall software) is designed to mislead consumers by leading them to believe that some rules and regulations outside (the restrictive clause) exist under state or federal law prohibiting consumers from publishing reviews and the results of benchmark tests...the language is (also) deceptive because it may mislead consumers to believe that such clause is enforceable under the lease agreement, when in fact it is not...as a result consumers may be deceived into abandoning their right to publish reviews and results of benchmark tests”); People v. Lipsitz, 174 Misc2d 571 (failing to deliver purchased magazine subscriptions); Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 98 NY2d 314 (misrepresented Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) Internet services)];

“ *Knock-Off “ Telephone Numbers* [Drizin v. Sprint Corporation, 3 AD3d 388 (“defendants’ admitted practice of maintaining numerous toll-free call service numbers identical, but for one digit, to the toll-free call service numbers of competitor long-distance telephone service providers. This practice generates what is called ‘fat-fingers’ business, i.e., business occasioned by the misdialing of the intended customers of defendant’s competing long-distance

service providers. Those customers, seeking to make long-distance telephone calls, are, by reason of their dialing errors and defendants' many 'knock-off' numbers, unwittingly placed in contact with defendant providers rather than their intended service providers and it is alleged that, for the most part, they are not advised of this circumstance prior to completion of their long-distance connections and the imposition of charges in excess of those they would have paid had they utilized their intended providers. These allegations set forth a deceptive and injurious business practice affecting numerous consumers (under GBL 349)");

Lasik Eye Surgery [Gabbay v. Mandel, New York Law Journal, March 10, 2004, p. 19, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup.)(medical malpractice and deceptive advertising arising from lasik eye surgery)];

Layaway Plans [Amiekumo v. Vanbro Motors, Inc., 3 Misc. 3d 1101 (failure to deliver vehicle purchased on layaway plan and comply with statutory disclosure requirements; a violation of GBL § 396-t is a *per se* violation of GBL § 349)];

Leases, Equipment [Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., 40 AD3d 366, aff'd 10 N.Y. 3d 486, 837 N.Y.S. 2d 10 (2008) (equipment lessees asserted, inter alia, violations of GBL 349 arising from allegations that defendant "purposely concealed

three pages of the four-page equipment lease...the concealment finds support in the first page...which contains all of the elements that would appear to form a binding contract including the signature line, a personal guaranty and forum selection, jury waiver and merger clauses, with the only references to the additional pages of the lease being in very small print... defendants did not provide plaintiffs with fully executed copies of the leases and overcharged them by deducting amounts from their bank accounts greater than those called for by the leases"); Sterling National Bank v. Kings Manor Estates, 9 Misc3d 1116 ("The defendants ...claim that the equipment lease was tainted by fraud and deception in the inception, was unconscionable and gave rise to unjust enrichment... the bank plaintiff, knowing of the fraudulent conduct, purchased the instant equipment lease at a deep discount, and by demanding payment thereunder acted in a manner violating...(GBL § 349)");

Liquidated Damages Clause [Morgan Services, Inc. v. Episcopal Church Home & Affiliates Life Care Community, Inc., 305 AD2d 1106 (it is deceptive for seller to enter "into contracts knowing that it will eventually fail to supply conforming goods and that, when the customer complains and subsequently attempts to terminate the contract (seller) uses the liquidated damages clause of the contract as a threat either to force the customer to accept the non-conforming goods or to settle the lawsuit")];

Loan Applications [Dunn v. Northgate Ford, Inc., 1 Misc3d 911

(automobile dealer completes and submits loan application to finance company and misrepresents teenage customer's ability to repay loan which resulted in default and sale of vehicle)];

Mislabeling [Lewis v. Al DiDonna, 294 AD2d 799 [pet dog dies from overdose of prescription drug, Feldene, mislabeled "1 pill twice daily" when should have been "one pill every other day"]];

Monopolistic Business Practices [Cox v. Microsoft Corp., 8 AD3d 39 (monopolistic activities are covered by GBL § 349; "allegations that Microsoft engaged in purposeful, deceptive monopolistic business practices, including entering into secret agreements with computer manufacturers and distributors to inhibit competition and technological development and creating an 'applications barrier' in its Windows software that...rejected competitors' Intel-compatible PC operating systems, and that such practices resulted in artificially inflated prices for defendant's products and denial of consumer access to competitor's innovations, services and products")];

Mortgages: Misleading Practices [Popular Financial Services, LLD v. Williams, 50 A.D. 3d 660, 855 N.Y.S. 2d 581 (2d Dept. 2008)](foreclosure action; counterclaim alleging fraudulent inducement to enter mortgage states a claim under GBL 349); Delta

Funding Corp. v. Murdaugh, 6 A.D. 3d 571, 774 N.Y.S. 2d 797 (2d Dept. 2004)(foreclosure action; counterclaims state claims under Truth In Lending Act and GBL 349)];

Mortgages: Improper Fees & Charges [MacDonell v. PHM Mortgage Corp., 846 N.Y.S. 2d 223 (N.Y.A.D.) (mortgagors challenged defendant's \$40 fee " charged for faxing the payoff statements " [which plaintiffs paid] as violations of GBL 349 and RPL 274-a(2) ["mortgagee shall not charge for providing the mortgage-related documents, provided...the mortgagee may charge not more than twenty dollars, or such amount as may be fixed by the banking board, for each subsequent payoff statement"] which statutory claims were sustained by the Court finding that the voluntary payment rule does not apply [see Dowd v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 32 AD3d 894; Dougherty v. North Fork Bank, 301 AD2d 491; see generally Negrin v. Norwest Mortgage, 263 AD2d 39] and noting that "To the extent that our decision in Dowd v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 32 AD3d 894 holds to the contrary it should not be followed"); Kidd v. Delta Funding Corp., 299 AD2d 457 (" The defendants failed to prove that their act of charging illegal processing fees to over 20,000 customers, and their failure to notify the plaintiffs of the existence and terms of the settlement agreement, were not materially deceptive or misleading"); Walts v. First Union Mortgage Corp., New York Law Journal, April 25, 2000, p. 26,col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. 2000)(consumers induced to pay for private mortgage insurance beyond requirements under New York Insurance Law § 6503); Trang v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., USA, New York Law Journal, April 17, 2002, p. 28, col. 3 (Queens

Sup.)(\$15.00 special handling/fax fee for a faxed copy of mortgage payoff statement violates RPL § 274-a(2)(a) which prohibits charges for mortgage related documents and is deceptive as well)];

Mortgages & Home Equity Loans: Improper Closings [Bonior v. Citibank, N.A., 14 Misc3d 771 (“The Court will set forth below several ‘problems’ with this closing that might have been remedied by the active participation of legal counsel for the borrowers as well for the other participants”. The Court found that the lenders had violated GBL § 349 by (1) failing to advise the borrowers of a right to counsel, (2) use of contradictory and ambiguous documents containing no prepayment penalty clauses and charging an early closing fee, (3) failing to disclose relationships settlement agents and (4) document discrepancies “ The most serious is that the equity source agreement and the mortgage are to be interpreted under the laws of different states, New York and California respectively”)];

Movers; Household Goods [Goretsky v. ½ Price Movers, New York Law Journal, March 12, 2004, p. 19, col. 3 (N.Y. Civ. 2004) (“failure to unload the household goods and hold them ‘hostage’ is a deceptive practice under (GBL § 349)”)];

Packaging [Sclafani v. Barilla America, Inc., 19 AD3d 577 (deceptive packaging of retail food products)];

Predatory Lending And Property Flipping [Cruz v. HSBC Bank, N.A., 2008 NY Slip Op 52484(U) (Richmond Sup. 2008)(“plaintiff... alleges...that defendant Fremont engaged in inducing the plaintiff to accept mortgages where the payments were unaffordable to him; misrepresenting the plaintiff’s income and assets, failing to disclose all the risks of the loan and concealing major defects and illegality in the home’s structure “; GBL 349 claim stated “)]];

Price Matching [Dank v. Sears Holding Management Corporation, 59 AD3d 582 (“The complaint alleges that Sears published a policy promising...to match the ‘price on an identical branded item with the same features currently available for sale at another local retail store’. The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff requested at three different locations that Sears sell him a flat-screen television at the same price at which it was being offered by another retailer. His request was denied at the first two Sears locations on the basis that each store manager had the discretion to decide what retailers are considered local and what prices to match. Eventually he purchased the television at the third Sears at the price offered by a retailer located 12 miles from the store, but was denied the \$400 lower price offered by a retailer located 8 miles

from the store...the complaint states a cause of action under GBL 349 and 350"]];

Professional Networking [BNI New York Ltd. v. DeSanto, 177 Misc2d 9 (enforcing an unconscionable membership fee promissory note)];

Privacy [Anonymous v. CVS Corp., New York Law Journal, January 8, 2004, p. 19, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup.)(sale of confidential patient information by pharmacy to a third party is "an actionable deceptive practice" under GBL 349); Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 293 AD2d 598; Meyerson v. Prime Realty Services, LLC, 7 Misc2d 911 ("landlord deceptively represented that (tenant) was required by law to provide personal and confidential information, including... social security number in order to secure renewal lease and avoid eviction")];

Pyramid Schemes [C.T.V., Inc. v. Curlen, New York Law Journal, Dec. 3, 1997, p. 35, col. 1 (Yks. Cty. Ct.)(selling bogus "Beat The System Program" certificates); Brown v. Hambric, 168 Misc2d 502 (selling misrepresented instant travel agent credentials and educational services)];

Real Estate Sales [Guterman v. Romano Real Estate, New York Law Journal, Oct. 28, 1998, p. 36, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.) (misrepresenting that a house with a septic tank was connected to a city sewer system); Board of Mgrs. Of Bayberry Greens Condominium v. Bayberry

Greens Associates, 174 AD2d 595 (deceptive advertisement and sale of condominium units); B.S.L. One Owners Corp. v. Key Intl. Mfg. Inc., 225 AD2d 643 (deceptive sale of shares in a cooperative corporation); Breakwaters Townhouses Ass'n. V. Breakwaters of Buffalo, Inc., 207 AD2d 963 (condominium units); Latiuk v. Faber Const. Co., 269 AD2d 820 (deceptive design and construction of home); Polonetsky v. Better Homes Depot, Inc., 185 Misc2d 282, rev'd 279 AD2d 418, rev'd 97 NY2d 46 (N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 20-700 et seq (Consumer Protection Law) applies to business of buying foreclosed homes and refurbishing and reselling them as residential properties; misrepresentations that recommended attorneys were approved by Federal Housing Authority deceptive)];

Sports Nutrition Products [Morelli v. Weider Nutrition Group, Inc., 275 AD2d 607 (manufacturer of Steel Bars, a high-protein nutrition bar, misrepresented the amount of fat, vitamins, minerals and sodium therein)];

Tax Advice [Mintz v. American Tax Relief, 16 Misc. 3d 517, 837 N.Y.S. 2d 841 (N.Y. Sup. 2007)("the second and fourth mailing unambiguously state that recipients of the (post) cards 'can be helped Today' with their 'Unbeatable Monthly Payment Plan(s)' and that defendant can stop wage garnishments, bank seizures and assessment of interest and penalties. These two mailing...make explicit promises which...Cannot

be described as 'puffery' and could...be found to be purposely misleading and deceptive");

Termite Inspections [Anunziata v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 353 (misrepresentations of full and complete inspections of house and that there were no inaccessible areas are misleading and deceptive)];

Timberpeg Homes [DeAngelis v. Timberpeg East, Inc., 51 AD3d 1175 ("the complaint alleges that Timberpeg engaged in consumer-oriented acts by representing itself, through an advertisement...as the purveyor of a 'package' of products and services necessary to provide a completed Timberpeg home...The complaint...(alleges that such language and conduct related thereto were) false and misleading in that Timberpeg was responsible for only the building supplies for Timberpeg homes...plaintiffs have stated viable causes of action under GBL 349 and 350 against defendants")];

Travel Services [Meachum v. Outdoor World Corp., 235 AD2d 462 (misrepresenting availability and quality of vacation campgrounds); Vallery v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc., 141 Misc2d 395 (misrepresented cruise); Pellegrini v. Landmark Travel Group, 165 Misc2d 589 (refundability of tour operator tickets misrepresented)];

Tummy Tighteners [In Johnson v. Body Solutions of Commack, LLC, 19 Misc3d 1131, the plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant and paid \$4,995 for a single "treatment to tighten her stomach area which lasted 30 minutes wherein the defendant allegedly applied capacitive radio frequency generated heat to plaintiffs' stomach in order to tighten post childbirth wrinkled skin (and according to plaintiff) the service had no beneficial effect whatsoever upon her stomach". At issue were various representations the essence of which was (1) the 30 minute treatment "would improve the appearance of her stomach area", (2) "One using the websites, provided to him or her by the defendant, will thus be led to believe they are dealing with medical doctors when they go to Body Solutions...another page of this site, described 'The... Procedure ' as ' available only in the office of qualified physicians who specialize in cosmetic procedures'...the website provided to the plaintiff for reference promises that treatment will be provided exclusively in a physician's office...There is no...evidence that the plaintiff was treated in a physician's or doctor's office or by a doctor...The Court finds that the defendant has engaged in deceptive conduct under (GBL 349) by not treating her in a medical doctor's office under the proper supervision of a medical doctor and/or by representing...that she would receive noticeable beneficial results from a single 30 minute treatment and that the lack of proper medical involvement and

supervision caused the lack of positive results“)]].

TV Repair Shops [Tarantola v. Becktronix, Ltd., Index No: SCR 1615/03, N.Y. Civ., Richmond Cty., March 31, 2004 (TV repair shop's violation of " Rules of the City of New York (6 RCNY 2-261 et seq)...that certain procedures be followed when a licensed dealer receives an electronic or home appliance for repair...constitutes a deceptive practice under (GBL § 349)")]];

Wedding Singers [Bridget Griffin-Amiel v. Frank Terris Orchestras, 178 Misc2d 71 (the bait and switch of a "40-something crooner" for the "20-something 'Paul Rich' who promised to deliver a lively mix of pop hits, rhythm-and-blues and disco classics"; violation of GBL 349)]].

[C] **Stating A Cognizable Claim**

Stating a cause of action for a violation of GBL 349 is fairly straight forward and should identify the misconduct which is deceptive and materially misleading to a reasonable consumer [see Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 NY2d 20); Andre Strishak & Assocs., P.C. v Hewlett Packard Co., 300 AD2d 608)], which causes actual damages [see Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 NY2d 43 ("To state a claim...a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has engaged ' 'in

an act or practice that is deceptive or misleading in a material way and that plaintiff has been injured by reason thereof’...Intent to defraud and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff are not elements of the statutory claim...However, proof that ‘a material deceptive act or practice causes actual, although not necessarily pecuniary harm’ is required to impose compensatory damages”); Stutman v Chemical Bank, 95 NY2d 24, 29.

For example, in Baron v. Pfizer, Inc., 42 AD3d 627, the GBL 349 claim was dismissed because of an absence of actual injury [“Without allegations that...the price of the product was inflated as a result of defendant’s deception or that use of the product adversely affected plaintiff’s health...failed even to allege...that Neurontin was ineffective to treat her neck pain and her claim that any off-label prescription was potential dangerous both asserts a harm that is merely speculative and is belied...by the fact that off-label use is a widespread and accepted medical practice”)].

In Ballas v. Virgin Media, Inc., 18 Misc3d 1106 aff’d 60 AD3d 712 a class of consumers charged the defendant cell phone service provider with breach of contract and a violation of GBL 349 in allegedly failing to properly reveal “ the top up provisions of the pay by the minute plan “ known as “Topping up (which) is a means by which a purchaser of Virgin’s cell phone (“Oystr”), who pays by the minute, adds cash to their cell phone account so that they can continue to receive cell phone service. A customer may top up by (1) purchasing Top Up cell phone cards that are sold separately; (2) using a credit or debit card to pay by phone or on the Virgin Mobile USA website or (3) using the Top Up option contained on the phone “. If customers do not “top up” when advised to do so they “ would be

unable to send or receive calls“. The Court dismissed the GBL 349 claim “because the topping-up requirements of the 18 cent per minute plan were fully revealed in the Terms of Service booklet“).

And in Vigiletti v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Index No: 2573/05, Sup. Ct. Westchester County, J. Rudolph, Decision September 23, 2005, aff'd 42 AD3d 497 (a class of consumers alleged that Sears marketed its Craftsman tools “ as ‘ Made in USA ‘ although components of the products were made outside the United States as many of the tools have the names of other countries, e.g., ‘China‘ or ‘Mexico‘ diesunk or engraved into various parts of the tools“. In dismissing the GBL 349 claim the Court found that plaintiffs had failed to prove actual injury [“no allegations ...that plaintiffs paid an inflated price for the tools...that tools purchased...were not made in the U.S.A. or were deceptively labeled or advertised as made in the U.S.A. or that the quality of the tools purchased were of lesser quality than tools made in the U.S.A.“] causation [“plaintiffs have failed to allege that they saw any of these allegedly misleading statements before they purchased Craftsman tools“] and territoriality [“no allegations that any transactions occurred in New York State“]).

In addition the subject misconduct must have “a broad impact on consumers at large“ [Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 85 NY2d 20); Shebar v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 23 AD3d 858 (“Plaintiff alleged a specific deceptive practice on the part of defendant, directed at members of the public generally who purchased its standard-form policy“)]^{vi}, does not involve private disputes^{vii} and constitutes “consumer-oriented conduct“. Further, GBL § 349 claims are governed by a three-year period of limitations [see

State v. Daicel Chemical Industries, Ltd., 42 AD3d 301; Beller v. William Penn Life Ins. Co. 8 AD3d 310)], “does not need to be based on an independent private right of action” [Farino v. Jiffy Lube International, Inc., 298 AD2d 553] and does not apply to the claims of non-residents who did not enter into contracts in New York State [see Goshen v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 98 N.Y. 2d 314, 746 N.Y.S. 2d 858 (2002) and Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 98 N.Y. 2d 314, 746 N.Y.S. 2d 858 (2002)] (not wishing to “tread on the ability of other states to regulate their own markets and enforce their own consumer protection laws” and seeking to avoid “nationwide, if not global application” , the Court of Appeals held that GBL § 349 requires that “the transaction in which the consumer is deceived must occur in New York”)].

[D] **Consumer Oriented Conduct**

Where the conduct being complained of is not “a private contract dispute as to policy coverage” but instead “involves an extensive marketing scheme that has ‘a broader impact on consumers at large’^{viii}” (Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 94 NY2d 330, 344 quoting Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v Marine Midland Bank, at 25), the courts will uphold a suit pursuant to GBL 349. Thus in Gaidon the Court held that the plaintiffs' allegations stated a cause of action for violation of GBL 349, where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had marketed policies

by giving misleading assurances that, after a certain amount of time, they would no longer have to pay insurance premiums. These promises of so called “vanishing” premiums implicated “practices of a national scope that have generated industry-wide litigation” (id. at 342) (see also Beller v William Penn Life Ins. Co., 8 AD3d 310, 314 [complaint stated a cause of action pursuant to GBL 349 where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had improperly raised insurance rates on its flexible premium life insurance policies because it had failed to consider factors such as improvements in mortality; Elacqua v Physicians' Reciprocal Insurers, 52 AD3d 886, 888 [allegation that the defendant’s practice of not informing its insureds that they had the right to choose an independent counsel states a cause of action under GBL 349 because it “was not an isolated incident, but a routine practice that affected many similarly situated insureds”])).

[E] **Misleading Acts**

A plaintiff seeking to state a cause of action under GBL 349 must plead that the challenged act or practice was “misleading in a material way” (Lonner v Simon Prop. Group, Inc., 57 AD3d 100, 110). Whether a representation or an omission, the test is whether the deceptive practice is “likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances” (Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund, 85 NY2d at 25; Andre Strishak & Assocs., P.C. v Hewlett Packard Co., 300 AD2d

608). "Such a test . . . may be determined as a matter of law or fact (as individual cases require)" (Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund, 85 NY2d at 26)^{ix}.

[F] **Injury**

The Plaintiffs must, of course, allege an injury as a result of the deceptive act or practice (see Stutman v Chemical Bank, 95 NY2d at 29)^x. See also: Florczak v. Oberriter, 50 A.D. 3d 1440 (3d Dept. 2008)(dispute between competitors over the origin of baseball bats; " plaintiff alleges that defendants confused and misled potential consumers by falsely claiming in their advertisements that they ' manufacture ' and ' make ' baseball bats and that these bat are made in Cooperstown-the birthplace of baseball-when in fact the vast percentage of these bats are actually manufactured in a factory owned by defendants located two miles outside of Cooperstown "; no damages shown; no evidence " that the allegedly false advertisements had a deceptive or misleading impact upon a '' consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances '' and no " evidence...that such a consumer purchased a bat from defendants because they believed the bat was completely manufactured within the confines of Cooperstown "). In Sutherland v. Remax, 2008 NY Slip Op 51701(U) the Court dismissed the GBL 349 claim finding that plaintiff made generalized allegations of false advertising and failed to

demonstrate any damages.

In addition, derivative claims may not be asserted under GBL 349 [See City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.Com, 12 N.Y. 3d 616 (2009) (“ We reject the City’s assertion that it may state a cognizable section 349(h) claim ‘ simply ‘ by alleging ‘ consumer injury or harm to the public interest ‘. If a plaintiff could avoid the derivative injury bar by merely alleging that its suit would somehow benefit the public, then the very ‘ tidal wave of litigation ‘ that we have guarded against since Oswego would look ominously on the horizon “)].

[G] **Recoverable Damages**

Under GBL 349 consumers may recover actual damages in any amount, treble damages under GBL 349(h) up to \$1,000 [see Teller v. Bill Hayes, Ltd., 213 AD2d 141; Hart v. Moore (155 Misc2d 203)] and both treble damages and punitive damages [see Volt Systems Development Corp. v. Raytheon Co., 155 AD2d 309; Bianchi v. Hood, 128 AD2d 1007].

4] **False Advertising: G.B.L. § 350**

Consumers who rely upon false advertising and purchase defective goods or services may claim a violation of G.B.L. § 350

[Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corp.^{xi} (defective ' high speed ' Internet services falsely advertised); Card v. Chase Manhattan Bank^{xii} (bank misrepresented that its LifePlus Credit Insurance plan would pay off credit card balances were the user to become unemployed)]. G.B.L. § 350 prohibits false advertising which " means advertising, including labeling, of a commodity...if such advertising is misleading in a material respect...(covers)....representations made by statement, word, design, device, sound...but also... advertising (which) fails to reveal facts material "^{xiii}. G.B.L. § 350 covers a broad spectrum of misconduct [Karlin v. IVF America^{xiv} (" (this statute) on (its) face appl(ies) to virtually all economic activity and (its) application has been correspondingly broad ")].

Proof of a violation of G.B.L. 350 is straightforward, i.e., " the mere falsity of the advertising content is sufficient as a basis for the false advertising charge " [People v. Lipsitz^{xv} (magazine salesman violated G.B.L. § 350; " (the) (defendant's) business practice is generally ' no magazine, no service, no refunds " although exactly the contrary is promised "); People v. McNair ^{xvi} (" deliberate and material misrepresentations to parents enrolling their children in the Harlem Youth Enrichment Christian Academy...thereby entitling the parents to all fees paid (in the amount of \$182,393.00); civil penalties pursuant to G.B.L. 350-d of \$500 for each deceptive act or \$38,500.00 and

costs of \$2,000.00 pursuant to CPLR § 8303(a)(6) with the re-aging of consumers' accounts, Supreme Court justified that penalty by finding the practice ' particularly abhorrent ' ")].

However, unlike a claim under G.B.L. § 349 plaintiffs must prove reliance on false advertising to establish a violation of G.B.L. § 350 [In Berkman v. Robert's American Gourmet Food, Inc.^{xvii}, (a class of consumers of Pirate's Booty, Veggie Booty and Fruity Booty brands snack food alleged defendant's advertising " made false and misleading claims concerning the amount of fat and calories contained in their products ". Noting that certification of a settlement class requires heightened scrutiny [" where a class action is certified for settlement purposes only, the class prerequisites ...must still be met and indeed scrutinized "]^{xviii}, the Court denied class certification to the GBL 350 claim because individual issues of reliance predominated [" common reliance on the false representations of the fat and caloric content...cannot be presumed (in GBL 350 claims) "]^{xix}, but noted that certification of the GBL claim may be appropriate if limited to New York residents [" causes of action predicated on GBL 349 which do not require reliance (may be certifiable but) a nationwide class certification is inappropriate "]^{xx}; See also: Pelman v. McDonald's Corp.^{xxi}(G.B.L. § 350 requires proof of reliance); Leider v. Ralfe^{xxii} (G.B.L. § 350 requires proof of reliance); Gale v. International Business Machines Corp.^{xxiii}(" Reliance is not an element of a claim under (G.B.L. § 349)...claims under (G.B.L. § 350)...do require proof of reliance ")].

[A] **Unlawful Use Of Name Of Nonprofit Organization**

G.B.L. § 397 provides that “ no person...shall use for advertising purposes...the name...of any non-profit corporation ...without having first obtained the written consent of such non-profit corporation “. In Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. v. Figaro Systems, Inc.^{xxiv} the Met charged a New Mexico company with unlawfully using its name in advertising promoting its “ ‘ Simultext ‘ system which defendant claims can display a simultaneous translation of an opera as it occurs on a stage and that defendant represented that its system is installed at the Met “)].

5] **Cars, Cars, Cars**

There are a variety of consumer protection statutes available to purchasers and lessees of automobiles, new and used. A comprehensive review of five of these statutes [GBL § 198-b^{xxv} (Used Car Lemon Law), express warranty^{xxvi}, implied warranty of merchantability^{xxvii} (U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-318), Vehicle and Traffic Law [V&T] § 417, strict products liability^{xxviii}] appears in Ritchie v. Empire Ford Sales, Inc.^{xxix}, a case involving a used 1990 Ford Escort which burned up 4 ½ years after being purchased

because of a defective ignition switch. A comprehensive review of two other statutes [GBL § 198-a (New Car Lemon Law) and GBL § 396-p (New Car Contract Disclosure Rules)] appears in Borys v. Scarsdale Ford, Inc.^{xxx}, a case involving a new Ford Crown Victoria, the hood, trunk and both quarter panels of which had been negligently repainted prior to sale.

[A] **Automotive Parts Warranty: G.B.L. § 617(2)(a)**

“ The extended warranty and new parts warranty business generates extraordinary profits for the retailers of cars, trucks and automotive parts and for repair shops. It has been estimated that no more than 20% of the people who buy warranties ever use them... Of the 20% that actually try to use their warranties... (some) soon discover that the real costs can easily exceed the initial cost of the warranty certificate ”^{xxxi}. In Giarratano v. Midas Muffler^{xxxi}, Midas would not honor its brake shoe warranty unless the consumer agreed to pay for additional repairs found necessary after a required inspection of the brake system. G.B.L. § 617(2)(a) protects consumers who purchase new parts or new parts’ warranties from breakage or a failure to honor the terms and conditions of a warranty [“ If a part does not conform to the warranty...the initial seller shall make repairs as are necessary to correct the nonconformity ”^{xxxiii}]. A violation of G.B.L. § 617(2)(a) is a per se violation of G.B.L. § 349 which provides for

treble damages, attorneys fees and costs^{xxxiv}. See also: Chun v. BMW of Manhattan, Inc.^{xxxv}(misrepresented extended automobile warranty; G.B.L. § 349(h) statutory damages of \$50 awarded).

[B] Auto Repair Shop Duty To Perform Quality Repairs

Service stations should perform quality repairs. Quality repairs are those repairs held by those having knowledge and expertise in the automotive field to be necessary to bring a motor vehicle to its premalfuction or predamage condition [Welch v. Exxon Superior Service Center^{xxxvi} (consumer sought to recover \$821.75 from service station for failing to make proper repairs to vehicle; “ While the defendant’s repair shop was required by law to perform quality repairs, the fact that the claimant drove her vehicle without incident for over a year following the repairs indicates that the vehicle had been returned to its premalfuction condition following the repairs by the defendant, as required “); Shalit v. State of New York^{xxxvii}(conflict in findings in Small Claims Court in auto repair case with findings of Administrative Law Judge under VTL § 398).

[C] Implied Warranty Of Merchantability: U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-318; 2-A-212, 2-A-213; Delivery Of Non-Conforming Goods: U.C.C. § 2-608

Both new and used cars carry with them an implied warranty of merchantability [U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-318][Denny v. Ford Motor Company^{xxxviii}]. Although broader in scope than the Used Car Lemon Law the implied warranty of merchantability does have its limits, i.e., it is time barred four years after delivery[U.C.C. § 2-725; Hull v. Moore Mobile Homes Stebra, Inc^{xxxix}.,(defective mobile home; claim time barred)] and the dealer may disclaim liability under such a warranty [U.C.C. § 2-316] if such a disclaimer is written and conspicuous [Natale v. Martin Volkswagen, Inc.^{xl} (disclaimer not conspicuous); Mollins v. Nissan Motor Co., Inc.^{xli}(“ documentary evidence conclusively establishes all express warranties, implied warranties of merchantability and implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose were fully and properly disclaimed “)]. A knowing misrepresentation of the history of a used vehicle may state a claim under U.C.C. § 2-608 for the delivery of non-conforming goods [Urquhart v. Philbor Motors, Inc.^{xlii}]

[D] **Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act And Leased Vehicles: 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq**

In Tarantino v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.^{xliii}, DiCinto v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.^{xliiv} and Carter-Wright v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.^{xlv}, it

was held that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq. applies to automobile lease transactions. However, in DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.^{xlvi}, the Court of Appeals held that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not apply to automobile leases.

[E] **New Car Contract Disclosure Rule: G.B.L. § 396-p**

In Borys v. Scarsdale Ford, Inc^{xlvii}, a consumer demanded a refund or a new car after discovering that a new Ford Crown Victoria had several repainted sections. The Court discussed liability under G.B.L. § 198-a (New Car Lemon Law) and G.B.L. § 396-p(5) (Contract Disclosure Requirements) [" gives consumers statutory rescission rights ' in cases where dealers fail to provide the required notice of prior damage and repair(s)' (with a) ' retail value in excess of five percent of the lesser of manufacture's or distributor's suggested retail price "] . In Borys the Court dismissed the complaint finding (1) that under G.B.L. § 198-a the consumer must give the dealer an opportunity to cure the defect and (2) that under G.B.L. § 396-p(5) Small Claims Court would not have jurisdiction [money damages of \$3,000] to force " defendant to give...a new Crown Victoria or a full refund, minus appropriate deductions for use " .

In Levitsky v. SG Hylan Motors, Inc^{xlviii} a car dealer

overcharged a customer for a 2003 Honda Pilot and violated G.B.L. § 396-p by failing to disclose the " estimated delivery date and place of delivery...on the contract of sale ". The Court found that the violation of G.B.L. § 396-p " and the failure to adequately disclose the costs of the passive alarm and extended warranty constitutes a deceptive act (in violation of G.B.L. § 349). Damages included " \$2,251.50, the \$2,301.50 which he overpaid, less the cost of the warranty of \$50.00 " and punitive damages under G.B.L. § 349(h) bringing the award up to \$3,000.00, the jurisdictional limit of Small Claims Court.

In Spielzinger v. S.G. Hylan Motors Corp.^{xlix}(failure to disclose the true cost of " Home Care Warranty " and " Passive Alarm ", failure to comply with provisions of G.B.L. § 396-p (confusing terms and conditions, failure to notify consumer of right to cancel) and G.B.L. § 396-q (dealer failed to sign sales contract); *per se* violations of G.B.L. § 349 with damages awarded of \$734.00 (overcharge for warranty) and \$1,000 statutory damages).

And in Thompson v. Foreign Car Center, Inc.¹ a car purchaser charged a Volkswagen dealer with " misrepresentations and non-disclosures concerning price, after-market equipment, unauthorized modification and compromised manufacturer warranty protection ". The Court dismissed the claim under G.B.L. § 396-p (" While GBL § 396-p(1) and (2) state that a contract price cannot be increased

after a contract has been entered into, the record reveals that defendants appear to have substantially complied with the alternative provisions of GBL § 396-p(3) by providing plaintiffs with the buyers' form indicating the desired options and informing them they had a right to a full refund of their deposit "). However, claims under G.B.L. § 396-q and P.P.L. § 302 were sustained because defendants had failed to sign the retail installment contract.

[F] New Car Lemon Law: G.B.L. § 198-a

As stated by the Court of Appeals in Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp., v. Spitzer^{li} " In 1983, the Legislature enacted the New Car Lemon Law (G.B.L. § 198-a) ' to provide New York consumers greater protection than afforded by automobile manufacturers' express limited warranties or the Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act '". New York State's New Car Lemon Law [G.B.L. § 198-a] provides that " If the same problem cannot be repaired after four or more attempts; Or if your car is out of service to repair a problem for a total of thirty days during the warranty period; Or if the manufacturer or its agent refuses to repair a substantial defect within twenty days of receipt of notice sent by you...Then you are entitled to a comparable car or refund of the purchase price " [Borys v. Scarsdale Ford, Inc.^{lii}].

In Kandel v. Hyundai Motor America^{liii} (" The purpose of the Lemon Law is to protect purchasers of new vehicles. This law is remedial in nature and therefore should be liberally construed in favor of consumers...The plaintiff sufficiently established that the vehicle was out of service by reason of repair of one or more nonconformities, defects or conditions for a cumulative total of 30 or more calendar days within the first 18,000 miles or two years...that the defendant was unable to correct a problem that ' substantially impaired ' the value of the vehicle after a reasonable number of attempts...and the defendant failed to meet its burden of proving its affirmative defense that the stalling problem did not substantially impair the value of the vehicle to the plaintiff...plaintiff was entitled to a refund of the full purchase price of the vehicle ").

In General Motors Corp. V. Sheikh, 41 A.D. 3d 993, 838 N.Y.S. 2d 235 (2007)the Court held that a vehicle subject to " conversion " is not covered by GBL 198-a (" it is unrefuted that only evidence at the hearing regarding the cause of the leaky windshield was the expert testimony offered by petitioner's area service manager, who examined the vehicle and its lengthy repair history and opined that the leak was caused by the extensive conversion of the vehicle by American Vans " .

The consumer has no claim under G.B.L. § 198-a if the dealer has " complied with this provision by accepting the vehicle,

canceling the lease and refunding...all the payments made on account of the lease " [Mollins v. Nissan Motor Co., Inc.^{liv}] or if the " cause of the leaky windshield " was extensive alterations done after final assembly by the manufacturer [Matter of General Motors Corp. [Sheikh]^{lv}].

Before commencing a lawsuit seeking to enforce the New Car Lemon Law the dealer must be given an opportunity to cure the defect [Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Schachner^{lvi} (dealer must be afforded a reasonable number of attempts to cure defect)].

The consumer may utilize the statutory repair presumption after four unsuccessful repair attempts after which the defect is still present^{lvii}. However, the defect need not be present at the time of arbitration hearing^{lviii} [" The question of whether such language supports an interpretation that the defect exist at the time of the arbitration hearing or trial. We hold that it does not "^{lix}]. Civil Courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate Lemon Law refund remedy claims up to \$25,000.^{lx}. In Alpha Leisure, Inc. v. Leaty^{lxi} the Court approved an arbitrators award of \$149,317 as the refund price of a motor home that " was out of service many times for repair ".

Attorneys fees and costs may be awarded to the prevailing consumer [Kandel v. Hyundai Motor America^{lxii} (" plaintiff was entitled to an award of a statutory attorney's fee "); Kucher v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.^{lxiii}(" this court is mindful of the positive

public policy considerations of the ' Lemon Law ' attorney fee provisions... Failure to provide a consumer such recourse would undermine the very purpose of the Lemon Law and foreclose the consumer's ability to seek redress as contemplated by the Lemon Law "); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Karman^{lxiv}(\$5,554.35 in attorneys fees and costs of \$300.00 awarded)].

[F.1] **Used Cars**

In Matter of City Line Auto Mall, Inc. v. Mintz^{lxv} a used car dealer was charged with failing to provide consumers with essential information regarding the used vehicles they purchased. The Court found that " Substantial evidence supports the findings that for more than two years petitioner engaged in deceptive trade practices and committed other violations of its used-car license by failing to provide consumers with essential information (Administrative Code 20-700, 20-701[a][2], namely the FTC Buyers Guide (16 CFR 455.2) containing such information as the vehicle's make, model, VIN, warranties and service contract; offering vehicles for sale without the price being posted (Administrative Code 20-7-8), failing to have a ' Notice to Our Customers ' sign conspicuously posted within the business premises (6 RCNY 2-103[g][1][v]) and carrying on its business off of the licensed premises (Administrative Code 20-268[a])...We reject petitioner's argument that respondent's authority to license and

regulate used-car dealers is preempted by State law. While Vehicle and Traffic Law 415 requires that used-car dealers be registered, the State has not assumed full regulatory responsibility for their licensing “.

[G] Used Car Dealer Licensing: C.P.L.R. § 3015(e)

In B & L Auto Group, Inc. v. Zilog^{lxvi} a used car dealer sued a customer to collect the \$2,500.00 balance due on the sale of a used car. Because the dealer failed to have a Second Hand Automobile Dealer’s license pursuant to New York City Department of Consumer Affairs when the car was sold the Court refused to enforce the sales contract pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 3015(e).

[H] Used Car Extended Warranty

In Goldsberry v. Mark Buick Pontiac GMC^{lxvii} the Court noted that plaintiff “ bought a used automobile and a ‘ SmartChoice 2000 ‘ extended warranty, only later to claim that neither choice was very smart “. Distinguishing Barthley v. Autostar Funding LLC^{lxviii} [which offered “ a tempting peg upon which the Court can hang its robe “] the Court found for plaintiff in the amount \$1,119.00 [cost of the worthless extended warranty] plus 9% interest.

[I] Used Car Lemon Law: G.B.L. § 198-b

New York State's Used Car Lemon Law [G.B.L. § 198-b] provides limited warranty protection for used cars costing more than \$1,500 depending upon the number of miles on the odometer [e.g., 18,000 miles to 36,000 miles a warranty " for at least 90 days or 4,000 miles ", 36,000 miles to 80,000 miles a warranty " for at least 60 days or 3,000 miles " and 80,000 miles to 100,000 miles a warranty " for 30 days or 3,000 miles "] [Cintron v. Tony Royal Quality Used Cars, Inc.^{lxxix} (defective 1978 Chevy Malibu returned within thirty days and full refund awarded)]. Used car dealers must be given an opportunity to cure a defect before the consumer may commence a lawsuit enforcing his or her rights under the Used Car Lemon Law [Milan v. Yonkers Avenue Dodge, Inc.^{lxx} (dealer must have opportunity to cure defects in used 1992 Plymouth Sundance)].

The Used Car Lemon Law does not preempt other consumer protection statutes [Armstrong v. Boyce^{lxxi}], does not apply to used cars with more than 100,000 miles when purchased^{lxxii} and has been applied to used vehicles with coolant leaks [Fortune v. Scott Ford, Inc.^{lxxiii}], malfunctions in the steering and front end mechanism [Jandreau v. LaVigne^{lxxiv}, Diaz v. Audi of America, Inc.^{lxxv}], stalling and engine knocking [Ireland v. JL's Auto Sales, Inc.^{lxxvi}], vibrations [Williams v. Planet Motor Car, Inc.^{lxxvii}],

“ vehicle would not start and the ‘ check engine ‘ light was on “ [DiNapoli v. Peak Automotive, Inc.^{1xxviii}] and malfunctioning “ flashing data communications link light “ [Felton v. World Class Cars^{1xxix}]. An arbitrator’s award may be challenged in a special proceeding [C.P.L.R. 7502][Lipscomb v. Manfredi Motors^{1xxx}] and “ does not necessarily preclude a consumer from commencing a subsequent action provided that the same relief is not sought in the litigation [Felton v. World Class Cars^{1xxxi}]. In Hurley v. Suzuki, New York Law Journal, February 3, 2009, p. 27, col. 1 (Suffolk District Court 2009) the Court held arbitration was not a precondition to a used car Lemon Law lawsuit [“ Unlike the Lemon law situation with ‘ new cars ‘ which sets up mandatory arbitration and creates liability for the manufacturers; used cars are sold by a much more diverse universe of entities. The corner “ used car lot “ may or may not have the resources or wherewithal to implement an arbitration system which comports with the requirements of Federal and New York State Law “].

Recoverable damages include the return of the purchase price and repair and diagnostic costs [Williams v. Planet Motor Car, Inc.^{1xxxii} , Sabeno v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, 20 A.D. 3d 466, 799 N.Y.S. 2d 527 (2005)(consumer obtained judgment in Civil Court for full purchase price of \$20,679.60 “ with associated costs, interest on the loan and prejudgment interest “

which defendant refused to pay [and also refused to accept return of vehicle]; instead of enforcing the judgment in Civil Court the consumer commenced a new action, two claims of which [violation of U.C.C. § 2-717 and G.B.L. § 349] were dismissed)] and attorneys' fees [Diaz v. Audi of America, 50 A.D. 3d 728 (2d Dept. 2008)(after non jury trial defendant liable on breach of warranty and violation of GBL 198-b and plaintiff awarded damages of \$16,528.38 and \$25,000 in attorneys fees; on appeal attorneys increased to \$7,500 for initial attorney and \$22,500 for trial attorney)].

[J] Warranty Of Serviceability: V.T.L. § 417

Used car buyers are also protected by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 417 [" VTL § 417 "] which requires used car dealers to inspect vehicles and deliver a certificate to buyers stating that the vehicle is in condition and repair to render, under normal use, satisfactory and adequate service upon the public highway at the time of delivery. V&T § 417 is a non-waiveable, nondisclaimable, indefinite, warranty of serviceability which has been liberally construed [Barilla v. Gunn Buick Cadillac-GNC, Inc.^{lxxxiii}; Ritchie v. Empire Ford Sales, Inc.^{lxxxiv} (dealer liable for Ford Escort that burns up 4 ½ years after purchase); People v. Condor Pontiac^{lxxxv} (used car dealer violated G.B.L. § 349 and V.T.L. §

417 in failing to disclose that used car was " previously used principally as a rental vehicle "; " In addition (dealer violated) 15 NYCRR §§ 78.10(d), 78.11(12), (13)...fraudulently and/or illegally forged the signature of one customer, altered the purchase agreements of four customers after providing copies to them, and transferred retail certificates of sale to twelve (12) purchasers which did not contain odometer readings...(Also) violated 15 NYCRR § 78.13(a) by failing to give the purchaser a copy of the purchase agreement in 70 instances (all of these are deceptive acts) "]; recoverable damages include the return of the purchase price and repair and diagnostic costs [Williams v. Planet Motor Car, Inc.^{lxxxvi}].

[K] **Repossession & Sale Of Vehicle: U.C.C. § 9-611(b)**

In Coxall v. Clover Commercial Corp.^{lxxxvii}, the consumer purchased a " 1991 model Lexus automobile, executing a Security Agreement/Retail Installment Contract. The ' cash price ' on the Contract was \$8,100.00 against which the Coxalls made a ' cash downpayment ' of \$3,798.25 ". After the consumers stopped making payments because of the vehicle experienced mechanical difficulties the Lexus was repossessed and sold. In doing so, however, the secured party failed to comply with U.C.C. § 9-611(b) which requires " ' a reasonable authenticated notification of

disposition ' to the debtor " and U.C.C § 9-610(b) (" the sale must be ' commercially reasonable ' "). Statutory damages awarded offset by defendant's breach of contract damages.

[L] Wrecked Cars

In Jung v. The Major Automotive Companies, Inc.^{lxxxviii} a class of 40,000 car purchasers charged the defendant with fraud " in purchas(ing) automobiles that were ' wrecked ' or ' totaled ' in prior accidents, had them repaired and sold them to unsuspecting consumers...purposely hid the prior accidents from consumers in an attempt to sell the repaired automobiles at a higher price for a profit ". The parties jointly moved for preliminary approval of a proposed settlement featuring (1) a \$250 credit towards the purchase of any new or used car, (2) a 10% discount for the purchase of repairs, parts or services, (3) for the next three years each customer who purchases a used car shall receive a free CarFax report and a description of a repair, if any and (4) training of sales representatives " to explain a car's maintenance history ", (5) projected settlement value of \$4 million, (6) class representative incentive award of \$10,000, and (7) \$480,000 for attorneys fees, costs and expenses. The Court preliminarily certified the settlement class, approved the proposed settlement and set a date for a fairness hearing.

[M] Inspection Stations

In Stiver v. Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc.^{lxxxix} the plaintiff was

involved in an automobile accident and sued an automobile inspection station for negligent inspection of one of the vehicles in the accident. In finding no liability the Court held “ as a matter of public policy we are unwilling to force inspection stations to insure against risks ‘ the amount of which they may not know and cannot control, and as to which contractual limitations of liability [might] be ineffective ‘...If New York State motor vehicle inspection stations become subject to liability for failure to detect safety-related problems in inspected cars, they would be turned into insurers. This transformation would increase their liability insurance premiums and the modest cost of a State-mandated safety and emission inspection (\$12 at the time of the inspection in this case) would inevitably increase “).

[6] **Educational Services**

In Drew v. Sylvan Learning Center Corp.^{xc} parents enrolled their school age children in an educational services^{xc_i} program which promised “ The Sylvan Guarantee. Your child will improve at least one full grade level equivalent in reading or math within 36 hours of instruction or we’ll provide 12 additional hours of instruction at no further cost to you “. After securing an \$11,000 loan to pay for the defendant’s services and eight months, thrice weekly, on one hour tutoring sessions the parents were shocked when “ based on the Board of Education’s standards, it was concluded that neither child met the grade level

requirements. As a result plaintiff's daughter was retained in second grade ".

The Court found (1) fraudulent misrepresentation noting that no evidence was introduced " regarding Sylvan's standards, whether those standards were aligned with the New York City Board of Education's standards, or whether Sylvan had any success with students who attended New York City public schools ", (2) violation of GBL 349 citing Brown v. Hambric^{xcii}, Cambridge v. Telemarketing Concepts^{xciii} and People v. McNair^{xciv} in that " defendant deceived consumers...by guaranteeing that its services would improve her children's grade levels and there by implying that its standards were aligned with the Board of Education's standards " and (3) unconscionability [" There is absolutely no reason why a consumer interested in improving her children's academic status should not be made aware, prior to engaging Sylvan's services, that these services cannot, with any reasonable probability, guarantee academic success. Hiding its written disclaimer within the progress report and diagnostic assessment is unacceptable "]. See also: Andre v. Pace University^{xcv} (failing to deliver computer programming course for beginners).

[7] Food: Caloric Information

In New York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of Health^{xvii}

restaurant owners challenged constitutionality of New York City Health Code Section 81.50 (“ Regulation 81.50 “) which “ requires certain chain restaurants that sell standardized meals to post caloric content information on their menus and on their menu boards “. The Court found that Regulation 81.50 is not preempted by the federal Nutrition, Labeling and Education Act (NELA) and is reasonably related the New York City’s interest in reducing obesity. “ The City submitted evidence that...people tend to underestimate the calorie content of restaurant foods...that many consumers report looking at calorie information on packaged goods and changing their purchasing habits...that, after the introduction of mandatory nutrition labeling on packaged foods, food manufacturers began to offer reformulated and ‘ nutritionally improved ‘ product- suggesting that consumer demand for such products is promoted by increased consumer awareness of the nutritional content of available food options “.

[8] **Franchising** [Emfore Corp. v. Blimpie Associates, Ltd., 51 A.D. 3d 434 (1st Dept. 2008) (franchisee stated claim of violation of GBL 683 and 687 (Franchise Act) asserting oral misrepresentations; “ Indeed, by requesting franchisees to disclose whether a franchisor’s representatives made statements concerning the financial prospects for the franchise during the sales process, franchisors can effectively root out dishonest sales personnel and avoid sales secured by fraud. However, defendant, in direct contravention of the laudatory goal it claims

to be advancing, is asking this Court to construe the representations made by plaintiff is the questionnaire as a waiver of fraud claims Such waivers are barred by the Franchise Act. Accordingly, defendant's attempt to utilize the representations as a defense must be rejected "; breach of contract and fraud claims dismissed)].

[9] **Homes, Apartments And Co-Ops**

[A] **Home Improvement Contracts & Frauds: G.B.L. §§ 771, 772**

G.B.L. § 771 requires that home improvement contracts be in writing and executed by both parties. A failure to sign a home improvement contract means it can not be enforced in a breach of contract action [Precision Foundations v. Ives^{xcvii}]. However, a court may overlook the absence of a written contract to protect consumers. In Cristillo v. Custom Construction Services, Inc.^{xcviii} the Court stated " the question then becomes how the GBL applies in this case and whether the Builder can use its provisions as a sword rather than a shield...Article 36 of the (GBL) is at its heart a consumer protection law. Sanctions may be imposed on builders but not homeowners for non-compliance. Underlying GBL Section 771 is a legislative concern that the myriad problems which might arise in home construction or remodeling work need to

be clearly spelled out in a written contract signed by the homeowner and contractors...The court finds it would (not) be in the interest of justice...to allow the defendant to benefit from his failure to comply with the requirements of the (GBL) by retaining the entire amount he has received ").

G.B.L. § 772 provides homeowners victimized by unscrupulous home improvement contractors [who make " false or fraudulent written statements "] with statutory damages of \$500.00, reasonable attorneys fees and actual damages [Udezeh v. A+Plus Construction Co.^{xcix} (statutory damages of \$500.00, attorneys fees of \$1,500.00 and actual damages of \$3,500.00 awarded); Garan v. Don & Walt Sutton Builders, Inc.^c(construction of a new, custom home falls within the coverage of G.B.L. § 777(2) and not G.B.L. § 777-a(4))].

[A.1] Home Inspections

In Carney v. Coull Building Inspections, Inc.^{ci} the home buyer alleged that the defendant licensed home inspector " failed to disclose a defective heating system " which subsequently was replaced with a new " heating unit at a cost of \$3,400.00 " although the " defendant pointed out in the report that the hot water heater was ' very old ' and " has run past its life expectancy ". In finding for the plaintiff the Court noted that

although the defendant's damages would be limited to the \$395.00 fee paid [See e.g., Ricciardi v. Frank d/b/a/ InspectAmerica Enginerring, P.C.^{cii} (civil engineer liable for failing to discover wet basement)] and no private right of action existed under the Home Improvement Licensing Statute, Real Property Law 12-B, the plaintiff did have a claim under GBL 349 because of defendant's " failure...to comply with RPL Article 12-B " by not including important information on the contract such as the " inspector's licensing information ".

In Mancuso v. Rubin^{ciii} the plaintiffs retained the services of a home inspector prior to purchasing a house and relied on the inspector's report stating " no ' active termites or termite action was apparent '" but disclaimed by also stating that the " termite inspection certification " was "' not a warranty or a guaranty that there are no termites " and its liability, if any, would be " limited to the \$200 fee paid for those services ". After the closing the plaintiffs claim they discovered " extensive termite infestation and water damage which caused the home to uninhabitable and necessitated extensive repair ". The Court found no gross negligence or fraud and limited contractual damages to the \$200 fee paid. As for the homeowners the complaint was dismissed as well since no misrepresentations were made and the house was sold " as is " [see Simone v. Homecheck Real Estate Services Inc.^{civ}]

[B] Home Improvement Contractor Licensing: C.P.L.R. § 3015(e); G.B.L. Art. 36-A; RCNY § 2-221; N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 20-387, Nassau County Administrative Code § 21-11.2

Homeowners often hire home improvement contractors to repair or improve their homes or property. Home improvement contractors must, at least, be licensed by the Department of Consumer Affairs of New York City, Westchester County, Suffolk County, Rockland County, Putnam County and Nassau County if they are to perform services in those Counties [C.P.L.R. § 3015(e)][see People v. Biegler^{cv}(noting the differences between NYC Administrative Code 20-386 and Nassau County Administrative Code 21-11.1.7 (“ there is no requirement under the Nassau County home improvement ordinance that the People plead or prove that the ‘ owner ’ of the premises did actually reside at or intend to reside at the place where the home improvement was performed in order to maintain liability under the ordinance “)].

Should the home improvement contractor be unlicensed he will be unable to sue the homeowner for non-payment for services rendered [Flax v. Hommel^{cv1} (“ Since Hommel was not individually licensed pursuant to Nassau County Administrative Code § 21-11.2 at the time the contract was entered and the work performed, the alleged contract...was unenforceable “); CLE Associates, Inc. v.

Greene,^{cvii} (N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 20-387; “ it is undisputed that CLE...did not possess a home improvement license at the time the contract allegedly was entered into or the subject work was performed...the contract at issue concerned ‘ home improvement ‘...the Court notes that the subject licensing statute, §20-387, must be strictly construed “); Goldman v. Fay^{cviii} (“ although claimant incurred expenses for repairs to the premises, none of the repairs were done by a licensed home improvement contractor...(G.B.L. art 36-A; 6 RCNY 2-221). It would violate public policy to permit claimant to be reimbursed for work done by an unlicensed contractor “); Tri-State General Remodeling Contractors, Inc v. Inderdai Baijnauth^{cix cx}(salesmen do not have to have a separate license); Franklin Home Improvements Corp. V. 687 6th Avenue Corp.^{cxii}(home improvement contractor licensing does not apply to commercial businesses (“ [t]he legislative purpose in enacting [CPLR 3015(e)] was not to strengthen contractor’s rights but to benefit consumers by shifting the burden from the homeowner to the contractor to establish that the contractor was licensed “); Altered Structure, Inc. v. Solkin^{cxiii}(contractor unable to seek recovery for home improvement work “ there being no showing that it was licensed “); Routier v. Waldeck^{cxiii} (“ The Home Improvement Business provisions...were enacted to safeguard and protect consumers against fraudulent practices and inferior work by those who would

hold themselves out as home improvement contractors "); Colorito v. Crown Heating & Cooling, Inc.^{cxiv}, (" Without a showing of proper licensing, defendant (home improvement contractor) was not entitled to recover upon its counterclaim (to recover for work done) " Cudahy v. Cohen^{cxv} (unlicensed home improvement contractor unable to sue homeowner in Small Claims Courts for unpaid bills); Moonstar Contractors, Inc. v. Katsir^{cxvi}(license of sub-contractor can not be used by general contractor to meet licensing requirements)].

Obtaining a license during the performance of the contract may be sufficient [Mandioc Developers, Inc. v. Millstone^{cxvii}] while obtaining a license after performance of the contract is not sufficient[B&F Bldg. Corp. V. Liebig^{cxviii} (" The legislative purpose...was not to strengthen contractor's rights, but to benefit consumers by shifting the burden from the homeowner to the contractor to establish that the contractor is licensed "); CLE Associates, Inc. v. Greene,^{cxix}].

Licenses to operate a home improvement business may be denied based upon misconduct [Naclerio v. Pradham^{cxx} ("... testimony was not credible...lack of regard for a number of its suppliers and customers...Enterprises was charged with and pleaded guilty to violations of Rockland County law insofar as it demanded excessive down payments from its customers, ignored the three-day right-to-cancel notice contained in its contract and unlawfully conducted

business under a name other than that pursuant to which it was licensed ")].

[C] New Home Housing Merchant Implied Warranty: G.B.L. § 777

G.B.L. § 777 provides, among other things, for a statutory housing merchant warranty^{cxxi} for the sale of a new house which for (1) one year warrants " the home will be free from defects due to a failure to have been constructed in a skillful manner " and for (2) two years warrants that " the plumbing, electrical, heating, cooling and ventilation systems of the home will be free from defects due to a failure by the builder to have installed such systems in a skillful manner " and for (3) six years warrants " the home will free from material defects " [See e.g., Etter v. Bloomingdale Village Corp.^{cxxii}(breach of housing merchant implied warranty claim regarding defective tub sustained; remand on damages)].

In Farrell v. Lane Residential, Inc.^{cxxiii}, after a seven day trial, the Court found that the developer had violated G.B.L. § 777-a regarding " defects with regard to the heating plant; plumbing; improper construction placement and installation of fireplace; master bedroom; carpentry defects specifically in the kitchen area; problems with air conditioning unit; exterior defects and problems with the basement such that the home was not reasonably tight from water and seepage ". With respect to damages

the Court found that the cost to cure the defects was \$35,952.00. Although the plaintiffs sought damages for the " stigma (that) has attached to the property " [see Putnam v. State of New York^{cxxiv}] the Court denied the request for a failure to present " any comparable market data ".

The statutory " Housing Merchant Implied Warranty may be excluded or modified by the builder of a new home if the buyer is offered a limited warranty that meets or exceeds statutory standards " [Farrell v. Lane Residential, Inc.^{cxxv} (Limited Warranty not enforced because " several key sections including the name and address of builder, warranty date and builder's limit of total liability " were not completed)].

The statute may not apply to a " custom home " [Security Supply Corporation v. Ciocca^{cxxvi}(" Supreme Court correctly declined to charge the jury with the statutory new home warranty provisions of (GBL) 777-a. Since the single-family home was to be constructed on property owned by the Devereauxs, it falls within the statutory definition of a ' custom home ' contained in (GBL) 777(7). Consequently, the provisions of (GBL) 777-a do not automatically apply to the parties' contract ")]. " While the housing merchant implied warranty under (G.B.L. § 777-a) is automatically applicable to the sale of a new home, it does not apply to a contract for the construction of a ' custom home ', this is, a single family residence to be constructed on the

purchaser's own property " [Sharpe v. Mann^{cxxvii}] and, hence, an arbitration agreement in a construction contract for a custom home may be enforced notwithstanding reference in contract to G.B.L. § 777-a [Sharpe v. Mann^{cxxviii}].

This Housing Merchant Implied Warranty can not be repudiated by " an ' as is ' clause with no warranties " [Zyburo v. Bristled Five Corporation Development Pinewood Manor^{cxxix} (" Defendant attempted to...Modify the Housing Merchant Implied Warranty by including an ' as is ' provision in the agreement. Under (G.B.L. § 777-b) the statutory Housing Merchant Implied Warranty may be excluded or modified by the builder of a new home only if the buyer is offered a limited warranty that meets or exceeds statutory standards [Latiuk v. Faber Construction Co., Inc.^{cxxx}; Fumarelli v. Marsam Development, Inc.^{cxxxi}] .

The statute requires timely notice from aggrieved consumers [Finnegan v. Hill^{cxxxi}(" Although the notice provisions of the limited warranty were in derogation of the statutory warranty (see (G.B.L. § 777-b(4)(g)) the notices of claim served by the plaintiff were nonetheless untimely "); Biancone v. Bossi^{cxxxiii}(plaintiff's breach of warranty claim that defendant contractor failed " to paint the shingles used in the construction...(And) add sufficient topsoil to the property "; failure " to notify...of these defects pursuant to...(G.B.L. § 777-a(4)(a) "); Rosen v. Watermill Development Corp.^{cxxxiv} (notice adequately alleged in complaint); Taggart v. Martano^{cxxxv}(failure to allege compliance

with notice requirements (G.B.L. § 777-a(4)(a)) fatal to claim for breach of implied warranty); Testa v. Liberatore^{cxxxvi} (“ prior to bringing suit (plaintiff must) provide defendant with a written notice of a warranty claim for breach of the housing merchant implied warranty ”); Randazzo v. Abram Zylberberg^{cxxxvii}(defendant waived right “ to receive written notice pursuant to (G.B.L. § 777-1(4)(a) “)].

[D] Movers, Household Goods: 17 N.Y.C.R.R. § 814.7

In Goretsky v. ½ Price Movers, Inc^{cxxxviii} claimant asserted that a mover hired to transport her household goods “ did not start at time promised, did not pick-up the items in the order she wanted and when she objected (the mover) refused to remove her belongings unless they were paid in full “. The Court noted the absence of effective regulations of movers. “ The biggest complaint is that movers refuse to unload the household goods unless they are paid...The current system is, in effect, extortion where customers sign documents that they are accepting delivery without complaint solely to get their belongings back. This situation is unconscionable “. The Court found a violation of 17 N.Y.C.R.R. § 814.7 when the movers “ refused to unload the entire shipment “, violations of G.B.L. § 349 in “ that the failure to unload the household goods and hold them ‘ hostage ‘ is a deceptive practice “

and a failure to disclose relevant information in the contract and awarded statutory damages of \$50.00.

[E] Real Estate Brokers' Licenses: R.P.L. § 441(b)

In Olukotun v. Reiff^{cxix} the plaintiff wanted to purchase a legal two family home but was directed to a one family with an illegal apartment. After refusing to purchase the misrepresented two family home she demanded reimbursement of the \$400 cost of the home inspection. Finding that the real estate broker violated the competency provisions of R.P.L. § 441(1)(b) (a real estate broker should have " competency to transact the business of real estate broker in such a manner as to safeguard the interests of the public "), the Court awarded damages of \$400 with interest, costs and disbursements.

[F] Arbitration Agreements: G.B.L. § 399-c

In Baronoff v. Kean Development Co., Inc.^{cx1} the petitioners entered into construction contracts with respondent to manage and direct renovation of two properties. The agreement contained an arbitration clause which respondent sought to enforce after petitioners terminated the agreement refusing to pay balance due. Relying upon Ragucci v. Professional Construction Services^{cxli},

the Court, in “ a case of first impression ”, found that G.B.L. § 399-c barred the mandatory arbitration clause and, further, that petitioners’ claims were not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act [While the (FAA) may in some cases preempt a state statute such as section 399-c, it may only do so in transactions ‘ affecting commerce ‘ ”].

[G] Real Property Condition Disclosure Act: R.P.L. §§ 462-465

With some exceptions [Real Property Law § 463] Real Property Law § 462 [“ RPL ”] requires sellers of residential real property to file a disclosure statement detailing known defects. Sellers are not required to undertake an inspection but must answer 48 questions about the condition of the real property. A failure to file such a disclosure statement allows the buyer to receive a \$500 credit against the agreed upon price at closing [RPL § 465] . A seller who files such a disclosure statement “ shall be liable only for a willful failure to perform the requirements of this article. For such a wilfull failure, the seller shall be liable for the actual damages suffered by the buyer in addition to any other existing equitable or statutory relief ” [RPL 465(2)].

Notwithstanding New York’s adherence to the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of real estate “ and imposed no liability on a seller for failing to disclose information regarding the premises

when the parties deal at arm's length, unless there is some conduct on the part of the seller which constitutes active concealment ^{cxlii} there have been two significant developments in protecting purchasers of real estate.

First, as stated by the Courts in Ayres v. Pressman^{cxliii} and Calvente v. Levy^{cxliv} any misrepresentations in the Property Condition Disclosure Statement mandated by RPL 462 provides a separate cause of action for defrauded home buyers entitling plaintiff " to recover his actual damages arising out of the material misrepresentations set forth on the disclosure form notwithstanding the ' as is ' clause contained in the contract of sale ^{cxlv}.

Second, the Court in Simone v. Homecheck Real Estate Services, Inc.^{cxlvi}, held that " when a seller makes a false representation in a Disclosure Statement, such a representation may be proof of active concealment...the alleged false representations by the sellers in the Disclosure Statement support a cause of action alleging fraudulent misrepresentation in that such false representations may be proof of active concealment ".

[H] Warranty Of Habitability: R.P.L. § 235-b

Tenants in Spatz v. Axelrod Management Co.^{cxlvii} and coop owners in Seecharin v. Radford Court Apartment Corp.^{cxlviii} brought actions

for damages done to their apartments by the negligence of landlords, managing agents or others, i.e., water damage from external or internal sources. Such a claim may invoke Real Property Law § 235-b [“ RPL § 235-b ”], a statutory warranty of habitability in every residential lease “ that the premises...are fit for human habitation “. RPL § 235-b “ has provided consumers with a powerful remedy to encourage landlords to maintain apartments in a decent, livable condition “^{cxlix} and may be used affirmatively in a claim for property damage^{cl} or as a defense in a landlord’s action for unpaid rent^{cli}. Recoverable damages may include apartment repairs, loss of personal property and discomfort and disruption^{clii}.

[I] **Duty To Keep Rental Premises In Good Repair: M.D.L. § 78.**

In Goode v. Bay Towers Apartments Corp.^{cliii} the tenant sought damages from his landlord arising from burst water pipes under Multiple Dwelling Law § 78 which provides that “ Every multiple dwelling...shall be kept in good repair “. The Court applied the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* and awarded damages of \$264.87 for damaged sneakers and clothing, \$319.22 for bedding and \$214.98 for a Playstation and joystick.

[10] **Insurance**

A] Insurance Coverage And Rates [Gaidon v. Guardian Life

Insurance Co. & Goshen v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.^{cliv}

(misrepresentations that " out-of-pocket premium payments (for life insurance policies) would vanish within a stated period of time "); Tahir v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.^{clv}(trial on whether " a no-fault health service provider's claim for compensation for charges for an electrical test identified as Current Perception Threshold Testing " is a compensable no-fault claim); Beller v. William Penn Life Ins. Co.^{clvi}(" Here, the subject insurance contract imposed a continuing duty upon the defendant to consider the factors comprising the cost of insurance before changing rates and to review the cost of insurance rates at least once every five years to determine if a change should be made "); Monter v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co.^{clvii}(misrepresentations with respect to the terms " Flexible Premium Variable Life Insurance Policy "); Skibinsky v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.^{clviii} (misrepresentation of the coverage of a " builder's risk " insurance policy); Brenkus v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.^{clix}(misrepresentations by insurance agent as to amount of life insurance coverage); Makastchian v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc.^{clx} (practice of terminating health insurance policies without providing 30 days notice violated terms of policy and was a

deceptive business practice because subscribers may have believed they had health insurance when coverage had already been canceled); Whitfield v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.^{clxi}(automobile owner sues insurance company seeking payment for motor vehicle destroyed by fire; “ Civil Court in general, and the Small Claims Part is particular, may entertain “ insurance claims which involve disputes over coverage).

B] Insurance Claims Procedures [Shebar v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.^{clxii}(“ Allegations that despite promises to the contrary in its standard-form policy sold to the public, defendants made practice of ‘ not investigating claims for long-term disability benefits in good faith, in a timely fashion, and in accordance with acceptable medical standards...when the person submitting the claim...is relatively young and suffers from a mental illness ‘, stated cause of action pursuant to (G.B.L.) § 349 “); Edelman v. O’Toole-Ewald Art Associates, Inc.^{clxiii}(“ action by an art collector against appraisers hire by his property insurer to evaluate damage to one of his paintings while on loan “; failure to demonstrate duty, reliance and actual or pecuniary harm); Makuch v. New York Central Mutual Fire Ins. Co.^{clxiv} (“ violation of (G.B.L. § 349 for disclaiming) coverage under a homeowner’s policy for damage caused when a falling tree struck plaintiff’s home “); Acquista v. New York Life Ins. Co.^{clxv} (“ allegation that

the insurer makes a practice of inordinately delaying and then denying a claim without reference to its viability "" may be said to fall within the parameters of an unfair or deceptive practice "; Rubinoff v. U.S. Capitol Insurance Co.^{clxvi} (automobile insurance company fails to provide timely defense to insured)].

[C] **Provision Of Independent Counsel**: In Elacqua v. Physicians' Reciprocal Insurers^{clxvii} (" Elacqua I ") the Court held that " when the existence of covered and uncovered claims gives rise to a conflict of interest between and insurer and its insureds, the insured is entitled to independent counsel of his or her choosing at the expense of the insurer ". Subsequently, in Elacqua II^{clxviii} the Court, allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint asserting a violation of GBL 349, noted that " the partial disclaimer letter sent by defendant to its insureds...failed to inform them that they had the right to select independent counsel at defendants expense, instead misadvising that plaintiffs could retain counsel to protect their uninsured interests ' at [their] own expense '. Equally disturbing is the fact that defendant continued to send similar letters to its insureds, failing to inform them of their rights, even after this Court's pronouncement in Elacqua I ". The Court held that "This threat of divided loyalty and conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured is the precise evil sought to be

remedied...Defendant's failure to inform plaintiffs of this right, together with plaintiffs' showing that undivided and uncompromised conflict-free representation was not provided to them, constituted harm within the meaning of (GBL) 349".

[D] **No Fault Reimbursement Rates**: In Globe Surgical Supply v. GEICO^{clix} a class of durable medical equipment { DME } providers alleged that GEICO " violated the regulations promulgated by the New York State Insurance Department...pursuant to the no-fault provisions of the Insurance Law, by systematically reducing its reimbursement for medical equipment and supplies...based on what it deemed to be ' the prevailing rate in the geographic location of the provider ' or ' the reasonable and customary rate for the item billed '. In denying certification the Court found that Globe had met all of the class certification prerequisites except adequacy of representation since, *inter alia*, GEICO had asserted a counterclaim and as a result Globe may be " preoccupied with defenses unique to it ".

[E] **Insurance Bid Rigging** [In People v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 57 A.D. 3d 378 (1st Dept. 2008) the Attorney General asserted claims of bid rigging in violation of the Donnelly Act [GBL 340[2]] which the Court sustained on a motion to dismiss [" Here, the Attorney General sued to redress injury to its ' quasi-sovereign interest in securing an honest marketplace for all consumers '...free of bid rigging ".

[11] **Mortgages, Credit Cards And Loans**

- [A] Fair Credit Reporting Act: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq
- [B] Home Ownership and Equity Protection: 15 U.S.C. § 1639
- [C] Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act: 12 U.S.C. § 2601
- [D] Regulation Z: 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq.
- [E] Truth In Lending Act: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq
- [E.1] Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692

Consumers may sue for a violation of several federal statutes which seek to protect borrowers, including the

[A] **Truth In Lending Act**, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1665 [TILA^{clxx}]

[JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Tec^{clxxi} (" The purpose of the TILA is to ensure a meaningful disclosure of the cost of credit to enable consumers to readily compare the various terms available to them, and the TILA disclosure statement will be examined in the context of the other documents involved "); Deutsche Bank National Trust v. West^{clxxii}(" The Truth in Lending Act was enacted to ' assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that [consumers] will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to [them] and avoid the uninformed use of credit '...if the creditor fails to deliver the material disclosures required or the notice of the right to rescind, the three day rescission period may be

extended to three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or until the property is sold, whichever occurs first “); Community Mutual Savings Bank v. Gillen^{clxxiii} (borrower counterclaims in Small Claims Court for violation of TILA and is awarded rescission of loan commitment with lender and damages of \$400.00; “ TILA (protects consumers) from the inequities in their negotiating position with respect to credit and loan institutions...(TILA) requir(es) lenders to provide standard information as to costs of credit including the annual percentage rate, fees and requirements of repayment...(TILA) is liberally construed in favor of the consumer...The borrower is entitled to rescind the transaction ‘ until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery of the information and rescission forms required ... together with a statement containing the material disclosures required... whichever is later...The consumer can opt to rescind for any reasons, or for no reason “); Rochester Home Equity, Inc. v. Upton^{clxxiv} (mortgage lock-in fee agreements are covered by TILA and RESPA; “ There is nothing in the New York regulations concerning lock-in agreements that sets out what disclosures are required and when they must be made...In keeping with the trend toward supplying consumers with more information than market forces alone would provide, TILA is meant to permit a more judicious use of credit by consumers through a ‘ meaningful disclosure of credit terms ‘...It would clearly

violate the purpose behind TILA and RESPA to allow fees to be levied before all disclosures were made...the court holds that contracts to pay fees such as the lock-in agreements must be preceded by all the disclosures that federal law requires ") ,

[B] **Fair Credit Reporting Act**, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 [Citibank (South Dakota) NA v. Beckerman^{clxxv} (" The billing error notices allegedly sent by defendant were untimely since more than 60 days elapsed from the date the first periodic statement reflecting the alleged errors was transmitted "); Ladino v. Bank of America^{clxxvi}(plaintiff alleges that defendant negligently published false credit information which constituted violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act and GBL 349; no private right of action under Fair Credit Reporting Act and plaintiff " never notified any credit reporting agency that he was disputing the accuracy of information provided by defendant "); Tyk v. Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc.^{clxxvii} (consumer who recovered damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act denied an award of attorneys fees (" more must be shown than simply prevailing in litigation. It must be shown that the party who did not prevail acted in bad faith or for purposes of harassment ")].],

[C] **Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act**, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 [RESPA] [Iyare v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP^{clxxviii} (borrower's "

entitlement to damages pursuant to (RESPA) for alleged improper late charges (dismissed because) none of plaintiff's payments during the relevant period...was made in a timely fashion ")],

[D] **Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act**, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1639 [HOEPA][Bank of New York v. Walden^{clxxix} (counterclaiming borrowers allege violations of TILA, HOEPA and Regulation Z; " mortgages were placed on...defendants' properties without their knowledge or understanding. Not the slightest attempt at compliance with applicable regulations was made by the lenders. No Truth in Lending disclosures or copies of any of the loan documents signed at the closing were given to the defendants. Thus, plaintiffs did not comply with TILA and Regulation Z...It also appears that the lenders violated HOEPA and Regulation Z in that they extended credit to the defendant based on their collateral rather than considering their incomes...The lenders also violated Regulation Z which prohibits lenders from entering into a balloon payment note with borrowers on high-interest, high fee loans "; injunction preventing eviction issued) and

[E] **Regulation Z**, 13 C.F.R. §§ 226.1 et seq. [Bank of New York v. Walden^{clxxx}].

[E.1] **Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692**

[Jacobson v. Healthcare Financial Services, Inc., 516 F. 3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008) (we “ hold that the recipient of a debt collection letter covered by the FDCPA validly invokes the right to have the debt verified whenever she mails a notice of dispute within thirty days of receiving a communication from the debt collector “)].

[E.2] Preemption of State Law Claims

TILA has been held to preempt Personal Property Law provisions governing retail installment contracts and retail credit agreements [Albank, FSB v. Foland^{clxxxix}], but not consumer fraud claims brought under G.B.L. §§ 349, 350 [In People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc.^{clxxxii} the Attorney General alleged that Cross Country Bank (CCB), a purveyor of credit cards to “ consumers in the ‘ subprime ‘ credit market “... “ had misrepresented the credit limits that subprime consumers could obtain and that it failed to disclose the effect that its origination and annual fees would have on the amount of initially available credit “. On respondent’s motion to dismiss based upon preemption by Truth in Lending Act (TILA) the Court held that “ Congress also made clear that, even when enforcing the TILA disclosure requirements, states could use their unfair and deceptive trade practices acts to ‘ requir[e] or obtain[] the requirements of a specific disclosure beyond those specified...Congress only intended the (Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act) to preempt a specific set of state credit card disclosure laws, not states’ general unfair trade practices acts “. Both

TILA and RESPA have been held to “ preempt any inconsistent state law ” [Rochester Home Equity, Inc. v. Upton^{clxxxiii}) and “ *de minimis* violations with ‘ no potential for actual harm ’ will not be found to violate TILA ”^{clxxxiv}. See also: Witherwax v. Transcare^{clxxxv} (negligence claim stated against debt collection agency)].

[F] Fees For Mortgage Related Documents: R.P.L. § 274-a(2)(a)

In Dougherty v. North Ford Bank^{clxxxvi} the Court found that the lender had violated R.P.L. § 274-a(2)(a) which prohibits the charging of fees for “ for providing mortgage related documents “ by charging the consumer a \$5.00 “ Facsimile Fee “ and a \$25.00 “ Quote Fee “. In MacDonell v. PHM Mortgage Corp., ___ A.D. 3d ___, 846 N.Y.S. 2d 223 (2d Dept. 2007) a class of mortgagors challenged defendant’s \$40 fee “ charged for faxing the payoff statements “ [which plaintiffs paid] asserting violations of GBL 349 and RPL 274-a(2) [“ mortgagee shall not charge for providing the mortgage-related documents, provided...the mortgagee may charge not more than twenty dollars, or such amount as may be fixed by the banking board, for each subsequent payoff statement “] and common law causes of action alleging unjust enrichment, money had and received and conversion. The Court sustained the statutory claims finding that the voluntary payment rule does not apply [See Dowd v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 32 A.D. 3d 894, 822 N.Y.S. 2d 558 (2d Dept. 2006); Dougherty v. North Fork Bank, 301 A.D. 2d 491, 753 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (2d Dept. 2003);

Negrin v. Norwest Mortgage, 263 A.D. 2d 39, 700 N.Y.S. 2d 184 (2d Dept. 1999)] but does serve to bar the common law claims and noting that “ To the extent that our decision in Dowd v. Alliance Mortgage Co., 32 A.D. 3d 894, 822 N.Y.S. 2d 558 (2d Dept. 2006) [See generally Dillon v. U-A Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, 100 N.Y. 2d 525, 760 N.Y.S. 2d 726, 790 N.E. 2d 1155 (2003)] holds to the contrary it should not be followed “.

But in Fuchs v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp.^{clxxxvii}, a class of mortgagees challenged the imposition of a \$100 document preparation fee for services as constituting the unauthorized practice of law and violative of Judiciary Law 478, 484 and 495(3). Specifically, it was asserted that bank employees “ completed certain blank lines contained in a standard ‘ Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument ‘...limited to the name and address of the borrower, the date of the loan and the terms of the loan, including the principal amount loaned, the interest rate and the monthly payment “. The plaintiffs, represented by counsel did not allege the receipt of any legal advice from the defendant at the closing. In dismissing the complaint that Court held that charging “ a fee and the preparation of the documents ...did not transform defendant's actions into the unauthorized practice of law “.

[F.1] Electronic Fund Transfer Act: 15 U.S.C. § 1693f

In Household Finance Realty Corp. v. Dunlap^{clxxxviii}, a mortgage foreclosure proceeding arising from defendant's failure to make timely payments, the Court denied plaintiff's summary motion since it was undisputed “ the funds were available in defendant's account to cover the preauthorized debit amount “ noting that the

Electronic Funds Transfer Act [EFTA] was enacted to ‘ provide a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems ‘...Its purpose is to ‘ assure that mortgages, insurance policies and other important obligations are not declared in default due to late payment caused by a system breakdown ‘...As a consumer protect measure, section 1693j of the EFTA suspends the consumer’s obligation to make payment ‘ [i]f a system malfunction prevents the effectuation of an electronic fund transfer initiated by [the] consumer to another person and such other person has agreed to accept payment by such means ‘”.

In Hodes v. Vermeer Owners, Inc.^{clxxxix} (landlord and tenant “ contemplated the use of the credit authorization for the preauthorized payment of rent or maintenance on substantially regular monthly intervals “; landlord’s unauthorized withdrawal of \$1,066 to pay legal fees without advanced notice “ constituted an unauthorized transfer pursuant to 15 USC § 1693e “.

[F.2] **Predatory Lending Practices; High-Cost Home Loans**

In LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Shearon^{cxc} the plaintiff bank sought summary judgment in a foreclosure action [“ financing was for the full \$355,000 “] to which defendant homeowners [“ joint tax return of \$29,567 “] responded by proving that the original lender had engaged in predatory lending and violated New York State

Banking Law 6-1(2). The court found three violations including (1) Banking Law 6-1(2)(k) [" which deals with the plaintiff's due diligence into the ability of the defendants to repay the loan. The plaintiff has not offered one scintilla of evidence of any inquiry into the defendant's ability to repay the loan "], (2) Banking Law 6-1(2)(1)(i) [" which requires lending institutions to provide a list of credit counselors licensed in New York State to any recipient of a high cost loan "] and (3) Banking Law 6-1(2)(m) [" which states that no more than 3% of the amount financed is eligible to pay the points and fees associated with closing the loans on the real property...The \$19,145.69 in expenses equates to almost 5.4% of the high cost loan and is a clear violation of the statute "]. With respect to available remedies the Court stated that defendants " may be entitled to receive: actual, consequential and incidental damages, as well as all of the interest, earned or unearned, points, fees, the closing costs charged for the loan and a refund of any amounts paid " [see discussion of this case in Scheiner, Federal Preemption of State Subprime Lending Laws, New York Law Journal, April 22, 2008, p. 4 and the case of Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F. 3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2008)].

However, in Alliance Mortgage Banking Corp. v. Dobkin^{cxc1}, also a foreclosure action wherein the defense of predatory lending was raised, the Court held that " She has claimed she was the victim of

predatory lending, but has not demonstrated that there was any fraud on the part of the lender or even any failure to disclose fully the terms of the loan. She relies on only one statute, Banking Law 6-1. However, she has not been able to provide any proof that she falls under its provisions, nor under a related Federal statute. See Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 [' HOEPA '](15 USC 1639). Neither of these statutes allow mortgagors to escape their legal obligations simply because they borrowed too much “.

[G] **Credit Cards: Misrepresentations** [People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc.^{cxcii} (misrepresenting the availability of certain pre-approved credit limits; “ solicitations were misleading...because a reasonable consumer was led to believe that by signing up for the program, he or she would be protected in case of an income loss due to the conditions described “), mod’d In People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc.^{cxci} (the Attorney General alleged that Cross Country Bank (CCB), a purveyor of credit cards to “ consumers in the ‘ subprime ‘ credit market “... “ had misrepresented the credit limits that subprime consumers could obtain and that it failed to disclose the effect that its origination and annual fees would have on the amount of initially available credit “. On respondent’s motion to dismiss based upon preemption by Truth in Lending Act (TILA) the Court held that “ Congress also made clear that, even when enforcing the TILA

disclosure requirements, states could use their unfair and deceptive trade practices acts to ' require[] or obtain[] the requirements of a specific disclosure beyond those specified...Congress only intended the (Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act) to preempt a specific set of state credit card disclosure laws, not states' general unfair trade practices acts "); People v. Telehublink^{CXCiv} (" telemarketers told prospective customers that they were pre-approved for a credit card and they could receive a low-interest credit card for an advance fee of approximately \$220. Instead of a credit card, however, consumers who paid the fee received credit card applications, discount coupons, a merchandise catalog and a credit repaid manual "); Sims v. First Consumers National Bank^{CXCV}, (" The gist of plaintiffs' deceptive practices claim is that the typeface and location of the fee disclosures, combined with high-pressure advertising, amounted to consumer conduct that was deceptive or misleading "); Broder v. MBNA Corporation^{CXCVI} (credit card company misrepresented the application of its low introductory annual percentage rate to cash advances)].

H] Identity Theft: G.B.L. §§ 380-s, 380-1

In Kudelko v. Dalessio^{CXCVII} the Court declined to apply retroactively to an identity theft scheme, G.B.L. §§ 380-s and 380-1 which provide a statutory cause of action for damages [actual and punitive] for identity theft [" Identity theft has

become a prevalent and growing problem in our society with individuals having their credit ratings damaged or destroyed and causing untold financial burdens on these innocent victims. As stated above the New York State Legislature, recognizing this special category of fraudulent conduct, gave individuals certain civil remedies when they suffered this harm "] but did find that a claim for fraud was stated and the jury could decide liability, actual and punitive damages, if appropriate.

In Lesser v. Karenkooper.com^{cxcviii} the plaintiff " an E-Bay on-line store selling pre-owned luxury handbags and accessories, claims that defendant Karenkooper.com, a website selling luxury goods...sought to destroy her business (i) by making false allegations about her and her business on the internet (and alleges, inter alia) statutory identity theft pursuant to (GBL) 380-s ". In dismissing the 380-s claim the Court noted that " The claim asserted by plaintiff...does not involve credit reporting in any way and thus does not appear to fall within the intended scope of GBL 380-s ".

I] Debt Collection Practices: G.B.L. Article 29-H

In American Express Centurion Bank v. Greenfield^{cxcix} the Court held that there is no private right of action for consumers under G.B.L. §§ 601, 602 [Debt Collection Practices]; See also Varela

v. Investors Insurance Holding Corp^{cc}.

In People v. Boyajian Law Offices^{cci} the Court noted that NYFDCPA (GBL 600(1)) “ is a remedial statute and, as such, should be liberally construed... This is particularly true since the statute involves consumer protection...It is clear that the NYFDCPA was intended to protect consumers from improper collection practices...the Court will not read the statute as to preclude applying these protections to debtors whose checks were dishonored “); People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc.^{ccii}(“ considering the allegation that ACS engaged in improper debt collection practices (G.B.L. Article 29-H) the record reflects that despite an initial training emphasizing the parameters of the Debt Collection Procedures Act, the practice changed once actual collection practices commenced. ACS employees were encouraged to use aggressive and illegal practices and evidence demonstrated that the salary of both the collector and the supervisor were determined by their success...ACS collectors used rude and obscene language with consumers, repeatedly called them even when requested not to do so, misrepresented their identities to gain access and made unauthorized debits to consumer accounts “), mod’d In People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc.^{cciii}).

In Centurion Capital Corp. v. Druce^{cciv} (plaintiff, a purchaser of credit card debt, was held to be a debt collector as defined in Administrative Code of City of New York § 20-489 and

because it was not licensed its claims against defendant must be dismissed. In addition, defendant's counterclaim asserting that plaintiff violated G.B.L. § 349 by " bringing two actions for the same claim...is sufficient to state a (G.B.L. § 349) cause of action "]. In MRC Receivables Corp. v. Pedro Morales^{ccv}(" In this action to collect on a credit card debt, Civil Court properly " found that plaintiff debt collector need not be licensed pursuant to New York City Administrative Code Section 20-489 because of insufficient evidence that plaintiff's "' principal purpose...is to regularly collect or attempt to collect debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another "); In Asokwah v. Burt^{ccvi} the Court addressed " the issue of whether the defendant improperly collected funds in excess of the outstanding judgment. The plaintiff asks this Court to determine whether the defendant improperly served additional restraining... even though the defendant had already restrained sufficient funds in plaintiff's Citibank account "

[J] **Fair Debt Collective Practices Act: 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, 1692k** [Larsen v. LBC Legal Group, P.C.^{ccvii}(lawfirm qualified as debt collector under FDCPA and violated various provisions thereof including threatening legal action that could not be taken, attempts to collect unlawful amounts, failing to convey true amount owed); People v. Boyajian Law Offices^{ccviii} (

lawfirm violated FDCPA by threatening litigation without an intent to file suit, sought to collect time-barred debts and threatened legal action thereon and use of accusatory language); Barry v. Board of Managers of Elmwood Park Condominium^{ccix} (FDCPA does not apply to the collection of condominium common charges because “ common charges run with the unit and are not a debt incurred by the unit owner ”); American Credit Card Processing Corp. V. Fairchild^{ccx} (FDCPA does not apply to business or commercial debts; “ The FDCPA provides a remedy for consumers who are subjected to abusive, deceptive and unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors. The term ‘ debt ’ as used in that act is construed broadly to include any obligation to pay monies arising out of a consumer transaction...and the type of consumer transaction giving rise to a debt has been described as one involving the offer or extension of credit to a consumer or personal, family and household expenses ”)].

[K] **Standing: Foreclosures** [Wells Fargo Bank v. Reyes^{ccxi} (“ With Wells Fargo’s failure to have ever owned the Reyes’ mortgage, the Court must not only deny the instant motion, but also dismiss the complaint and cancel the notice of pendency filed by Wells Fargo...This Court will examine the conduct of plaintiff’s counsel in a hearing pursuant to 22 NYCRR Section 130-1.1 to determine if plaintiff’s counsel engaged in frivolous conduct ”)].

[12] Overcoats Lost At Restaurants: G.B.L. § 201

" For over 100 years consumers have been eating out at restaurants, paying for their meals and on occasion leaving without their simple cloth overcoats...mink coats...mink jackets...raccoon coats...Russian sable fur coats...leather coats and, of course, cashmere coats..."^{ccxii}. In DiMarzo v. Terrace View^{ccxiii}, restaurant personnel encouraged a patron to remove his overcoat and then refused to respond to a claim after the overcoat disappeared from their coatroom. In response to a consumer claim arising from a lost overcoat the restaurant may seek to limit its liability to \$200.00 as provided for in General Business Law § 201 [" GBL § 201 "]. However, a failure to comply with the strict requirements of GBL § 201 ["' as to property deposited by...patrons in the...checkroom of any...restaurant, the delivery of which is evidenced by a check or receipt therefor and for which no fee or charge is exacted..."^{ccxiv}] allows the consumer to recover actual damages upon proof of a bailment and/or negligence^{ccxv}. The enforceability of liability limiting clauses for lost clothing will often depend upon adequacy of notice [Tannenbaum v. New York Dry Cleaning, Inc.^{ccxvi} (clause on dry cleaning claim ticket limiting liability for lost or damaged clothing to \$20.00 void for lack of adequate notice); White v. Burlington Coat Factory^{ccxvii}(\$100 liability

limitation in storage receipt enforced for \$1,000 ripped and damaged beaver coat)].

[13] **Pyramid Schemes: G.B.L. § 359-fff**

“(a pyramid scheme) is one in which a participant pays money...and in return receives (1) the right to sell products, and (2) the right to earn rewards for recruiting other participants into the scheme ”^{ccxviii}. Pyramid schemes are sham money making schemes which prey upon consumers eager for quick riches. General Business Law § 359-fff [“ GBL § 359-fff ”] prohibits “ chain distributor schemes ” or pyramid schemes voiding the contracts upon which they are based. Pyramid schemes were used in Brown v. Hambric^{ccxix} to sell travel agent education programs [“ There is nothing new ’ about NU-Concepts. It is an old scheme, simply, repackaged for a new audience of gullible consumers mesmerized by the glamour of travel industry and hungry for free or reduced cost travel services ”] and in C.T.V., Inc. v. Curlen^{ccxx}, to sell bogus “ Beat The System Program ” certificates. While, at least, one Court has found that only the Attorney General may enforce a violation of GBL 359-fff^{ccxxi}, other Courts have found that GBL 359-fff gives consumers a private right of action^{ccxxii}, a violation of which also constitutes a per se violation of GBL 349 which provides

for treble damages, attorneys fees and costs^{ccxxiii}.

[14] **Retail Sales & Leases**

[A] **Consumer Contract Type Size: C.P.L.R. § 4544**

C.P.L.R. § 4544 provides that “ any printed contract... involving a consumer transaction...where the print is not clear and legible or is less than eight points in depth...May not be received in evidence in any trial “. C.P.L.R. § 4544 has been applied in consumer cases involving property stolen from a health club locker^{ccxxiv}, car rental agreements^{ccxxv}, home improvement contracts^{ccxxvi}, giftcards [see below], equipment leases [see below], insurance policies^{ccxxvii}, dry cleaning contracts^{ccxxviii} and financial brokerage agreements^{ccxxix}. However, this consumer protection statute is not available if the consumer also relies upon the same size type^{ccxxx} and does not apply to cruise passenger contracts which are, typically, in smaller type size and are governed by maritime law [see e.g., Lerner v. Karageorgis Lines, Inc.^{ccxxxi} (maritime law preempts state consumer protection statute regarding type size; cruise passenger contracts may be in 4 point type) and may not apply if it conflicts with federal Regulation Z [Sims v. First Consumers National Bank^{ccxxxii}(“ Regulation Z does not preempt state consumer protection laws completely but requires

that consumer disclosures be ' clearly and conspicuously in writing ' (12 CFR 226.5(a)(1)) and, considering type size and placement, this is often a question of fact ")].

[A.1] **Dating Services: G.B.L. § 394-c**

G.B.L. § 394-c applies to a social referral service which charges a " fee for providing matching of members of the opposite sex, by use of computer or any other means, for the purpose of dating and general social contact " and provides for disclosures, a three day cancellation requirement, a Dating Service Consumer Bill of Rights, a private right of action for individuals seeking actual damages or \$50.00 which ever is greater and licensing in cities of 1 million residents [See e.g., Doe v. Great Expectations^{ccxxxiii} (" Two claimants sue to recover (monies) paid under a contract for defendant's services, which offer to expand a client's social horizons primarily through posting a client's video and profile on an Internet site on which other clients can review them and, therefore, as desired, approach a selected client for actual social interaction "; defendant violated G.B.L. § 394-c(3) by implementing a " massive overcharge " [" Where, as here, the dating service does not assure that it will furnish a client with a specified number of social referrals per month, the service may charge no more than \$25 "] and § 394-c(7)(e) by failing to provide claimants

with the required " Dating Service Consumer Bill of Rights "; full refund awarded as restitutionary damages); Grossman v. MatchNet^{ccxxxiv} (plaintiff failed to allege that " she sustained any ' actual harm ' from defendant's failure to include provisions mandated by the Dating Services Law. Plaintiff has not alleged that she ever sought to cancel or suspend her subscription (or that any rights were denied her) ").

[B] Dogs And Cat Sales: G.B.L. § 752

Disputes involving pet animals are quite common [see e.g., Miuccio v. Puppy City, Inc.^{ccxxxv}(claimant " purchased a Shitzu-Maltese puppy...at a cost of \$937.54. Within a week the dog was lethargic, had diarrhea and blood in his stool...a local veterinarian...concluded that the dog had parasites and kennel cough...veterinarian issued a letter stating that the dog was ' unfit for purchase ' "); Woods v. Kittykind^{ccxxxvi}(owner of lost cat claims that " Kittykind (a not-for-profit animal shelter inside a PetCo store) improperly allowed defendant Jane Doe to adopt the cat after failing to take the legally-required steps to locate the cat's rightful owner "); O'Rourke v. American Kennels^{ccxxxvii}(Maltese misrepresented as " teacup dog "; " (Little

Miss) Muffet now weighs eight pounds. Though not exactly the Kristie Alley of the dog world, she is well above the five pounds that is considered the weight limit for a ' teacup ' Maltese "; damages \$1,000 awarded); Mongelli v. Cabral^{ccxxxviii} (" The plaintiffs ...and the defendants...are exotic bird lovers. It is their passion for exotic birds, particularly, for Peaches, a five year old white Cockatoo, which is at the heart of this controversy"); Dempsey v. American Kennels, 121 Misc. 2d 612 (N.Y. Civ. 1983)("' Mr. Dunphy ' a pedigreed white poodle held to be defective and nonmerchantable (U.C.C. § 2-608) because he had an undescended testicle "); Mathew v. Klinger^{ccxxxix} (" Cookie was a much loved Pekinese who swallowed a chicken bone and died seven days later. Could Cookie's life have been saved had the defendant Veterinarians discovered the presence of the chicken bone sooner? "); O'Brien v. Exotic Pet Warehouse, Inc.^{ccxl} (pet store negligently clipped the wings of Bogey, an African Grey Parrot, who flew away); Nardi v. Gonzalez^{ccxli} (" Bianca and Pepe are diminutive, curly coated Bichon Frises (who were viciously attacked by) Ace...a large 5 year old German Shepherd weighing 110 pounds "); Mercurio v. Weber^{ccxlii} (two dogs burned with hair dryer by dog groomer, one dies and one survives, damages discussed); Lewis v. Al DiDonna^{ccxlili}(pet dog dies from overdose of prescription drug, Feldene, mislabeled " 1 pill twice daily ' when should have been " one pill every other day "); Roberts v. Melendez^{ccxliv} (eleven week

old dachshund puppy purchased for \$1,200 from Le Petit Puppy in New York City becomes ill and is euthanized in California; costs of sick puppy split between buyer and seller); Anzalone v. Kragness^{ccxlv}(pet cat killed by another animal at animal hospital; damages may include “ actual value of the owner ” where no fair market value exists)].

General Business Law §§ 752 et seq applies to the sale of dogs and cats by pet dealers and gives consumers rescission rights fourteen days after purchase if a licensed veterinarian “ certifies such animal to be unfit for purchase due to illness, a congenital malformation which adversely affects the health of the animal, or the presence of symptoms of a contagious or infectious disease ” [GBL § 753]. The consumer may (1) return the animal and obtain a refund of the purchase price plus the costs of the veterinarian’s certification, (2) return the animal and receive an exchange animal plus the certification costs, or (3) retain the animal and receive reimbursement for veterinarian services in curing or attempting to cure the animal. In addition, pet dealers are required to have animals inspected by a veterinarian prior to sale [GBL § 753-a] and provide consumers with necessary information [GBL §§ 753-b, 753-c].

Several Courts have applied GBL §§ 752 et seq in Small Claims Courts [see e.g., Budd v. Quinlin^{ccxlv}(consumer purchased puppy not in good heal and taken to veterinarian who charged \$2,383.00

which is recoverable not under GBL 753(1) [damages limited to price for dog or cat here \$400.00] but under UCC Section 2-105 [breach of the implied warranty of merchantability); Miuccio v. Puppy City, Inc.^{ccxlvii} (claimant “ purchased a Shitzu-Maltese puppy “; violation of GBL 349, no actual damages, \$50.00 awarded); _ O’Rourke v. American Kennels^{ccxlviii} (statutory one year guarantee which “ provides that if the dog is found to have a ‘ serious congenital condition ‘ within one year period, then the purchaser can exchange the dog for ‘ another of up to equal value ‘ ” does not apply to toy Maltese with a luxating patella); Fuentes v. United Pet Supply, Inc.^{ccxlix} (miniature pinscher puppy diagnosed with a luxating patella in left rear leg; claims under GBL § 753 must be filed within fourteen days; claim valid under UCC § 2-324); Saxton v. Pets Warehouse, Inc.^{cc1} (consumer’s claims for unhealthy dog are not limited to GBL § 753(1) but include breach of implied warranty of merchantability under UCC § 2-714); Smith v. Tate^{cc1i} (five cases involving sick German Shepherds); Sacco v. Tate^{cc1ii} (buyers of sick dog could not recover under GBL § 753 because they failed to have dog examined by licensed veterinarian); Roberts v. Melendez^{cc1iii} (claim against Le Petit Puppy arising from death of dachshund puppy; contract “ clearly outlines the remedies available “, does not violate GBL § 753 and buyer failed to comply with available remedies; purchase price of \$1,303.50 split between buyer and seller]. Pets have also been the subject of aggravated cruelty

pursuant to Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a [People v. Garcia^{cccliv} (" Earlier on that day, defendant had picked up a 10-gallon fish tank containing three pet goldfish belonging to Ms. Martinez's three children and hurled it into a 47-inch television screen, smashing the television screen and the fish tank...Defendant then called nine-year old Juan into the room and said ' Hey, Juan, want to something cool? ' Defendant then proceeded to crush under the heel of his shoe one of the three goldfish writhing on the floor ") and protected by Environmental Conservation Laws [People v. Douglas Deelecave^{ccclv}(D & J Reptiles not guilty of violations of Environmental Conservation Law for exhibiting alligator at night and selling a Dwarfed Calman)].

[C] **Door-To-Door Sales: G.B.L. §§ 425-431**

" Some manufacturers...favor door-to-door sales (because) ...the selling price may be several times greater than...in a more competitive environment (and)...consumers are less defensive...in their own homes and...are, especially, susceptible to high pressure sales tactics "^{ccclvi}. Personal Property Law [" PPL "] §§ 425-431 "' afford(s) consumers a ' cooling-off' period to cancel contracts which are entered into as a result of high pressure door-to-door sales tactics' "^{ccclvii}. PPL § 428 provides consumers with rescission rights should a salesman fail to complete a Notice Of Cancellation

form on the back of the contract. PPL § 428 has been used by consumers in New York Environmental Resources v. Franklin^{cclviii} (misrepresented and grossly overpriced water purification system), Rossi v. 21st Century Concepts, Inc.^{cclix} [misrepresented pots and pans costing \$200.00 each], Kozlowski v. Sears^{cclx} [vinyl windows hard to open, did not lock properly and leaked] and in Filpo v. Credit Express Furniture Inc^{cclxi}. [unauthorized design and fabric color changes and defects in overpriced furniture]. Rescission is also appropriate if the Notice of Cancellation form is not in Spanish for Spanish speaking consumers^{cclxii}. A failure to “ comply with the disclosure requirements of PPL 428 regarding cancellation and refund rights ” is a per se violation of GBL 349 which provides for treble damages, attorneys fees and costs^{cclxiii}. In addition PPL 429(3) provides for an award of attorneys fees. In Certified Inspections, Inc. v. Garfinkel^{cclxiv} the Court found that the subject contract was covered by PPL 426(1) (“ The contract provided by plaintiff failed to contain the terms required by article 10-A, particularly with regard to the right of cancellation as provided in (PPL 428). Under the circumstances, defendants effectively cancelled the contract ”).

[C.1] Equipment Leases

For an excellent “ exploration of the (U.C.C.) and consumer

law provisions governing the private parties to (equipment lease agreements) " see Sterling National Bank v. Kings Manor Estates^{cclxv} (" The defendants...claim that the equipment lease was tainted by fraud and deception in the inception, was unconscionable and gave rise to unjust enrichment...the bank plaintiff, knowing of the fraudulent conduct, purchased the instant equipment lease at a deep discount, and by demanding payment thereunder acted in a manner violating...(G.B.L. § 349) ")].

In Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc.^{cclxvi} a class of small business owners who had entered into lease agreements for POS terminals asserted that defendant used " deceptive practices, hid material and onerous lease terms. According to plaintiffs, defendants' sales representatives presented them with what appeared to be a one-page contract on a clip board, thereby concealing three other pages below...among such concealed items...(were a) no cancellation clause and no warranties clause, absolute liability for insurance obligations, a late charge clause, and provision for attorneys' fees and New York as the chosen forum ", all of which were in " small print " or " microprint ". In sustaining the fraud cause of action against the individually named corporate officers the Court noted that " it is the language, structure and format of the deceptive Lease Form and the systematic failure by the sales people to provide each lessee a copy of the lease at the time of its execution that permits, at this early stage, an inference of

fraud against the corporate officers in their individual capacities and not the sales agents “.

[C.2] **Furniture Extended Warranties**

“ The extended warranty and new parts warranty business generates extraordinary profits for the retailers... and for repair shops. It has been estimated that no more than 20% of the people who buy warranties ever use them... Of the 20% that actually try to use their warranties...(some) soon discover that the real costs can easily exceed the initial cost of the warranty certificate ^{ccclxvii}. In Dvoskin v. Levitz Furniture Co., Inc.^{ccclxviii}, the consumer purchased furniture from Levitz Furniture Company with “ defects (that) occurred within six to nine months of delivery “. Levitz’s attempt to disavow liability under both a one year warranty and a five year extended warranty was rejected by the Court for lack of notice (“ The purported limited warranty language which the defendant attempts to rely on appears on the reverse side of this one page ‘ sale order ‘. The defendant has not demonstrated and the Court does not conclude that the plaintiff was aware of or intended to be bound by the terms which appear on the reverse side of the sale order...the solicitation and sale of an extended warranty to be honored by an entity that is different from the selling party is inherently deceptive if an express representation is not made

disclosing who the purported contracting party is “); See also: Giaratano v. Midas Muffler^{cclxxix} (extended warranty for automobile brake pads); Kim v. BMW of Manhattan, Inc.^{cclxxx}(misrepresented automobile extended warranty); Petrello v. Winks Furniture^{cclxxxi} (misrepresenting a sofa as being covered in Ultrasuede HP and protected by a 5 year warranty).

[C.3] **Giftcards**

In three class actions purchasers of gift cards challenged the imposition of dormancy fees by gift card issuers^{cclxxii}. Gift cards, a multi-billion business^{cclxxiii}, may “ eliminate the headache of choosing a perfect present (but) the recipient might find some cards are a pain in the neck. Many come with enough fees and restrictions that you might be better off giving a check. Most annoying are expiration dates and maintenance or dormancy fees^{cclxxiv}. In addition, gift cards may not be given any special consideration in a bankruptcy proceeding^{cclxxv}.

In Lonner v. Simon Property Group, Inc.^{cclxxvi} a class of consumers challenged the imposition of gift card dormancy fees of \$2.50 per month setting forth three causes of action seeking damages for breach of contract, violation of General Business Law 349 (“GBL 349”) and unjust enrichment. Within the context of defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the Court

found that the Lonner plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to support causes of action for breach of contract based upon a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and a violation of GBL 349. In Llanos v. Shell Oil Company^{cclxxvii}, a class of consumers challenged the imposition of gift card dormancy fees of \$1.75 per month setting forth four causes of action seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment and violation of GBL 349. Within the context of defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint as preempted by GBL 396-I and for failure to state a cause of action, the Court found that the claims of the Llanos plaintiffs were not preempted by GBL 396-I and remitted the matter for consideration of the merits of each cause of action. And in Goldman v. Simon Property Group, Inc.^{cclxxviii}, a class of consumers also challenged dormancy fees and the Court found that there was no private right of action under GBL 396-I and that CPLR 4544 applies to business gifts which involve a consumer transaction. The Court also restored claims for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment and allowed plaintiffs to plead unjust enrichment and money had and received as alternative claims to the breach of contract cause of action. In an earlier decision the Court found that these claims were not preempted by federal law^{cclxxix}.

[C.4] **Health Club Services: G.B.L. §§ 620-631**

The purpose of G.B.L. § 620-631 is to “ safeguard the public and the ethical health club industry against deception and financial hardship “ by requiring financial security such as bonds, contract restrictions, disclosures, cancellation rights, prohibition of deceptive acts and a private right of action for individuals seeking actual damages which may be trebled plus an award of attorneys fees [Faer v. Verticle Fitness & Racquet Club, Ltd.^{cclxxx}(misrepresentations of location, extent, size of facilities; full contract price minus use recoverable); Steuben Place Recreation Corp. v. McGuiness^{cclxxxi}(health club contract void as violating provision that “ no contract for services shall provide for a term longer than thirty-six months “); Nadoff v. Club Central^{cclxxxii}(restitution of membership fees charged after expiration of one year membership where contract provided for renewal without 36 month statutory limitation)].

[D] Lease Renewal Provisions: G.O.L. § 5-901

In Andin International Inc. v. Matrix Funding Corp.^{cclxxxiii} the Court held that the automatic renewal provision in a computer lease was ineffective under G.O.L. § 5-901 because the lessor failed to notify lessee of lessee’s obligation to provide notice of intention not to renew. In addition, the provision may be unconscionable (

under terms of lease unless lessee " is willing to meet the price unilaterally set for the purchase of the equipment, (lessee) will be bound for a successive 12-month period to renting the equipment. This clause, which, in essence, creates a perpetual obligation, is sufficiently one-sided and imbalanced so that it might be found to be unconscionable (under Utah law) ")].

[E] Licensing To Do Business: C.P.L.R. § 3015(e)

C.P.L.R. § 3015(e) provides, in part, that " Where the plaintiff's cause of action against a consumer arises from the plaintiff's conduct of a business which is required by state or local law to be licensed...the complaint shall allege...that plaintiff is duly licensed...The failure of the plaintiff to comply...will permit the defendant (consumer) to move for dismissal ". This rule has been applied to

[1] Home Improvement Contractors [Tri-State General Remodeling Contractors, Inc v. Inderdai Baijnauth^{cclxxxiv} (salesmen do not have to have a separate license); Routier v. Waldeck^{cclxxxv} (" The Home Improvement Business provisions...were enacted to safeguard and protect consumers against fraudulent practices and inferior work by those who would hold themselves out as home improvement contractors "); Power Cooling, Inc. v. Wassong^{cclxxxvi},

(N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 20-386[2] requiring the licensing of home improvement contractors does not apply to the installation of room air-conditioners); Colorito v. Crown Heating & Cooling, Inc.^{cclxxxvii}, (“ Without a showing of proper licensing, defendant (home improvement contractor) was not entitled to recover upon its counterclaim (to recover for work done) ”); Falconieri v. Wolf^{cclxxxviii}(home improvement statute, County Law § 863.313 applies to barn renovations); Cudahy v. Cohen^{cclxxxix} (unlicensed home improvement contractor unable to sue homeowner in Small Claims Courts for unpaid bills); Moonstar Contractors, Inc. v. Katsir^{ccxc}(license of sub-contractor can not be used by general contractor to meet licensing requirements). Obtaining a license during the performance of the contract may be sufficient (Mandioc Developers, Inc. v. Millstone^{ccxc i}) while obtaining a license after performance of the contract is not sufficient (B&F Bldg. Corp. V. Liebig^{ccxcii} (“ The legislative purpose...was not to strengthen contractor’s rights, but to benefit consumers by shifting the burden from the homeowner to the contractor to establish that the contractor is licensed ”)]);

[2] **Used Car Dealers** [B & L Auto Group, Inc. v. Zilog^{ccxciii} (used car dealer’s claim against consumer for balance of payment for used car of \$2,500.00 dismissed for a failure to have a Second Hand Automobile Dealer’s license pursuant to New York

City Department of Consumer Affairs Regulation when the car was sold)];

[3] **Debt Collectors** [In Centurion Capital Corp. v. Druce^{CCXCiv} (plaintiff, a purchaser of credit card debt, was held to be a debt collector as defined in Administrative Code of City of New York § 20-489 and because it was not licensed its claims against defendant must be dismissed "];

[4] **Other Licensed Businesses** [B & L Auto Group, Inc. v. Zilog^{CCXCV} (" The legal consequences of failing to maintain a required license are well known. It is well settled that not being licensed to practice in a given field which requires a license precludes recovery for the services performed " either pursuant to contract or in quantum merit...This bar against recovery applies to...architects and engineers, car services, plumbers, sidewalk vendors and all other businesses...that are required by law to be licensed ")].

[E.1] **Massage Therapy: Education Law § 6512(1)**

" To the extent that the small claims action is founded upon allegations that defendant unlawfully practiced ' manipulation ' or massage therapy in violation of Education Law § 6512(1), no private

right of action is available under the statute "ccxcvi.

[F] Merchandise Delivery Dates: G.B.L. § 396-u

" In order to induce a sale furniture and appliance store salesman often misrepresent the quality, origin, price, terms of payment and delivery date of ordered merchandise "ccxcvii. In Walker v. Winks Furniture^{ccxcviii}, a salesman promised delivery of new furniture within one week and then refused to return the consumer's purchase price when she canceled two weeks later unless she paid a 20% cancellation penalty. GBL § 396-u protects consumers from unscrupulous salesmen who promise that merchandise will be delivered by specific date when, in fact, it is not. A violation of GBL § 396-u [failing to disclose an estimated delivery date in writing when the order is taken [GBL § 396-u(2)], failing to advise of a new delivery date and giving the consumer the opportunity to cancel [GBL § 396-u(2)(b)], failing to honor the consumer's election to cancel without imposing a cancellation penalty [GBL § 396-u(s)©)], failing to make a full refund within two weeks of a demand without imposing a cancellation penalty [GBL § 396-u(2)(d)]] allows the consumer to rescind the purchase contract without incurring a cancellation penalty^{ccxcix}. A violation of GBL 396-u is a per se violation of GBL 349 which provides for treble damages, attorneys fees and costs^{ccc}. In addition, GBL 396-

u(7) provides for a trebling of damages upon a showing of a wilful violation of the statute^{ccci}.

In Dweyer v. Montalbano's Pool & Patio Center, Inc^{ccci} a furniture store failed to timely deliver two of six purchased chairs. The Court found that the delayed furniture was not " custom-made " and that the store violated G.B.L. § 396-u(2) in failing to fill in an " ' estimated delivery date ' on the form as required by statute ", failing to give notice of the delay and advising the customer of her right to cancel under G.B.L. § 396-u(2)(b). The Court awarded G.B.L. § 396-u damages of \$287.12 for the two replacement chairs, trebled to \$861.36 under G.B.L. 396-u(7). In addition the Court granted rescission under U.C.C. § 2-601 [" if the goods or tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject the whole..."] awarding the customer the contract price of \$2,868.63 upon return of the furniture.

In Julio v. Villency^{ccci} the Court held " that an item of furniture ordered in one of several designs, materials, sizes, colors or fabrics offered by a manufacturer to all of its customers, if made pursuant to an order specifying a substantial portion of its components and elements, is ' in substantial part custom-made ".

[F.1] Merchandise Layaway Plans: G.B.L. § 396-t

G.B.L. § 396-t " governs merchandise sold according to a layaway plan. A layaway plan is defined as a purchase over the amount of \$50.00 where the consumer agrees to pay for the purchase of merchandise in four or more installments and the merchandise is delivered in the future " [Amiekumo v. Vanbro Motors, Inc.^{ccciv}(failure to deliver vehicle purchased and comply with statutory disclosure requirements)]. While G.B.L. § 396-t does not provide a private right of action for consumers it is has been held that a violation of G.B.L. § 396-t is a *per se* violation of G.B.L. § 349 thus entitling the recovery of actual damages or \$50 whichever is greater, attorneys and costs [Amiekumo v. Vanbro Motors, Inc., *supra*].

[F.2] **Price Gouging**

G.B.L. § 396-r prohibits price gouging during emergency situations. In People v. My Service Center, Inc.^{cccv} the Court addressed the charge that a " gas station (had inflated) the retail price of its gasoline " after the "' abnormal market disruption '" caused by Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005. " this Court finds that respondent's pricing patently violated GBL § 396-r...given such excessive increases and the fact that such increases did not bear any relation to the supplier's costs...Regardless of respondent's desire to anticipate market

fluctuations to remain competitive, notwithstanding the price at which it purchased that supply, is precisely the manipulation and unfair advantage GBL § 396-r is designed to forestall ". See also: People v. Two Wheel Corp.^{cccvi}; People v. Beach Boys Equipment Co., Inc.^{cccvii}; People v. Wever Petroleum Inc.^{cccviii} (disparity in gasoline prices following Hurricane Katrina warranting injunction); People v. Chazy Hardware, Inc.^{cccix}(generators sold following ice storm at unconscionable prices).

[G] Retail Refund Policies: G.B.L. § 218-a

Some stores refuse to refund the consumer's purchase price in cash upon the return of a product [" Merchandise, in New Condition, May be Exchanged Within 7 Days of Purchase for Store Credit...No Cash Refunds or Charge Credits "^{cccx}]. In Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse^{cccxi}, a clothing retailer refused to refund the consumer's cash payment when she returned a shedding and defective fake fur two days after purchase. General Business Law § 218-a [" GBL § 218-a "] permits retailers to enforce a no cash refund policy if there are a sufficient number of signs notifying consumers of " its refund policy including whether it is ' in cash, or as credit or store credit only '"^{cccxi}. In McCord v. Norm's Music^{cccxiii}the music store's no-refund policy " was posted at each cash register ". Plaintiff failed to show the musical

instrument " was defective or that there was a breach of warranty of merchantability ". In Evergreen Bank, NA v. Zerteck^{cccxiv}(" defendant had violated (G.B.L. § 218-a when it sold a boat to Jacobs...(by failing) to post its refund policy...Jacobs was awarded a refund (and attorneys fees of \$2,500)"); In Perel v. Eagletronics^{cccxv} the consumer purchased a defective air conditioner and sought a refund. The Court held that defendant's refund policy [" No returns or exchanges "] placed " at the very bottom " of invoices and sales receipts was inconspicuous and violated G.B.L. § 218-a(1). In addition, the air conditioner was defective and breached the implied warranty of merchantability under U.C.C. § 2-314.

If, however, the product is defective and there has been a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability [U.C.C. § 2-314] then consumers may recover all appropriate damages including the purchase price in cash [U.C.C. § 2-714]^{cccxi}. In essence, U.C.C. § 2-314 preempts^{cccxvii} GBL § 218-a [Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse^{cccxviii} (defective shedding fake fur); Dudzik v. Klein's All Sports^{cccix} (defective baseball bat)]. It has been held that a " failure to inform consumers of their statutory right to a cash or credit card charge refund when clothing is defective and unwearable " is a violation of GBL 349 which provides for treble damages, attorneys fees and costs^{cccxx}.

[G.1] **Retail Sales Installment Agreements: P.P.L. § 401**

New York's Retail Installment Sales Act is codified in P.P.L. § 401 et seq. In Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA^{cccxxi} a credit card holder challenged the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration agreement on, amongst other grounds, that it violated P.P.L. § 413(10)(f) which " voids a provision in a retail installment credit agreement by which the retail buyer waives any right to a trial by jury in any proceeding arising out of the agreement ". Nonetheless the Johnson Court found the arbitration agreement enforceable because the Federal Arbitration Act " preempts state law to the extent that it conflicts with the FAA ".

[H] Rental Purchase Agreement: P.P.L. § 500

Personal Property Law §§ 500 et seq [" PPL §§ 500 et seq] provides consumers who enter into rental purchase agreements with certain reinstatement rights should they fall behind in making timely payments or otherwise terminate the contract [PPL § 501]. In Davis v. Rent-A-Center of America, Inc^{cccxxii} the Court awarded the consumer damages of \$675.73 because the renter had failed to provide substitute furniture of a comparable nature after consumer reinstated rental purchase agreement after skipping payment. In Sagiede v. Rent-A-Center^{cccxxiii} the Court awarded the

consumers damages of \$2,124.04 after their TV was repossessed (" this Court finds that, in keeping with the intent of Personal Property Law which attempts to protect the consumer while simultaneously allowing for a competitive business atmosphere in the rental-purchase arena, that the contract at bar fails to reasonably assess the consumer of his rights concerning repossession ").

[I] Implied Warranty Of Merchantability: U.C.C. § 2-314

U.C.C. § 2-314 provides consumers with an implied warranty of merchantability for products and has arisen in consumer lawsuits involving air conditioners [Perel v. Eagletronics^{cccxxiv} (defective air conditioner; breach of the implied warranty of merchantability); alarm and monitoring systems [Cirillo v. Slomin's Inc.^{cccxxv} (contract clause disclaiming express or implied warranties enforced), kitchen cabinet doors [Malul v. Capital Cabinets, Inc.^{cccxxvi} (kitchen cabinets that melted in close proximity to stove constitutes a breach of implied warranty of merchantability; purchase price proper measure of damages), fake furs [Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse^{cccxxvii} (U.C.C. § 2-314 preempts^{cccxxviii} GBL § 218-a], baseball bats [Dudzik v. Klein's All Sports^{cccxxix}] and dentures [Shaw-Crummel v. American Dental Plan^{cccxxx} (" Therefore implicated in the contract ...was the

warranty that the dentures would be fit for chewing and speaking. The two sets of dentures...were clearly not fit for these purposes ")].

[J] Travel Services

Consumers purchase a variety of travel services from airlines, cruise lines, railroads, bus and rental car companies, hotels and resorts, time share operators, casinos, theme parks, tour operators, travel agents and insurance companies some of which are misrepresented, partially delivered or not delivered at all [Meachum v. Outdoor World Corp.^{cccxxxix} (misrepresenting availability and quality of vacation campgrounds; Vallery v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc.^{cccxxxii} (misrepresented cruise); Pellegrini v. Landmark Travel Group^{cccxxxiii} (refundability of tour operator tickets misrepresented); People v. P.U. Travel, Inc.^{cccxxxiv}(Attorney General charges travel agency with fraudulent and deceptive business practices in failing to deliver flights to Spain or refunds)]; See also: Dickerson, Travel Law, Law Journal Press, N.Y., 2009; Dickerson, False, Misleading & Deceptive Advertising In The Travel Industry^{cccxxxv}; Dickerson, The Cruise Passenger's Rights & Remedies^{cccxxxvi}; Dickerson, Hotels, Resorts And Casinos Selected Liability Issues^{cccxxxvii}].

1] Airline Bumping

In Stone v. Continental Airlines^{cccxviii} the Court held the airline liable for reasonable damages arising from airline bumping (passenger who purchased, Colorado ski trip for himself and 13 year old daughter for the 2004 Christmas season was bumped and canceled trip “ Because the airline would not unload their luggage and could give no firm advice regarding how long the airline would take to return the baggage, which included cold-weather sportswear for both and the father’s ski equipment, the father and daughter returned home and were unable to make any firm alternate ski or ‘ getaway ’ plans. Continental refunded the price of the airline rickets while claimant was in the airline terminal...He testified that his loss included \$1,360 for unrecoverable pre-paid ski lodge accommodations, lift tickets and his daughter’s equipment rental, and that the entire experience involved inconveniences and stresses upon himself and his daughter because the ‘ bumping ’ and the scheduled holiday ‘ that never was ’. (Damages included the following) First, as to out-of-pocket expenses flowing from the loss of passage, claimant testified that he was unable to recoup \$1,360 of pre-paid expenses. This item falls within the class of traditionally recognized damages for ‘ bumped ’ passengers... Second, it is well settled that an award for inconvenience, delay and uncertainty is cognizable under New York law. Here, a father

and teenage daughter were bumped on the outward leg of a week-long round trip during the holiday season to a resort location, leaving the claimant father subject to the immediate upset of being denied boarding in a public setting, and with resulting inconvenience continuing for some period of time thereafter. Inconvenience damages represent compensation for normal reactions...On the record presented...inconvenience damages of \$1,000 are awarded...Third, regarding the deprivation of use of the contents of checked baggage, this factor was also present and claimant testified that, had their baggage been made available, he would have arranged for a local substitute ski trip...the court awards \$740 as rough compensation...Based on the foregoing, judgment shall enter for the total mount of \$3,110...With interest from December 25, 2004, the date of the ' bumping ' ").

2] Failure To Adhere To Check-In Times

In Rottman v. El Al Israel Airlines^{cccxxxix} the passenger failed to check in within the airline's 3 hour pre-boarding check-in time. " Claimant has failed to establish that El Al breached its contract by overbooking the flight and not offering him alternative transportation. Rottman arrived at te El Al terminal less than an hour before departure. By this time, the flight was closed and El Al properly refused him passage. However...The ticket issued by the

travel agent to Rottman made it impossible for him to comply with El Al's rule requiring a minimum of three hours for check-in...the travel agent who was bound by El Al's rules pertaining to the sale of tickets was acting as the agent of the airline...El Al is responsible for the agent's error in writing a ticket for the first leg of the journey that did not comply with the airline's rules ". The plaintiff was awarded \$2,945.40 together with interest.

3] Breach Of Hotel Reservations Contract

In Fallsview Glatt Kosher Caterers Inc v. Rosenfeld^{cccxi}, the Court held that U.C.C. § 2-201(1)(Statute of Frauds) did not apply to a hotel reservations contract which the guest failed to honor (" Fallsview...alleges that it ' operates a catering business...and specializes in organizing and operating programs at select hotels whereby [its] customers are provided with Glatt Kosher food service during Jewish holiday seasons...at Kutcher's Country Club...Mr. Rosenfeld ' requested accommodations for 15 members of his family...and full participation in the Program '...he agreed to pay Fallsview \$24,050.00 ' for the Program '...Mr. Rosenfeld and his family ' failed to appear at the hotel without notification ' to Fallsview "). See also: Tal Tours v. Goldstein^{cccxi} (dispute between joint venturers of a company catering to " a clientele which observes Jewish dietary laws known

as Kashrut or Kosher ").

[15] **Telemarketing**

It is quite common for consumers and businesses to receive unsolicited phone calls, faxes and text messages^{cccqlii} at their homes, places of business or on their cellular telephones from mortgage lenders, credit card companies and the like. Many of these phone calls, faxes or text messages originate from automated telephone equipment or automatic dialing-announcing devices, the use of which is regulated by Federal and New York State consumer protection statutes.

[A] **Federal Telemarketing Rule: 47 U.S.C. § 227**

On the Federal level the Telephone Consumer Protection Act^{cccqliii} [TCPA] prohibits " *inter alia*, the ' use [of] any telephone, facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement...47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)© "cccqliv. A violation of the TCPA may occur when the " offending calls (are) made before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. " or " the calling entity (has) failed to implement do-not-call procedures " [Weiss v. 4 Hour Wireless, Inc.^{cccqlv}] The purpose of the TCPA is to provide " a remedy to consumers who are subjected to

telemarketing abuses and ' to encourage consumers to sue and obtain monetary awards based on a violation of the statute ' "cccxlvi The TCPA may be used by consumers in New York State Courts including Small Claims Court [Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle^{cccxlvi}; Shulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,^{cccxlvi} (TCPA provides a private right of action which may be asserted in New York State Courts)]. See Pollock v. Island Arbitration & Mediation, Inc., 22 Misc. 3d 463, 869 N.Y.S. 2d 740 (2008)(" The statute preserves the ' right to be let alone ' famously classified by United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis as ' the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men ' ").

The use of cellphone text messaging features to send advertisements may constitute a violation of TCPA [Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp.^{cccxlvi}]. However, the Court in Pollock v. Island Arbitration & Mediation, Inc., 22 Misc. 3d 463, 869 N.Y.S. 2d 740 (2008) has held that attempting to place over 100 faxes to a cell phone by means other than " using a random or sequential number generator " does not constitute a violation of TCPA.

In Stern v. Bluestone^{ccc} an attorney received 14 faxes entitled "' Attorney Malpractice Report " and subtitled ' Free Monthly report on Attorney Malpractice From the Law Office of Andrew Lavooott Bluestone '". Evidently, defendant was the subject of a similar TCPA action in 2003 wherein his faxes were found to be " prohibited advertisements ". Here, the Court found the faxes to be "

unsolicited advertisements “ notwithstanding their
“ informational “ content. “ The faxes at issue certainly have the
purpose and effect of influencing recipients to procure Bluestone’s
services...the motion court properly awarded treble damages for a
willful or knowing violation of the statute “.

1] Exclusive Jurisdiction

Some Federal Courts have held that the states have
exclusive jurisdiction over private causes of action brought under
the TCPA^{cccli} while others have not^{ccclii}. Some State Courts have held
that the Federal TCPA does not preempt State law analogues which may
be stricter^{cccliii}. Some scholars have complained that “ Congress
intended for private enforcement actions to be brought by *pro se*
plaintiffs in small claims court and practically limited enforcement
to such tribunals “^{cccliv}. Under the TCPA consumers may recover their
actual monetary loss for each violation or up to \$500.00 in damages,
whichever is greater [Kaplan v. Life Fitness Center^{ccclv} (“ that
plaintiff is entitled to damages of \$500 for the TCPA violation (and)
an additional award of damages of \$500 for violation of the
federal regulation “; treble damages may be awarded upon a showing
that “ defendant willfully and knowingly violated “^{ccclvi} the Act);
Antollino v. Hispanic Media Group, USA, Inc^{ccclvii}. (plaintiff who
received 33 unsolicited fax transmissions awarded “ statutory

damages of \$16,500 or \$500 for each violation “)]. In 2001 a Virginia state court class action against Hooters resulted in a jury award of \$12 million on behalf of 1,321 persons who had received 6 unsolicited faxes^{ccclviii}. Recently, the Court in Rudgayzer & Gratt v. Enine, Inc.^{ccclix} held that the TPCA, to the extent it restricts unsolicited fax advertisements, is unconstitutional as violative of freedom of speech. This decision was reversed^{ccclx}, however, by the Appellate Term (“ A civil liberties organization and a personal injury attorney might conceivably send identical communications that the recipient has legal rights that the communicating entity wishes to uphold; the former is entitled to the full ambit of First Amendment protection...while the latter may be regulated as commercial speech “). In Bonime v. Management Training International^{ccclxi} the Court declined to pass on the constitutionality of TPCA for a lack of jurisdiction.

[2] Statute of Limitations

In Stern v. Bluestone^{ccclxii} the Court noted that although “ TCPA does not have an express statute of limitations “ it would be appropriate to apply a “ four-year statute of limitations “.

[B] New York’s Telemarketing Rule: G.B.L. § 399-p

On the State level, General Business Law § 399-p [" GBL § 399-p "] " also places restrictions on the use of automatic dialing-announcing devices and placement of consumer calls in telemarketing^{ccclxiii} such as requiring the disclosure of the nature of the call and the name of the person on whose behalf the call is being made. A violation of GBL § 399-p allows recovery of actual damages or \$50.00, whichever is greater, including trebling upon a showing of a wilful violation.

Consumers aggrieved by telemarketing abuses may sue in Small Claims Court and recover damages under both the TCPA and GBL § 399-p [Kaplan v. First City Mortgage^{ccclxiv} (consumer sues telemarketer in Small Claims Court and recovers \$500.00 for a violation of TCPA and \$50.00 for a violation of GBL § 399-p); Kaplan v. Life Fitness Center^{ccclxv} (consumer recovers \$1,000.00 for violations of TCPA and \$50.00 for a violation of GBL § 399-p)].

[C] **Telemarketing Abuse Act: G.B.L. § 399-pp**

Under General Business Law § 399-z [" GBL § 399-z "], known as the " Do Not Call " rule, consumers may prevent telemarketers from making unsolicited telephone calls by filing their names and phone numbers with a statewide registry. " No telemarketer...may make...any unsolicited sales calls to any customer more than thirty days after the customer's name and telephone number(s)...appear on

the then current quarterly no telemarketing sales calls registry ". Violations of this rule may subject the telemarketer to a maximum fine of \$2,000.00. In March of 2002 thirteen telemarketers accepted fines totaling \$217,000 for making calls to persons who joined the Do Not Call Registry.^{ccclxvi} In addition " [n]othing (in this rule) shall be construed to restrict any right which any person may have under any other statute or at common law ".

[D] Telemarketing Abuse Prevention Act: G.B.L. § 399-pp

Under General Business Law § 399-pp [" GBL § 399-pp "] known as the Telemarketing And Consumer Fraud And Abuse Prevention Act, telemarketers must register and pay a \$500 fee [GBL § 399-pp(3)] and post a \$25,000 bond " payable in favor of (New York State) for the benefit of any customer injured as a result of a violation of this section " [GBL § 399-pp(4)]. The certificate of registration may be revoked and a \$1,000 fine imposed for a violation of this section and other statutes including the Federal TCPA. The registered telemarketer may not engage in a host of specific deceptive [GBL § 399-pp(6)(a)] or abusive [GBL § 399-pp(7)] telemarketing acts or practices, must provide consumers with a variety of information [GBL § 399-pp(6)(b)] and may telephone only between 8:00AM to 9:00PM. A violation of GBL § 399-pp is also a

violation of GBL § 349 and also authorizes the imposition of a civil penalty of not less than \$1,000 nor more than \$2,000.

[E] **Unsolicited Telefacsimile Advertising: G.B.L. § 396-aa**

This statute makes it unlawful to “ initiate the unsolicited transmission of fax messages promoting goods or services for purchase by the recipient of such messages ” and provides an private right of action for individuals to seek “ actual damages or one hundred dollars, whichever is greater “. In Rudgayser & Gratt v. Enine, Inc.^{ccclxvii}, the Appellate Term refused to consider “ whether the TCPA has preempted (G.B.L.) § 396-aa in whole or in part “. However, in Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc.^{ccclxviii} The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the TCPA “ prohibits all unsolicited fax advertisements, and the plaintiff therefore has alleged facts in his complaint sufficient to state a cause of action under the act. Furthermore...(GBL § 396-aa) cannot preempt the plaintiff’s federal cause of action “. And in Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp.^{ccclxix} the Court of Appeals vacated a District court decision which held that a G.B.L. § 396-aa claim was not stated where there was no allegation that faxes had been sent in intrastate commerce.

Proper pleading was addressed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc.^{ccclxx} which noted the GBL 396-aa “ provides an exception from liability for certain transmissions: ‘ This section shall not apply...to transmissions not

exceeding five pages received between the hours of 9:00P.M. and 6:00 A.M. local time '". The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed that trial court's conclusion " that § 393-aa precludes the plaintiff's individual claim because the fax underlying the plaintiff's complaint fell within the exception contained in that statute. That is, because the plaintiff failed to allege that he had received an unsolicited fax advertisement between the hours of 6 a.m. and 9 p.m., or that he had received and unsolicited fax advertisement in excess of five pages between the hours of 6 a.m. and 9. P.m., the fax at issue is not actionable under § 396-aa ". Nonetheless, the plaintiff did state a claim under the federal TCPA as noted above.

[16] **Weddings**

Weddings are unique experiences and may be cancelled or profoundly effected by a broken engagement [see DeFina v. Scott^{ccclxxi} (" The parties, once engaged, sue and countersue on issues which arise from the termination of their engagement. The disputes concern the wedding preparation expenses, the engagement ring, third-party gifts and the premarital transfer of a one-half interest in the real property which as to be the marital abode ")], failure to deliver a contracted for wedding hall [see Barry v. Dandy, LLC^{ccclxxii} (" Defendant's breach of contract left Plaintiff

without a suitable wedding hall for her wedding a mere two months before the scheduled date for her wedding. Monetary damages would adequately compensate Plaintiff for her loss. A bride's wedding day should be one of the happiest occasions in her life. It is a time filled with love and happiness, hopes and dreams...(She) secured the perfect wedding hall for her wedding, namely Sky Studios (which) is a unique, high-end event location with spectacular views of New York City...As Plaintiff is from Iowa, this will negatively interfere with the traveling plans of numerous out-of-town guests... Defendant is obligated to make its space available for Plaintiff's September 15th wedding pursuant to the terms of its agreement ") or " ideal wedding site "[Murphy v. Lord Thompson Manor, Inc.^{ccclxxiii} (unhappy bride recovers \$17,000 in economic and non-economic damages plus costs arising from defendant, Lord Thompson Manor's " failure to perform a contract for wedding related services and accommodations ")], failure to deliver a promised wedding singer [see Bridget Griffin-Amiel v. Frank Terris Orchestras^{ccclxxiv} (" the bait and switch^{ccclxxv} of a " 40-something crooner " for the " 20-something " Paul Rich " who promised to deliver a lively mix of pop hits, rhythm-and-blues and disco classics ")], failure to deliver proper photographs of the wedding [see Andreani v. Romeo Photographers & Video Productions^{ccclxxvi} (" The Plaintiff asserts that the quality of the pictures were unacceptable as to color, lighting, positioning and events...The majority of the photos depict

dark and grey backgrounds and very poor lighting. The colors were clearly distorted, for example, there were picture taken outdoors where the sky appeared to be purple instead of blue or gray; pictures where the grass and trees appeared to be brown instead of green and pictures where the lake appeared to be blue in some shots and brown in other shots. The majority of the indoor pictures were dark, blurry and unfocused ")].

13] Litigation Issues

A] Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: G.B.L. § 399-c

Manufacturers and sellers of goods and services have with increasing frequency used contracts with clauses requiring aggrieved consumers to arbitrate their complaints instead of bringing lawsuits, particularly, class actions^{ccclxxvii}. The language in such an agreement seeks to extinguish any rights customers may have to litigate a claim before a court of law. The U.S. Supreme Court^{ccclxxviii} and the Federal District Courts within the Second Circuit^{ccclxxix} have addressed the enforceability of contractual provisions requiring mandatory arbitration, including who decides arbitrability and the application of class procedures, the court or the arbitrator. New York Courts have, generally, enforced arbitration agreements^{ccclxxx} [especially between commercial entities^{ccclxxxi}] within the context of individual and class actions.

However, in Ragucci v. Professional Construction Services^{ccclxxxii}

the Court enforced G.B.L. § 399-c's prohibition against the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in certain consumer contracts and applied it to a contract for architectural services [" A residential property owner seeking the services of an architect for the construction or renovation of a house is not on equal footing in bargaining over contractual terms such as the manner in which a potential future dispute should be resolved. Indeed, the plaintiffs in this case played no role in drafting the subject form agreement. Moreover, a residential property owner may be at a disadvantage where the chosen forum for arbitration specializes in the resolution of disputes between members of the construction industry "]; Baronoff v. Kean Development Co., Inc.^{ccclxxxiii} the petitioners entered into construction contracts with respondent to manage and direct renovation of two properties. The agreement contained an arbitration clause which respondent sought to enforce after petitioners terminated the agreement refusing to pay balance due. The Court, in " a case of first impression ", found that G.B.L. § 399-c barred the mandatory arbitration clause and, further, that petitioners' claims were not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act [" While the (FAA) may in some cases preempt a state statute such as section 399-c, it may only do so in transactions ' affecting commerce ' "].

And in D'Agostino v. Forty-Three East Equities Corp.^{ccclxxxiv} (an arbitration clause between tenant and owner regarding any

dispute arising over a settlement agreement or lease was void on public policy grounds as contrary to the intent of the Legislature " to protect and preserve existing housing, regardless of whether the proceeding is commenced by (Department of Housing Preservation and Development [HPD]) or a tenant...The Legislature set specific time frames for the completing of repairs, specific penalties if repairs are not made and gave the court broad powers to obtain compliance...This responsibility cannot be placed in the hands of an arbitrator who only has a duty to the contracting Parties, is not bound by the principles of substantive law and has no authority to compel HPD into arbitration ").

In Tal Tours v. Goldstein^{ccclxxxv} the Court resolved the manner in which an arbitration before the Beth Din of America (" BDA ") involving a dispute between joint venturers of a tour " catering to a clientele which observes Jewish dietary laws known as Kashrut or Kosher " was to proceed.

In Kaminitzky v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide^{ccclxxxvi} (dispute on the cancellation of hotel reservations contract for Passover event subject to mandatory arbitration agreement which is neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable; motion to compel arbitration granted).

In Mahl v. Rand^{ccclxxxvii} the Court addressed " The need to identify a cognizable pleading " for persons dissatisfied with an arbitration award and held that " for the purposes of the New York

City Civil Court, a petition to vacate the arbitration award as a matter of right which thereby asserts entitlement to a trial *de novo* is a pleading which may be utilized by a party aggrieved by an attorney fee dispute arbitration award in a dollar amount within the court's monetary jurisdiction ").

In In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, a consumer anti-trust class action, the Court, noting that it frequently enforces mandatory arbitration clauses contained in commercial contracts based on " the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration " addressed the enforceability of such clauses featuring a class action waiver " that is, a provision which forbids the parties to the contract from pursuing anything other than individual claims in the arbitral forum. This is a matter of first impression in our Court...We therefore hold that the class action waiver in the Card Acceptance Agreement cannot be enforced in this case because to do so would grant Amex de facto immunity from antitrust liability by removing the plaintiffs' only reasonably feasible means of recovery "ccclxxxviii.

B] Credit Card Defaults & Mortgage Foreclosures

Last year we noted the avalanche of credit card default cases being brought in New York State and the extraordinary response of our Civil Courts^{ccclxxxix}. A recent study^{cccxc} by the Urban Justice

Center discussed " the explosion of consumer debt cases in the New York City Civil Court in recent years. Approximately, 320,000 consumer debt cases were filed in 2006, leading to almost \$800 million in judgments. The report notes that this is more filings than all the civil and criminal cases in U.S. District Courts...findings of the report include (1) The defendant failed to appear in 93.3% of the cases, (2) 80% of cases result in default judgments, (3) Even when defendants appear, they were virtually never represented by counsel, (4) Almost 90% of cases are brought by debt buyers "cccxcⁱ.

Home foreclosures have increased dramatically leading New York State Court of Appeals Chief Justice Kaye to note that " Since January 2005, foreclosure filings have increased 150 percent statewide and filing are expected to ruse at least an additional 40 percent in 2008 " and to announce a residential foreclosure program to " help ensure that homeowners are aware of available legal service providers and mortgage counselors who can help them avoid unnecessary foreclosures and reach-of-court resolutions "cccxcⁱⁱ.

In addition, the Courts have responded vigorously as well [see Recent Standing Decisions from New York, NCLC Reports, Bankruptcy and Foreclosures Edition, Vol. 26, March/April 2008, p. 19 (" In a series of recent decisions several New York courts^{cccxcⁱⁱⁱ} either denied summary judgment or refused to grant motions for default to plaintiffs who provided the courts with clearly

inadequate proof of their standing to foreclose “) including the application of New York State’s predatory lending and “ high-cost home loan “ statute as an affirmative defense in foreclosure proceedings^{cccxciv}.

Several Courts have sought to establish appropriate standards for adjudicating credit card default claims brought by lenders. In Citibank (South Dakota), NA v. Martin^{cccxcv} the Court, after noting that “ With greater frequency, courts are presented with summary judgment motions by credit card issuers seeking a balance due from credit card holders which motions fail to meet essential standards of proof and form in one or more particulars “, set forth much needed standards of proof regarding, *inter alia*, assigned claims, account stated claims, tendering of original agreements, requests for legal fees and applicable interest rates.

In MBNA America Bank, NA v. Straub,^{cccxcvi} the Court set forth appropriate procedures for the confirmation of credit card arbitration awards. “ After credit card issuers and credit card debt holders turn to arbitration to address delinquent credit card accounts, as they do increasingly, courts are presented with post-arbitration petitions to confirm arbitration awards and enter money judgments (CPLR 7510). This decision sets out the statutory and constitutional framework for review of a petition to confirm a credit card debt arbitration award, utilizing legal precepts relating to confirming arbitration awards and credit cards, a novel

approach most suited to this type of award. Briefly put, to grant a petition to confirm an arbitration award on a credit card debt, a court must require the following: (1) submission of the written contract containing the provision authorizing arbitration; (2) proof that the cardholder agreed to arbitration in writing or by conduct, and (3) a demonstration of proper service of the notice of arbitration hearing and of the award. In addition, the court must consider any supplementary information advanced by either party regarding the history of the parties' actions. Judicial review of the petition should commence under the New York provisions governing confirmation of an arbitration award but- if the written contract and cardholder agreement are established by the petition-the manner of service of the notice and award and treatment of supplementary information should be considered under the Federal Arbitration Act provisions (9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., ' FAA') “.

In MBNA America Bank, NA v. Nelson^{cccxcvii} the Court stated that “ Over the past several years this Court has received a plethora of confirmation of arbitration award petitions. These special proceedings commenced by a variety of creditors...seek judgment validating previously issued arbitration awards against parties who allegedly defaulted on credit card debt payments. In most of these cases the respondents have failed to answer...the judiciary continues to provide an important role in safeguarding consumer rights and in overseeing the fairness of the debt collection

process. As such this Court does not consider its function to merely rubber stamp confirmation of arbitration petitions...Specifically, ' an arbitration award may be confirmed upon nonappearance of the respondent only when the petitioner makes a prima facie showing with admissible evidence that the award is entitled to confirmation '... Petition dismissed without prejudice (for failure of proof)". The Court also created " two checklist short form order decisions to help provide guidance and a sense of unity among the judges of the Civil Court of New York. One provides grounds for dismissal without prejudice...The other lists grounds for dismissal with prejudice ".

And in MBNA America Bank NA v. Pacheco^{cccxcviii} the denied a motion to confirm an arbitration award for lack of proper service.

C] Forum Selection Clauses

" Forum selection clauses are among the most onerous and overreaching of all clauses that may appear in consumer contracts. The impact of these clauses is substantial and can effectively extinguish legitimate consumer claims, e.g., plaintiff' claim herein of \$1,855 is, practically speaking, unenforceable except in the Small Claims Court, since the costs of retaining an attorney in and traveling to Utah would far exceed recoverable damages "

[Arbor Commercial Mortgage, LLC v. Martinson,^{cccxcix} (the contract

provision “ does not establish New York as the exclusive or only possible forum “); Strujan v. AOL, 12 Misc. 3d 1160 (N.Y. Civ. 2006)(“ If the court were to enforce the forum selection clause, Ms. Stujan...would have to travel to Virginia, probably more than once, for court appearances. The trip is not one easily completed in a single day which could necessitate food and lodging expenses...Ms. Stujan would quickly see her litigation expenses eat away at her potential recovery. Ms. Stujan brought her action against AOL in a forum designed to provide an economical and prompt resolution of action involving pro se litigants. To enforcement of the Agreement’s forum selection clauses would deprive her of this forum and provide no practical alternative...the enforcement of the forum selection clause in this action would be unreasonable “); Oxman v. Amoroso^{cd} (Utah forum selection clause not enforced); Posh Pooch Inc. v. Nieri Argenti^{cdi} (“ Defendant also contends that I should dismiss this action based on the forum selection clause written in Italian in tiny type at the bottom of several invoices sent to Plaintiffs. I do not need to reach the question of whether a forum selection clause written in Italian is enforceable against a plaintiff that does read or understand Italian, because I find that the forum selection clause is unenforceable under (UCC) § 2-207(2)(b)... which governs disputes arising out of a contract for sale of goods between merchants “); Studebaker-Worthington Leasing Corp. V. A-1 Quality Plumbing Corp.^{cdii}(“ the forum selection clause lacks specificity as it does not designate a specific forum or choice of law for the determination of the controversies that may arise out of the contract. Therefore,

enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable and unjust as it is overreaching “); Boss v. American Express Financial Advisors, Inc.^{cdiii} (Minnesota forum selection clause enforced citing Brooke Group v. JCH Syndicate 488^{cdiv} (“ Forum selection clauses are enforced because they provide certainty and predictability in the resolution of disputes “); Glen & Co. V. Popular Leasing USA, Inc.,^{cdv} (Norvergence forum selection clause; “ Whether the forum selection clause is enforceable, which would place venue of this action in Missouri, or unenforceable, requiring the Court to then consider whether New York or Missouri is a proper forum for this action pursuant to CPLR 327...venue would in either event be in Missouri “); Sterling National Bank v. Borger, Jones & Keeley-Cain, N.Y.L.J., April 28, 2005, p. 21 (N.Y. Civ. 2005)

(contractual dispute between defunct telecommunications company and lawfirm; “ floating “ forum selection clause not enforced as lacking in “ “ certainty and predictability “ “ and not negotiated as part of “ sophisticated business transaction “); Scarella v. America Online^{cdvi} (“ the forum selection clause set forth in the electronic (AOL) membership agreement, which required that any dispute against AOL be litigated in Virginia, was unenforceable in the limited context of this small claims case...enforcement of the forum selection clause in the parties’ ‘ clipwrap ‘ agreement would be unreasonable in that he would be deprived not only of his preferred choice to litigate this \$5,000 controversy in the Small Claims Part, but for all practical purposes of his day in court “). But see Gates v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.^{cdvii} (Gay & Lesbian AOL customers challenged AOL’s failure to police chat rooms to prevent threats by hate speech by others; Virginia forum selection clause enforced notwithstanding plaintiffs’ claims that it “ should not be enforced...because Virginia law does not allow for consumer

class action litigation and would therefore conflict with...public policy “); See also: Murphy v. Schneider National, Inc.^{cdviii} (court must conduct evidentiary hearing to determine if person against whom enforcement of forum selection clause is sought would be deprived of day in court)].

D] Tariffs; Filed Rate Doctrine

An excellent discussion of filed and unfiled tariffs and the filed rate doctrine [“ Under that doctrine, ‘ the rules, regulations and rates filed by carriers with the I.C.C. form part of all contracts of shipments and are binding on all parties concerned, whether the shipper has notice of them or not ‘ (and) ‘ bars judicial challenges under the common law to a rate fixed by a regulatory agency ”] in cases involving loss of shipped packages appears in Great American Insurance Agency v. United Parcel Service^{cdix}, a case involving the loss of the contents of a package containing jewelry. The Court found that the filed rate doctrine did not apply because of a failure to establish that “ the 1998 UPS Tariff was properly made a part of the shipping contract at issue “. In addition, the two year contractual limitation period for the commencement of lawsuits was not enforced. “ The 1998 UPS Tariff’s reference to two years after discovery of the loss by the customer is impermissibly shorter than the Carmack Amendment’s minimum threshold of two years after notice of disallowance.

ENDNOTES

i. See Bonior v. Citibank, N.A., 14 Misc. 3d 771, 828 N.Y.S. 2d 765 (N.Y. Civ. 2006)(" Since this is a Small Claims action, the claimants' complaint is merely a general statement of why relief is being sought and not a formalistic assertion of legal principals. This requires the Court to analyze the facts of each case as presented rather than pleaded so as to grant the ' substantial justice ' mandated by the statute "); Dvoskin v. Levitz Furniture Co., Inc., 9 Misc. 3d 1125 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2005)(" The informal nature of the layman facilitated small claims process dispenses with written answers as well as the need for plaintiffs to articulate all requisite elements of causes of action and instead places the responsibility upon the tribunal to ascertain from the proof what legal issues have been joined for disposition ").

ii. Sorrentino v. ASN Roosevelt Center, LLC, 579 F. Supp. 2d 387 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

iii. Aponte v. Raychuk, 160 A.D. 2d 636, 559 N.Y.S. 2d 255 (1st Dept. 1990).

iv In Cuomo v. Dell, Inc., 21 Misc. 3d 1110(A), 873 N.Y.S. 2d 236 (Albany Sup. 2008).

v Ballas v. Virgin Media, Inc., 18 Misc3d 1106, 856 N.Y.S. 2d 22 aff'd 60 A.D. 3d 712, 875 N.Y.S. 2d 523 (2d Dept. 2009).

vi See also: **Brooks v. Key Trust Company National Ass'n**, 26 A.D. 3d 628, 809 N.Y.S. 2d 270 (2006)(" plaintiff's complaint... that defendants induced him to transfer his investment account to them for active management, that defendants thereafter failed to abide by promises and representations regarding the management and goals...(does) not amount to conduct affecting the consuming public at large "); **People v. Wilco Energy Corp.**, 284 A.D. 2d 469, 728 N.Y.S. 2d 471 (2d Dept. 2001)(" Wilco solicited contracts from the public and, after entering into approximately 143 contracts, unilaterally changed their terms. This was not a private transaction occurring on a single occasion but rather, conduct which affected numerous consumers...Wilco's conduct constituted a deceptive practice. It offered a fixed-price contract and then refused to comply with its most material term-an agreed-upon price for heating oil "); **Walts v. Melon Mortgage Corporation**, 259 A.D. 2d 322, 686 N.Y.S. 2d 428 (1999)(" Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a materially deceptive practice aimed at consumers "), appeal dismissed 94 N.Y. 2d 795, 700 N.Y.S. 2d 424, 722 N.E. 2d 504 (1999); **Tate v. Fuccillo Ford, Inc.**, 15 Misc. 3d 453 (

Watertown Cty. Ct. 2007)(" defendant's policy of fixing its times to do a given job on a customer's vehicle based on a national time standard rather than being based upon the actual time it took to do the task without so advising each customer of their method of assessing labor costs is ' a deceptive act or practice directed towards consumers and that such...practice resulted in actual injury to a plaintiff '"); Chun v. BMW of Manhattan, Inc., 11 Misc. 3d 1078 (N.Y. Sup. 2005)(misrepresented extended warranty; " Plaintiffs' inability to cancel the Extension was not a merely private one-shot transaction "); Meyerson v. Prime Realty Services, LLC, 7 Misc. 2d 911(N.Y. Sup. 2005)(" defendants own and manage a substantial number of rent-regulated apartments, and use its challenged forms for all lease renewals, so that the dispute is not simply a private contract dispute and generally claims involving residential rental units are a type of claim recognized under (G.B.L. § 349)); Dunn v. Northgate Ford, Inc., 1 Misc. 3d 911(A)(N.Y. Sup. 2004)(" there is evidence from other affiants that similar omissions and/or misstatements of fact, known to the dealer to be false or misleading...occurred in other sales at the same dealership...such practices are not isolated instances and would have a ' broader impact on consumers at large ' "); McKinnon v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 182 Misc. 2d 517, 522 (N.Y. Sup. 1999)(" the conduct must be consumer-oriented and have a broad impact on consumers at large ").

vii. See e.g., Anesthesia Associates of Mount Kisco, LLP v. Northern Westchester Hospital Center, 59 A.D. 3d 473, 873 N.Y.S. 2d 679 (2d Dept. 2009)(private contractual dispute between two groups of anesthesiologists at Northern Westchester Hospital Center; GBL 349 claim dismissed); Flax v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 54 A.D. 3d 992 (2d Dept. 2008)(" private contract disputes which are unique to the parties do not fall within the ambit of the statute. Here, the plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants engaged in deceptive business practices directed at members of the public generally who purchased flexible premium life insurance policies "); Mandelkow v. Child and Family Services of Erie County, 49 A.D. 3d 1316, 859 N.Y.S. 2d 321 (4th Dept. 2008)(first counterclaim " arises from ' a private contract dispute '"); Purmil v. Chuk Dey India Too, Inc., 2008 NY Slip Op 51766(U)(Nassau District Court 2008)(" The matter is a private contract dispute over a specific commercial transaction between business

entities ").

viii See also: Western Bldg. Restoration Co., Inc. v. Lovell Safety Management Co., LLC, 61 A.D. 3d 1095, 876 N.Y.S. 2d 733 (3d Dept. 2009)(worker's compensation claim processing; " plaintiff wholly failed to demonstrate that defendant's alleged deceptive business practices had a broad impact on consumers at large "); Paltre v. General Motors Corp., 26 A.D. 3d 481, 810 N.Y.S. 2d 496 (2006)(failure to state G.B.L. § 349 claim " because the alleged misrepresentations were either not directed at consumers or were not materially deceptive "); Weiss v. Polymer Plastics Corp., 21 A.D. 3d 1095, 802 N.Y.S. 2d 174 (2005)(defective synthetic stucco; " To establish prima facie violation of (G.B.L. § 349) a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant is engaging in consumer-oriented conduct which is deceptive or misleading in a material way, and that the plaintiff has been injured because of it...The transaction in this case was between two companies in the building construction and supply industry...It did not involve any direct solicitation...(of) the ultimate consumer...In short, this was not the type of ' modest ' transaction that the statute was intended to reach "); Biancone v. Bossi, 24 A.D. 3d 582, 806 N.Y.S. 2d 694 (2005)(plaintiff's claim that defendant contractor failed " to paint the shingles used in the construction...(And) add sufficient topsoil to the property " arose from " a private contract that is unique to the parties, rather than conduct that affects consumers at large "); Continental Casualty Co. v. Nationwide Indemnity Co., 16 A.D. 2d 353, 792 N.Y.S. 2d 434 (2005)(allegations that insurer misrepresented meaning of their standard comprehensive general liability policies is " at best a private contract dispute over policy coverage "); Fulton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 A.D. 3d 380, 788 N.Y.S. 2d 349 (2005)(denial of insurance claim not materially deceptive nor consumer oriented practice); Medical Society of New York v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 15 A.D. 3d 206, 790 N.Y.S. 2d 79 (2005)(denial or untimely settlement of claims not consumer oriented and too remote); Berardino v. Ochlan, 2 A.D. 3d 556, 770 N.Y.S. 2d 75 (2003)(claim against insurance agent for misrepresentations not consumer oriented); Martin v. Group Health, Inc., 2 A.D. 3d 414, 767 N.Y.S. 2d 803 (2003)(dispute over insurance coverage for dental implants not consumer oriented); Goldblatt v. MetLife, Inc., 306 A.D. 2d 217, 760 N.Y.S. 2d 850 (2003)(claim against insurance company not "

consumer oriented "); **Freefall Express, Inc. v. Hudson River Park Trust**, 16 Misc. 3d 1135 (N.Y. Sup. 2007)(" Where the alleged deceptive practices occur between relatively sophisticated entities with equal bargaining power such does not give rise to liability under GBL 349...large business are not the small-time individual consumers GBL 349 was intended to protect "); **Feinberg v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.**, 15 Misc. 3d 299, 832 N.Y.S. 2d 760 (N.Y. Sup. 2007)(private contract dispute over charge-backs between apparel manufacturer and distributor and retail store); **Huang v. Utica National Ins. Co.**, 15 Misc. 3d 127 (N.Y.A.T. 2007)(" private contract dispute "); **Rosenberg v. Chicago Ins. Co.**, 2003 WL 21665680 (N.Y. Sup. 2003)(conduct not consumer oriented; " Although the complaint includes allegations that the insurer's alleged bad acts had an impact on the public (plaintiff) is a large law firm, which commenced this action to protect its interests under a specific insurance policy "); **Canario v. Prudential Long Island Realty**, 300 A.D. 2d 332, 751 N.Y.S. 2d 310 (2002)(.78 acre property advertised as 1.5 acres is size; " the misrepresentation had the potential to affect only a single real estate transaction involving a single unique piece of property...There was no impact on consumers or the public at large "); **Cruz v. NYNEX Information Resources**, 263 A.D. 2d 285, 290, 703 N.Y.S. 2d 103 (1st Dept. 2000).

ix. See also: **Ladino v. Bank of America**, 52 A.D. 3d 571, 861 N.Y.S. 2d 683 (2d Dept. 2008)(plaintiff alleges that defendant negligently published false credit information which constituted violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act and GBL 349; no private right of action under Fair Credit Reporting Act and plaintiff " never notified any credit reporting agency that he was disputing the accuracy of information provided by defendant "; failure to state a GBL 349 claim; " Although Fleet's alleged conduct may have been negligent, it did not mislead the plaintiff in any material way and did not constitute a ' deceptive act ' ").

x. See e.g., **Florczak v. Oberriter**, 50 A.D. 3d 1440 (3d Dept. 2008)(dispute between competitors over the origin of baseball bats; " plaintiff alleges that defendants confused and misled potential consumers by falsely claiming in their advertisements that they ' manufacture ' and ' make ' baseball bats and that these bat are made in Cooperstown-the birthplace of baseball-when in fact the vast percentage of these bats are actually

manufactured in a factory owned by defendants located two miles outside of Cooperstown “; no damages shown; no evidence “ that the allegedly false advertisements had a deceptive or misleading impact upon a “ consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances “ and no “ evidence...that such a consumer purchased a bat from defendants because they believed the bat was completely manufactured within the confines of Cooperstown “).

xi. Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 98 N.Y. 2d 314, 746 N.Y.S. 2d 858, 774 N.E. 2d 1190 (2002).

xii. Card v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 175 Misc. 2d 389, 669 N.Y.S. 2d 117 (1996).

xiii. Card v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 175 Misc. 2d 389, 669 N.Y.S. 2d 117, 121 (1996)

xiv. Karlin v. IVF America, Inc., 93 N.Y. 2d 282, 690 N.Y.S. 2d 495, 712 N.E. 2d 662, 665 (1999).

xv. People v. Lipsitz, 174 Misc. 2d 571, 663 N.Y.S. 2d 468, 475 (1997).

xvi. People v. McNair, 9 Misc. 2d 1121(a) (N.Y. Sup. 2005).

xvii Berkman v. Robert's American Gourmet Food, Inc., 16 Misc. 3d 1104 (N.Y. Sup. 2007).

xviii See also Class Actions, supra, at 9.03[2]; WKM, supra, at 903.10.

xix See also WKM, supra, at 901.23[6][c].

xx Id.

xxi. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1229 (2d Cir. 2005).

xxii. Leider v. Ralfe, 2005 WL 152025 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

xxiii. Gale v. International Business Machines Corp., 9 A.D. 3d 446, 781 N.Y.S. 2d 45 (2d Dept. 2004).

xxiv. Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. v. Figaro Systems, Inc., 7 Misc. 3d 503 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).

xxv. Millan v. Yonkers Avenue Dodge, Inc., New York Law Journal, Sept. 17, 1996, p. 26, col. 5 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).

xxvi. Automobile manufacturers or dealers may sell consumers new and used car warranties which, typically, are contingent upon an opportunity to cure. Borys v. Scarsdale Ford Inc., New York Law Journal, June 15, 1998, p. 34, col. 4 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).

xxvii. Denny v. Ford Motor Company, 87 N.Y. 2d 248, 639 N.Y.S. 2d 250, 253-259, 662 N.E. 2d 730 (1995)(comparison of causes of action based upon strict products liability and breach of warranty of merchantability).

xxviii. Strict products liability theory applies to new and used car dealers. Nutting v. Ford Motor Company, 180 A.D. 2d 122, 584 N.Y.S. 2d 653 (1992).

xxix. Ritchie v. Empire Ford Sales Inc., New York Law Journal, Nov. 7, 1996, p. 30, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).

xxx. Borys v. Scarsdale Ford, Inc., New York Law Journal, June 15, 1998, p. 34, col. 4 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).

xxxi. Giarrantano v. Midas Muffler, 166 Misc. 2d 390, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 656, 659 (1995).

xxxii. Giarrantano v. Midas Muffler, 166 Misc. 2d 390, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 656, 660 (1995).

xxxiii. New York General Business Law § 617(2)(a).

xxxiv. Giarrantano v. Midas Muffler, 166 Misc. 2d 390, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 656, 661 (1995).

xxxv. Kim v. BMW of Manhattan, Inc., 11 Misc. 3d 1078 (N.Y. Sup. 2005).

xxxvi. Welch v. Exxon Superior Service Center, New York Law Journal, May 8, 2003, p. 25, col. 2 (City Ct. 2003).

xxxvii. Shalit v. State of New York, 153 Misc. 2d 241, 580 N.Y.S. 2d 836 (1992)

xxxviii. Denny v. Ford Motor Company, 87 N.Y. 2d 248, 638 N.Y.S. 2d 250, 253-259 (1995).

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- xxxix. Hull v. Moore Mobile Home Stebra, Inc., 214 A.D. 2d 923, 625 N.Y.S. 2d 710, 711 (1995).
- xl. Natale v. Martin Volkswagen, Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 1046, 402 N.Y.S. 2d 156, 158-159 (1978).
- xli. Mollins v. Nissan Motor Co., Inc., 14 Misc. 3d 1226 (Nassau Sup. 2007).
- xlii. Urquhart v. Philbor Motors, Inc., 9 A.D. 3d 458, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 176 (2d Dept. 2004).
- xliii. Tarantino v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., New York Law Journal, October 30, 2000, p. 34, col. 5 (West. Sup.).
- xliv. DiCinto v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., New York Law Journal, August 30, 2000, p. 24, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup.).
- xlv. Carter-Wright v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., New York Law Journal, August 30, 2000, p. 26.
- xlvi. DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2002 WL 257017 (N.Y. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2002).
- xlvii. Borys v. Scarsdale Ford, Inc., New York Law Journal, June 15, 1998, p. 34, col. 4 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).
- xlviii. Levitsky v. SG Hylan Motors, Inc., New York Law Journal, July 3, 2003, p. 27, col. 5 (N.Y. Civ. 2003).
- xlix. Spielzinger v. S.G. Hylan Motors Corp., New York Law Journal, September 10, 2004, p. 19, col. 3 (Richmond Civ. 2004).
- l. Thompson v. Foreign Car Center, Inc., New York Law Journal, March 10, 2006, p. 19, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup.).
- li. Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp., v. Spitzer, 7 N.Y. 3d 653, 860 N.E. 2d 705, 827 N.Y.S. 2d 88 (2006).
- lii. Borys v. Scarsdale Ford, Inc., New York Law Journal, June 15, 1998, p. 34, col. 4 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).
- liii. Kandel v. Hyundai Motor America, __A.D. 3d__, 858 N.Y.S. 2d 298 (2008).
- liv. Mollins v. Nissan Motor Co., Inc., 14 Misc. 3d 1226 (Nassau

Sup. 2007).

lv. Matter of General Motors Corp. [Sheikh], __A.D. 3d__, __N.Y.S. 2d__ 2007 WL 4577944 (3d Dept. 2007).

lvi. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Schachner, 166 A.D. 2d 683, 561 N.Y.S. 2d 595, 596-597 (1990).

lvii. Matter of General Motors Corp. v. Warner, 5 Misc. 3d 968, 784 N.Y.S. 2d 360 (Albany Sup. 2004).

lviii. Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 6 Misc. 3d 228, 782 N.Y.S. 2d 610 (Albany Sup. 2004), *aff'd* 26 A.D. 3d 88, 804 N.Y.S. 2d 506 (2005), *aff'd* 7 N.Y. 3d 653, 860 N.E. 2d 705, 827 N.Y.S. 2d 88 (2006). See also: Matter of Arbitration between General Motors Corp. v. Brenda Gurau, 33 A.D. 3d 1149, 824 N.Y.S. 2d 180 (3d Dept. 2006)(" Lemon Law does not require a consumer to prove that a defect exists at the time of an arbitration hearing in order to recover under the statute ").

lix. Kucher v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 9 Misc. 3d 45, 802 N.Y.S. 2d 298 (N.Y. App. Term 2005).

lx. Kucher v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 9 Misc. 3d 45, 802 N.Y.S. 2d 298 (N.Y. App. Term 2005).

lxi. Alpha Leisure, Inc. v. Leaty, 14 Misc. 3d 1235 (Monroe Sup. 2007).

lxii. Kandel v. Hyundai Motor America, __A.D. 3d__, 858 N.Y.S. 2d 298 (2008).

lxiii. Kucher v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., New York Law Journal, May 15, 2006, p. 20, col. 3 (N.Y. Civ.), *mod'd* 20 Misc. 3d 64 (N.Y.A.T. 2008).

lxiv. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Karman, 5 Misc. 3d 567, 782 N.Y.S. 2d 343 (Albany Sup. 2004).

lxv. Matter of City Line Auto Mall, Inc. v. Mintz, 42 A.D. 3d 407, 840 N.Y.S. 2d 783 (2007).

lxvi. B & L Auto Group, Inc. v. Zilog, New York Law Journal, July 6, 2001, p. 21, col. 2 (N.Y. Civ. 2001).

lxvii. Goldsberry v. Mark Buick Pontiac GMC, New York Law Journal,

December 14, 2006, p. 25, col. 1 (Yks Cty Ct.).

lxviii. **Barthley v. Autostar Funding LLC**, Index No: SC 3618-03, Yonkers Small Claims Court, December 31, 2003, J. Borrelli (In Barthley the consumer purchased a 1993 Lexus with over 110,000 miles and an extended warranty on the vehicle. After the vehicle experienced engine problems and a worn cam shaft was replaced at a cost of \$1,733.66 the consumer made a claim under the extended warranty. The claim was rejected by the warranty company " on the basis that a worn camshaft was a pre-existing condition ". The Court found this rejection unconscionable and awarded damages to cover the cost of the new camshaft. " In effect, the warranty company has chosen to warranty a ten year old car with over 110,000 miles on the odometer and then rejects a timely claim on the warranty on the basis that the car engine's internal parts are old and worn ", rev'd N.Y.L.J., April 26, 2005, p. 25, col. 3 (N.Y.A.T.) (" defendant was not a party to the warranty agreement ").

lxix. **Cintron v. Tony Royal Quality Used Cars, Inc.**, 132 Misc. 2d 75, 503 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (1986).

lxx. **Millan v. Yonkers Avenue Dodge, Inc.**, New York Law Journal, Sept. 17, 1996, p. 26, col. 5 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).

lxxi. **Armstrong v. Boyce**, 135 Misc. 2d 148, 513 N.Y.S. 2d 613, 617 (1987).

lxxii. **Shortt v. High-Q Auto, Inc.**, New York Law Journal, December 14, 2004, p. 20, col. 3 (N.Y. Civ. 2004).

lxxiii. **Fortune v. Scott Ford, Inc.**, 175 A.D. 2d 303, 572 N.Y.S. 2d 382 (1991).

lxxiv. **Jandreau v. LaVigne**, 170 A.D. 2d 861, 566 N.Y.S. 2d 683 (1991).

lxxv. **Diaz v. Audi of America, Inc.**, 19 A.D. 3d 357, 796 N.Y.S. 2d 419 (2005).

lxxvi. **Ireland v. J.L.'s Auto Sales, Inc.**, 151 Misc. 2d 1019, 574 N.Y.S. 2d 262 (1991), rev'd 153 Misc. 2d 721, 582 N.Y.S. 2d 603 (1992).

lxxvii. **Williams v. Planet Motor Car, Inc.**, New York Law Journal, January 3, 2002, p. 19 (Kings Civ. Ct.).

lxxviii. DiNapoli v. Peak Automotive, Inc., 34 A.D. 3d 674, 824 N.Y.S. 2d 424 (2d Dept. 2006).

lxxix. Felton v. World Class Cars, 12 Misc. 3d 64, __N.Y.S. 2d__ (N.Y.A.T. 2006).

lxxx. Lipscomb v. Manfredi Motors, New York Law Journal, April 2, 2002, p. 21 (Richmond Civ. Ct.)

lxxxxi. Felton v. World Class Cars, 12 Misc. 3d 64, __N.Y.S. 2d__ (N.Y.A.T. 2006). See also: Williams v. Planet Motor Car, 190 Misc. 2d 33 (2001).

lxxxii. Williams v. Planet Motor Car, Inc., New York Law Journal, January 3, 2002, p. 19 (Kings Civ. Ct.).

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. Barilla v. Gunn Buick Cadillac-GMC, Inc., 139 Misc. 2d 496, 528 N.Y.S. 2d 273 (1988).

lxxxiv. Ritchie v. Empire Ford Sales Inc., New York Law Journal, Nov. 7, 1996, p. 30, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).

lxxxv. People v. Condor Pontiac, 2002 WL 21649689 (N.Y. Sup. 2003).

lxxxvi. Williams v. Planet Motor Car, Inc., New York Law Journal, January 3, 2002, p. 19 (Kings Civ. Ct.).

lxxxvii. Coxall v. Clover Commercial Corp., New York Law Journal, June 17, 2004, p. 19, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ. 2004).

lxxxviii Jung v. The Major Automotive Companies, Inc., 17 Misc. 3d 1124 (Bronx Sup. 2007).

lxxxix. Stiver v. Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc., 9 N.Y. 3d 253, __N.Y.S. 2d__ (2007).

xc. Drew v. Sylvan Learning Center, 16 Misc. 3d 838 (N.Y. Civ. 2007).

xc. See e.g., Andre v. Pace University, 161 Misc. 2d 613, 618 N.Y.S. 2d 975 (1994), rev'd on other grounds 170 Misc. 2d 893, 655 N.Y.S. 2d 777 (1996)(failing to give basic computer course for beginners). See also: Cullen v. Whitman Medical Corp., 197

F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Pa. 2000)(settlement of class action involving education misrepresentations).

xcii. Brown v. Hambric, 168 Misc. 2d 502 (Yonkers City Ct. 1995).

xciii. Cambridge v. Telemarketing Concepts, 171 Misc. 2d 796 (Yonkers City Ct. 1997).

xciv. People v. McNair, 9 Misc. 3d 1121 (N.Y. Sup. 2005) (" deliberate and material misrepresentations to parents enrolling their children in the Harlem Youth Enrichment Christian Academy...thereby entitling the parents to all fees paid (in the amount of \$182,393.00); civil penalties pursuant to G.B.L. 350-d of \$500 for each deceptive act or \$38,500.00 and costs of \$2,000.00 pursuant to CPLR § 8303(a)(6)").

xcv. Andre v. Pace University, 161 Misc. 2d 613, 618 N.Y.S. 2d 975 (1994), rev'd on other grounds 170 Misc. 2d 893, 655 N.Y.S. 2d 777 (1996). See also: Cullen v. Whitman Medical Corp., 197 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Pa. 2000)(settlement of class action involving education misrepresentations).

xcvi New York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of Health, 2008 WL 1752455 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd 556 F. 3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009).

xcvii. Precision Foundations v. Ives, 4 A.D. 3d 589, 772 N.Y.S. 2d 116 (3d Dept. 2004).

xcviii. Cristillo v. Custom Construction Services, Inc., 19 Misc. 3d 1140(A) (Rochester City Ct. 2008).

xcix. Udezeh v. A+Plus Construction Co., New York Law Journal, October 10, 2002, p. 22 (N.Y. Civ. 2002).

c. Garan v. Don & Walt Sutton Builders, Inc., 5 A.D. 3d 349, 773 N.Y.S. 2d 416 (2d Dept. 2004).

ci. Carney v. Coull Building Inspections, Inc., 16 Misc. 3d 1114 (N.Y. Civ. 2007).

cii. Ricciardi v. Frank d/b/a InspectAmerica Engineering, P.C., 163 Misc. 2d 337, 620 N.Y.S. 2d 918 (1994), mod'd 170 Misc. 2d 777, 655 N.Y.S. 2d 242 (N.Y.A.T. 1996).

ciii. Mancuso v. Rubin, 52 A.D. 3d 580, 861 N.Y.S. 2d 79 (2d Dept. 2008).

civ. Simone v. Homecheck Real Estate Services Inc., 42 A.D. 3d 518 (N.Y.A.D. 2007).

cv. People v. Biegler, 17 Misc. 3d 1139 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2007).

cvi. Flax v. Hommel, 40 A.D. 3d 809, 835 N.Y.S. 2d 735 (2d Dept. 2007).

cvii. CLE Associates, Inc. v. Greene, New York Law Journal, Nov. 22, p. 27, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup.).

cvi. Goldman v. Fay, 8 Misc. 3d 959, 797 N.Y.S. 2d 731 (Richmond Civ. 2005).

cix. Tri-State General Remodeling Contractors, Inc. v. Inderdai Bailnauth, 194 Misc. 2d 135, 753 N.Y.S. 2d 327 (2002).

cx. Goldman v. Fay, 8 Misc. 3d 959, 797 N.Y.S. 2d 731 (2005).

cxi. Franklin Home Improvements Corp. V. 687 6th Avenue Corp., 19 Misc. 3d 1107 (N.Y. Sup. 2008).

cxii. Altered Structure, Inc. v. Solkin, 7 Misc. 3d 139(A) (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).

cxiii. Routier v. Waldeck, 184 Misc. 2d 487, 708 N.Y.S. 2d 270 (2000).

cxiv. Colorito v. Crown Heating & Cooling, Inc., 2005 WL 263751 (N.Y. App. Term 2005).

cxv. Cudahy v. Cohen, 171 Misc. 2d 469, 661 N.Y.S. 2d 171 (1997).

cxvi. Moonstar Contractors, Inc. v. Katsir, New York Law Journal, October 4, 2001, p. 19, col. 6 (N.Y. Civ.)

cxvii. Mandioc Developers, Inc. v. Millstone, 164 Misc. 2d 71, 623 N.Y.S. 2d 704 (1995).

cxviii. B&F Bldg. Corp. v. Liebig, 76 N.Y. 2d 689, 563 N.Y.S. 2d 40, 564 N.E. 2d 650 (1990).

cxix. **CLE Associates, Inc. v. Greene**, New York Law Journal, Nov. 22, p. 27, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup.).

cxx. **Naclerio v. Pradham**, 45 A.D. 3d 585, 845 N.Y.S. 2d 409 (2007).

cxxi. For a discussion of this statute see Bailey & Desiderio, **New Home Warranty, An Open Question Seeking an Answer**, Real Estate Update, New York Law Journal, November 10, 2004, p. 5.

cxxii. **Etter v. Bloomingdale Village Corp.**, 6 Misc. 3d 135(A) (N.Y. App. Term. 2005.)

cxxiii. **Farrell v. Lane Residential, Inc.**, 13 Misc. 3d 1239 (Broome Sup. 2006).

cxxiv. **Putnam v. State of New York**, 233 A.D. 2d 872 (2d Dept. 1996).

cxxv. **Farrell v. Lane Residential, Inc.**, 13 Misc. 3d 1239 (Broome Sup. 2006).

cxxvi. **Security Supply Corporation v. Ciocca**, 49 A.D. 3d 1136, 854 N.Y.S. 2d 570 (2008).

cxxvii. **Sharpe v. Mann**, 34 A.D. 3d 959, 823 N.Y.S. 2d 623 (3d Dept. 2006).

cxxviii. **Sharpe v. Mann**, 34 A.D. 3d 959, 823 N.Y.S. 2d 623 (3d Dept. 2006).

cxxix. **Zyburo v. Bristled Five Corporation Development Pinewood Manor**, 12 Misc. 3d 1177 (Nassau Dist. Ct. 2006).

cccc. **Latiuk v. Faber Construction Co., Inc.**, 269 A.D. 2d 820, 703 N.Y.S. 2d 645 (2000)(builder could not reply upon contractual shortened warranty period because of a failure to comply with statutory requirements).

cccci. **Fumarelli v. Marsam Development, Inc.**, 238 A.D. 2d 470, 657 N.Y.S. 2d 61 (1997), aff'd 92 N.Y. 2d 298, 680 N.Y.S. 2d 440, 703 N.E. 2d 251 (1998)(purchase agreement's limited warranty must be in accordance with the provisions of (G.B.L. § 777-b)).

ccccii. **Finnegan v. Hill**, 38 A.D. 3d 491, 833 N.Y.S. 2d 107 (2d Dept. 2007).

cxxxiii. Biancone v. Bossi, 24 A.D. 3d 582, 806 N.Y.S. 2d 694 (2005).

cxxxiv. Rosen v. Watermill Development Corp., 1 A.D. 3d 424, 768 N.Y.S. 2d 474 (2003).

cxxxv. Taggart v. Martano, 282 A.D. 2d 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).

cxxxvi. Testa v. Liberatore, 6 Misc. 3d 126(A)(N.Y. App. Term. 2004).

cxxxvii. Randazzo v. Abram Zylberberg, 4 Misc. 3d 109 (N.Y. App. Term. 2004).

cxxxviii. Goretsky v. ½ Price Movers, Inc., New York Law Journal, March 12, 2004, p. 19, col. 3 (N.Y. Civ. 2004).

cxxxix. Olukotun v. Reiff, Index No: S.C.R. 232/04, Richmond Cty Civ Ct. July 29, 2004, J. Straniere.

cxl. Baronoff v. Kean Development Co., Inc., 12 Misc. 3d 627 (Nassau Sup. 2006).

cxli. Ragucci v. Professional Construction Services, 25 A.D. 3d 43, 803 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (2005).

cxlii. Simone v. Homecheck Real Estate Services, Inc., 42 A.D. 2d 518, 840 N.Y.S. 2d 398, 400 (2d Dept. 2007).

cxliii. Ayres v. Pressman, 14 Misc. 3d 145 (N.Y.A.T. 2007).

cxliv. Calvente v. Levy, 12 Misc. 3d 38 (N.Y.A.T. 2006).

cxlv. Ayers, supra, at 14 Misc. 3d 145.

cxlvi. Simone v. Homecheck Real Estate Services, Inc., 42 A.D. 2d 518, 840 N.Y.S. 2d 398, 400 (2d Dept. 2007). See also: McMullen v. Propester, 13 Misc. 3d 1232 (N.Y. Sup. 2006).

cxlvii. Spatz v. Axelrod Management Co., 165 Misc. 2d 759, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (1995).

cxlviii. Seecharin v. Radford Court Apartment Corp., Index No. SC 3194-95, Yks. Cty. Ct. (TAD), Decision dated June 15, 1995.

cxlix. Spatz v. Axelrod Management Co., 165 Misc. 2d 759, 764, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (1995).

cl. Spatz v. Axelrod Management Co., 165 Misc. 2d 759, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (1995); Seecharin v. Radford Court Apartment Corp., supra.

300. Kachian v. Aronson, 123 Misc. 2d 743 (1984)(15% rent abatement).

clii. Spatz v. Axelrod Management Co., 165 Misc. 2d 759, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (1995).

cliii. Goode v. Bay Towers Apartments Corp., 1 Misc. 3d 381, 764 N.Y.S. 2d 583 (2003).

cliv. Gaidon v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 94 N.Y. 2d 330, 338, 704 N.Y.S. 2d 177, 725 N.E. 2d 598 (1999).

clv. Tahir v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 2006 WL 1023934 (N.Y. Civ. 2006).

clvi. Beller v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 8 A.D. 3d 310, 778 N.Y.S. 2d 82 (2d Dept. 2004).

clvii. Monter v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 12 A.D. 3d 651, 784 N.Y.S. 2d 898 (2d Dept. 2004).

clviii. Skibinsky v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 6 A.D. 3d 976, 775 N.Y.S. 2d 200 (3d Dept. 2004).

clix. Brenkus v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 309 A.D. 2d 1260, 765 N.Y.S. 2d 80 (2003).

clx. Makastchian v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 270 A.D. 2d 25, 704 N.Y.S. 2d 44 (2000).

clxi. Whitfield v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., New York Law Journal, March 29, 2006, p. 20, col. 3 (N.Y. Civ.).

clxii. Shebar v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 23 A.D. 3d 858, 807 N.Y.S. 2d 448 (2006).

clxiii. Edelman v. O'Toole-Ewald Art Associates, Inc., 28 A.D. 3d 250, 814 N.Y.S. 2d 98 (1st Dept. 2006).

clxiv. Makuch v. New York Central Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 12 A.D. 3d 1110, 785 N.Y.S. 2d 236 (4th Dept. 2004).

clxv. Acquista v. New York Life Ins. Co., 285 A.D. 2d 73, 730 N.Y.S. 2d 272 (2001).

clxvi. Rubinoff v. U.S. Capitol Insurance Co., New York Law Journal, May 10, 1996, p. 31, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).

clxvii Elacqua v. Physicians' Reciprocal Insurers, 21 A.D. 3d 702 (3d Dept. 2005).

clxviii Elacqua v. Physicians Reciprocal Insurers 52 AD3d 886 (3d Dept. 2008).

clxix Globe Surgical Supply v. GEICO, __A.D. 3d__, 2008 WL 5413643 (2d Dept. 2009).

clxx. See NCLC Reports, Consumer Credit and Usury Edition, Vol. 23, Dec. 2004, p. 10 (" TILA provides that a credit card issuer is subject to all claims (except tort claims) and defenses of a consumer against a merchant when the consumer uses a credit card as a method of payment, if certain conditions are met. This right is essentially the credit card equivalent of the Federal Trade Commission's Holder Rule (16 C.F.R. § 433)...A consumer invokes her right as at assert claims or defenses against a card issuer by withholding payment or as a defense in a collection action. The claims or defenses asserted can include claims that also might be raised as a billing error. More importantly, a consumer can use this right to raise a dispute as to the quality of the merchandise or services paid for by the credit card. Note, there is significant confusion about the existence of this right, especially in the context of disputes over the quality of goods or services ").

clxxi. JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Tecl, 24 A.D. 3d 1001 (3d Dept. 2005).

clxxii. Deutsche Bank National Trust v. West, 2009 NY Slip Op 50405(U)(Kings Sup. 2009).

clxxiii. Community Mutual Savings Bank v. Gillen, 171 Misc. 2d 535, 655 N.Y.S. 2d 271 (1997).

clxxiv. Rochester Home Equity, Inc. v. Upton, 1 Misc. 3d 412, 767

N.Y.S. 2d 201 (2003).

clxxv. Citibank (South Dakota) NA v. Beckerman, 18 Misc. 3d 133 (N.Y.A.T. 2008).

clxxvi. Ladino v. Bank of America, 52 A.D. 3d 571, 861 N.Y.S. 2d 683 (2d Dept. 2008).

clxxvii. Tyk v. Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc., 195 Misc. 2d 566, 758 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (2003).

clxxviii. Iyare v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 12 Misc. 3d 123, ___N.Y.S. 2d___ (N.Y.A.T. 2006).

clxxix. Bank of New York v. Walden, 194 Misc. 2d 461, 751 N.Y.S. 2d 341 (2002).

clxxx. Bank of New York v. Walden, 194 Misc. 2d 461, 751 N.Y.S. 2d 341 (2002).

clxxx. Albank, FSB v. Foland, 177 Misc. 2d 569, 676 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (1998).

clxxxii. People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc., 11 N.Y. 3d 105, 894 N.E. 2d 1 (2008).

clxxxiii. Rochester Home Equity, Inc. v. Upton, 1 Misc. 3d 412, 767 N.Y.S. 2d 201 (2003).

clxxxiv. JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Tecl, 24 A.D. 3d 1001 (3d Dept. 2005).

clxxxv. Witherwax v. Transcare, New York Law Journal, May 5, 2005, p. 19 (N.Y. Sup. 2005).

clxxxvi. Dougherty v. North Fork Bank, 301 A.D. 2d 491, 753 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (2003).

clxxxvii. Fuchs v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 41 A.D. 3d 424, 838 N.Y.S. 2d 148 (2d Dept. 2007).

clxxxviii. Household Finance Realty Corp. V. Dunlap, 15 Misc. 3d 659, 834 N.Y.S. 2d 438 (2007).

clxxxix. Hodes v. Vermeer Owners, Inc., 14 Misc. 3d 366, 824

N.Y.S. 2d 872 (N.Y. Civ. 2006).

cxc. LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Shearon, 19 Misc. 3d 433, 850 N.Y.S. 2d 871 (2008).

cxci. Alliance Mortgage Banking Corp. v. Dobkin, 19 Misc. 3d 1121, 2008 WL 1758864 (2008).

cxcii. **People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc.**, 27 A.D. 3d 104, 805 N.Y.S. 2d 175 (2005).

cxci. People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc., 11 N.Y. 3d 105, 894 N.E. 2d 1 (2008).

cxciv. **People v. Telehublink**, 301 A.D. 2d 1006, 756 N.Y.S. 2d 285 (2003).

cxcv. **Sims v. First Consumers National Bank**, 303 A.D. 2d 288, 758 N.Y.S. 2d 284 (2003).

cxcvi. **Broder v. MBNA Corporation**, New York Law Journal, March 2, 2000, p. 29, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup.), aff'd 281 A.D. 2d 369, 722 N.Y.S. 2d 524 (2001).

cxcvii. **Kudelko v. Dalessio**, 14 Misc. 3d 650, 829 N.Y.S. 2d 839 (N.Y. Civ. 2006).

cxcviii. Lesser v. Karenkooper.com, 18 Misc. 2d 1119 (N.Y. Sup. 2008).

cxcix. **American Express Centurion Bank v. Greenfield**, 11 Misc. 3d 129(A) (N.Y. App. Term. 2006).

cc. **Varela v. Investors Insurance Holding Corp.**, 81 N.Y. 2d 958, 598 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (1993).

cci. People v. Boyajian Law Offices, 17 Misc. 3d 1119 (N.Y. Sup. 2007).

ccii. **People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc.**, 27 A.D. 3d 104, 805 N.Y.S. 2d 175 (2005), *lv dismissed* 7 N.Y. 3d 741 (2006). See also: **People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc.**, __A.D. 3d __, __N.Y.S. 2d __, 2007 WL 1016885 (3d Dept. 2007)(" petitioner successfully established his claims pursuant to (G.B.L. § 349 and 350)...Having met the initial burden of establishing liability, Supreme Court was left to determine what measure of the injury ' is attributable to respondents' deception...We find

no error in its exercise of such discretion, despite the lack of a hearing...(as to damages decision modified " by reversing so much thereof as awarded restitution to consumers who enrolled in the Credit Account Protection program and whose accounts were re-aged ").

cciii People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc., 11 N.Y. 3d 105, 894 N.E. 2d 1 (2008).

cciv. Centurion Capital Corp. v. Druce, 14 Misc. 3d 564, 828 N.Y.S. 2d 851 (N.Y. Civ. 2006).

ccv. MRC Receivables Corp. v. Pedro Morales, 2008 NY Slip Op 52158(U)(N.Y.A.T. 2008).

ccvi. Asokwah v. Burt, New York Law Journal, June 19, 2006, p. 25, col. 3 (Yks. City Ct.).

ccvii. Larsen v. LBC Legal Group, P.C., 533 F. Supp. 2d 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

ccviii. People v. Boyajian Law Offices, 17 Misc. 3d 1119 (N.Y. Sup. 2007).

ccix. Barry v. Board of Managers of Elmwood Park Condominium, 18 Misc. 3d 559 (N.Y. Civ. 2007).

ccx. American Credit Card Processing Corp. V. Fairchild, 11 Misc. 3d 972, 810 N.Y.S. 2d 874 (Suffolk Sup. 2006).

ccxi. Wells Fargo Bank v. Reyss, 20 Misc. 3d 1104, 867 N.Y.S. 2d 21 (Kings Sup. 2008).

ccxii. DiMarzo v. Terrace View, New York Law Journal, June 9, 1997, p. 34, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.), remanded on damages only, N.Y.A.T, Decision dated Oct. 27, 1998.

ccxiii. DiMarzo v. Terrace View, New York Law Journal, June 9, 1997, p. 34, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.), remanded on damages only, N.Y.A.T, Decision dated Oct. 27, 1998.

ccxiv. New York General Business Law § 201(1).

ccxv. DiMarzo v. Terrace View, New York Law Journal, June 9, 1997, p. 34, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.), remanded on damages only, N.Y.A.T, Decision dated Oct. 27, 1998.

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- ccxvi. Tannenbaum v. New York Dry Cleaning, Inc., New York Law Journal, July 26, 2001, p. 19, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.).
- ccxvii. White v. Burlington Coat Factory, 3 Misc. 3d 1106(A) (Mt. Vernon Cty Ct 2004).
- ccxviii. Brown v. Hambric, 168 Misc. 2d 502, 638 N.Y.S. 2d 873 (1995).
- ccxix. Brown v. Hambric, 168 Misc. 2d 502, 638 N.Y.S. 2d 873 (1995).
- ccxx. C.T.V., Inc. v. Curlen, New York Law Journal, Dec. 3, 1997, p. 35, col. 1 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).
- ccxxi. Pacurib v. Villacruz, 183 Misc. 2d 850, 705 N.Y.S. 2d 819 (1999).
- ccxxii. See e.g., Brown v. Hambric, 168 Misc. 2d 502, 638 N.Y.S. 2d 873 (1995); C.T.V., Inc. v. Curlen, New York Law Journal, Dec. 3, 1997, p. 35, col. 1 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).
- ccxxiii. Brown v. Hambric, 168 Misc. 2d 502, 638 N.Y.S. 2d 873 (1995). Web Page, supra.
- ccxxiv. Welch v. New York Sports Club Corp., New York Law Journal, March 21, 2001, p. 19 (N.Y. Civ.).
- ccxxv. Hamilton v. Khalife, 289 A.D. 2d 444 (2d Dept. 2001); Morris v. Snappy Car Rental, 189 A.D. 2d 115 (4th Dept. 1993).
- ccxxvi. Bauman v. Eagle Chase Association, 226 A.D. 2d 488 (2d Dept. 1996); Filippazzo v. Garden State Brickface Co., 120 A.D. 2d 663 (2d Dept. 1986).
- ccxxvii. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Kanen, 13 A.D. 3d 579, 788 N.Y.S. 2d 132 (2d Dept. 2004) (
- ccxxviii. Tannenbaum v. N.Y. Dry Cleaning, New York Law Journal, July 26, 2001, at p. 19 (N.Y. Civ.).
- ccxxix. Hacker v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 131 Misc. 2d 757 (N.Y. Civ. 1986).

ccxxx. Tsadilas v. Providian National Bank, 2004 WL 2903518
(1st Dept. 2004)(“ Plaintiff may not invoke the type-size requirements of CPLR 4544
because her own claims against defendant depend on paragraph 4 of each credit card
agreement, which appears to be in the same size type as the rest of the agreement “)

ccxxxii. Lerner v. Karageorgis Lines, Inc., 66 N.Y. 2d 479, 497
N.Y.S. 2d 894, 488 N.E. 2d 824 (1985).

ccxxxiii. Sims v. First Consumers National Bank, 303 A.D. 2d 288,
758 N.Y.S. 2d 284 (2003).

ccxxxiiii. Doe v. Great Expectations, 10 Misc. 3d 618 (N.Y. Civ.
2005).

ccxxxv. Grossman v. MatchNet, 10 A.D. 3d 577, 782 N.Y.S. 2d 246
(1st Dept. 2004).

ccxxxvi. Miuccio v. Puppy City, Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 50404(U) (
N.Y. Civ. 2009).

ccxxxvii. Woods v. Kittykind, 8 Misc. 3d 1003, 801 N.Y.S. 2d 782
(2005).

ccxxxviii. O’Rourke v. American Kennels, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 2005, p.
18
(N.Y. Civ. 2005).

ccxxxix. Mongelli v. Cabral, 166 Misc. 2d 240, 632 N.Y.S. 2d
927
(1995).

ccxl. Mathew v. Klinger, New York Law Journal, October 7,
1997, p. 29, col. 1 (Yks. City. Ct.), mod’d 179 Misc. 2d 609,
686 N.Y.S. 2d 549 (1998).

ccxli. O’Brien v. Exotic Pet Warehouse, Inc., New York Law
Journal, October 5, 1999, p. 35, col. 2 (Yks. City Ct.).

ccxlii. Nardi v. Gonzalez, 165 Misc. 2d 336, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 215
(1995).

ccxliii. Mercurio v. Weber, New York Law Journal, June 30, 2003,
p. 33, col. 5 (N.Y. Civ. 2003).

ccxliv. Lewis v. Al DiDonna, 294 A.D. 2d 799, 743 N.Y.S. 2d 186

(3d Dept. 2002).

ccxliv. Roberts v. Melendez, N.Y.L.J., February 3, 2005, p. 19, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ. 2005)

ccxlv. Anzalone v. Kragness, 826 N.E. 2d 472 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).

ccxlvi. Budd v. Quinlin, 19 Misc. 3d 66 (N.Y.A.T. 2008).

ccxlvii. Miuccio v. Puppy City, Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 50404(U) (N.Y. Civ. 2009).

ccxlviii. O'Rourke v. American Kennels, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 2005, p. 18 (N.Y. Civ. 2005).

ccxlix. Fuentes v. United Pet Supply, Inc., New York Law Journal, September 12, 2000, p. 24, col. 3 ((N.Y. Civ. Ct.).

ccl. Saxton v. Pets Warehouse, Inc., 180 Misc. 2d 377, 691 N.Y.S. 2d 872 (1999).

ccli. Smith v. Tate, New York Law Journal, January 29, 1999, p. 35, col. 5 (N.Y. Civ.).

cclii. Sacco v. Tate, 175 Misc. 2d 901, 672 N.Y.S. 2d 618 (1998).

ccliii. Roberts v. Melendez, New York Law Journal, February 3, 2005, p. 19, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ. 2005).

ccliv. People v. Garcia, 3 Misc. 3d 699 (N.Y. Sup. 2004).

cclv. People v. Douglas Deelecave, New York Law Journal, May 10, 2005, p. 19 (N.Y. Dist Ct. 2005).

cclvi. Rossi v. 21st Century Concepts, Inc., 162 Misc. 2d 932, 618 N.Y.S. 2d 182, 185 (1994).

cclvii. Rossi v. 21st Century Concepts, Inc., 162 Misc. 2d 932, 618 N.Y.S. 2d 182, 185 (1994). Compare: Millan v. Yonkers Avenue Dodge, Inc., New York Law Journal, Sept. 17, 1996, p. 26, col. 5 (Yks. Cty. Ct.)(cooling-off period under Door-To-Door Sales Act does not apply to sale of used cars which is governed, in part, by cure requirements under New York's Used Car Lemon Law

(GBL § 198-b)).

cclviii. New York Environmental Resources v. Franklin, New York Law Journal, March 4, 2003, p. 27 (N.Y. Sup.)

cclix. Rossi v. 21st Century Concepts, Inc., 162 Misc. 2d 932, 618 N.Y.S. 2d 182 (1994); New York Environmental Resources v. Franklin, New York Law Journal, March 4, 2003, p. 27 (N.Y. Sup.).

cclx. Kozlowski v. Sears, New York Law Journal, Nov. 6, 1997, p. 27, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).

cclxi. Filpo v. Credit Express Furniture Inc., New York Law Journal, Aug. 26, 1997, p. 26, col. 4 (Yks. Cty. Ct.). Web Page, supra.

cclxii. Filpo v. Credit Express Furniture Inc., New York Law Journal, Aug. 26, 1997, p. 26, col. 4 (Yks. Cty. Ct.). Web Page, supra.

cclxiii. Rossi v. 21st Century Concepts, Inc., 162 Misc. 2d 932, 618 N.Y.S. 2d 182, 187 (1994).

cclxiv. Certified Inspections, Inc. v. Garfinkel, 19 Misc. 3d 134 (N.Y.A.T. 2008).

cclxv. Sterling National Bank v. Kings Manor Estates, 9 Misc. 3d 1116(A)(N.Y. Civ. 2005).

cclxvi. Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., 10 N.Y. 3d 486, 890 N.E. 2d 184 (2008).

cclxvii. Giarrantano v. Midas Muffler, 166 Misc. 2d 390, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 656, 659 (1995).

cclxviii. Dvoskin v. Levitz Furniture Co., Inc., 9 Misc. 3d 1125(A) (Suffolk Dist. Ct. 2005). See e.g., Giarratano v. Midas Muffler, 166 Misc. 2d 390, 393, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 656 (1995).

cclxix. Giarrantano v. Midas Muffler, 166 Misc. 2d 390, 630 N.Y.S. 2d 656, 660 (1995).

cclxx. Kim v. BMW of Manhattan, Inc., 11 Misc. 3d 1078 (N.Y.

Sup. 2005).

cclxxi. **Petrello v. Winks Furniture**, New York Law Journal, May 21, 1998, p. 32, col. 3 (Yks. Cty. Ct.).

cclxxii See Lonner v. Simon Property Group, Inc., __A.D. 3d__, 866 N.Y.S. 2d 239, 241, fn. 1 (2d Dept. 2008)(“ Virtually all gift cards have expiration dates and are subject to a variety of fees, including maintenance fees or dormancy fees (see Gift Cards 2007: Best and Worst Retail Cards: A Deeper View of Bank Cards Doesn’t Improve Their Look, Office of Consumer Protection, Montgomery County, Maryland at www.montgomerycountymd.gov. “).

cclxxiii See Alterio, Store closings deal blow to holiday gift-card sales, The Journal News, November 27, 2008, p. 1 (“ The National Retail Federation estimates that gift-card sales will dip 5% this holiday season to \$24.9 billion, down from \$26.3 billion last year “).

cclxxiv Gift-Card Gotchas, Consumer Reports, December 2006, at p. 8.

cclxxv See Alterio, Store closings deal blow to holiday gift-card sales, The Journal News, November 27, 2008, p. 1, 23A (“ ‘ We’ve never been very enthusiastic about gift cards around here ‘ Consumer Reports Executive Editor Greg Daugherty said. ‘ All the retailer and restaurant and bank and airline troubles are one more reason to think twice or three times before you get a gift card. It’s conceivable a company will go into bankruptcy, and you will be just one more creditor waiting to get your money back “).

cclxxvi Lonner v. Simon Property Group, Inc., __A.D. 3d__, 866 N.Y.S. 2d 239 (2d Dept. 2008). See also: Sims v First Consumers Nat’l Bank, 303 AD2d 288, 289, 750 N.Y.S. 2d 284 (1st Dept. 2003).

cclxxvii Llanos v. Shell Oil Company, __A.D. 3d__, 866 N.Y.S. 2d 309 (2d Dept. 2008).

cclxxviii Goldman v. Simon Property Group, Inc., __A.D. 3d__, 2008 WL_ 5006453 (2d Dept. 2008).

cclxxix Goldman v. Simon Property Group, Inc., 31 A.D. 3d 382, 383, 818 N.Y.S. 2d 245 (2d Dept. 2006).

cclxxx. **Faer v. Verticle Fitness & Racquet Club, Ltd.**, 126 Misc. 2d 720, 486 N.Y.S. 2d 594 (N.Y. Civ. 1983).

cclxxxi. **Steuben Place Recreation Corp. v. McGuiness**, 15 Misc. 3d 1114 (Albany Cty Ct 2007).

cclxxxii. Nadoff v. Club Central, 2003 WL 21537405 (N.Y. Civ. 2003).

cclxxxiii. Andin International Inc. v. Matrix Funding Corp., 194 Misc. 2d 719 (N.Y. Sup. 2003)(legislative history provides that
“ This bill seeks to protect all businessmen from fast talking sales organizations armed with booby traps which they plant in business contracts involving equipment rentals ”).

cclxxxiv. Tri-State General Remodeling Contractors, Inc. v. Inderdai Bailnauth, 194 Misc. 2d 135, 753 N.Y.S. 2d 327 (2002).

cclxxxv. Routier v. Waldeck, 184 Misc. 2d 487, 708 N.Y.S. 2d 270 (2000).

cclxxxvi. Power Cooling, Inc. v. Wassong, 5 Misc. 3d 22, 783 N.Y.S. 2d 741 (N.Y. App. Term. 2004).

cclxxxvii. Colorito v. Crown Heating & Cooling, Inc., 2005 WL 263751
(N.Y. App. Term 2005).

cclxxxviii. Falconieri v. Wolf, New York Law Journal, January 13, 2004, p. 20, col. 1 (West. Justice Court 2004).

cclxxxix. Cudahy v. Cohen, 171 Misc. 2d 469, 661 N.Y.S. 2d 171 (1997).

ccxc. Moonstar Contractors, Inc. v. Katsir, New York Law Journal, October 4, 2001, p. 19, col. 6 (N.Y. Civ.)

ccxci. Mindich Developers, Inc. v. Milstein, 164 Misc. 2d 71, 623 N.Y.S. 2d 704 (1995).

ccxcii. B&F Bldg. Corp. v. Liebig, 76 N.Y. 2d 689, 563 N.Y.S. 2d 40, 564 N.E. 2d 650 (1990).

ccxciii. B & L Auto Group, Inc. v. Zelig, New York Law Journal, July 6, 2001, p. 21, col. 2 (N.Y. Civ. 2001).

ccxciv. Centurion Capital Corp. v. Druce, 14 Misc. 3d 564, 828 N.Y.S. 2d 851 (N.Y. Civ. 2006).

ccxcv. B & L Auto Group, Inc. v. Zelig, New York Law Journal,

July 6, 2001, p. 21, col. 2 (N.Y. Civ. 2001).

ccxcvi. Vashovsky v. Blooming Nails, 11 Misc. 3d 127(A)(N.Y. Sup. 2006).

ccxcvii. Walker v. Winks Furniture, 168 Misc. 2d 265, 640 N.Y.S. 2d 428 (1996).

ccxcviii. Walker v. Winks Furniture, 168 Misc. 2d 265, 640 N.Y.S. 2d 428 (1996).

ccxcix. Walker v. Winks Furniture, 168 Misc. 2d 265, 640 N.Y.S. 2d 428, 430 (1996). But see Dweyer v. Montalbano's Pool & Patio Center, Inc., New York Law Journal, March 16, 2004, p. 18, col. 3 (N.Y. Civ. 2004) (" There is nothing in the statute that permits the consumer to rescind the contract; damages are the only remedy under the statute ").

ccc. Walker v. Winks Furniture, 168 Misc. 2d 265, 640 N.Y.S. 2d 428, 431 (1996).

ccci. Walker v. Winks Furniture, 168 Misc. 2d 265, 640 N.Y.S. 2d 428 (1996).

cccii. Dweyer v. Montalbano's Pool & Patio Center, Inc., New York Law Journal, March 16, 2004, p. 18, col. 3 (N.Y. Civ. 2004).

ccciiii. Julio v. Villency, 15 Misc. 3d 913, 832 N.Y.S. 2d 788 (2007).

ccciv. Amiekumo v. Vanbro Motors, Inc., 3 Misc. 3d 1101(A) (Richmond Civ. 2004).

cccv. People v. My Service Center, Inc., 14 Misc. 3d 1217, 836 N.Y.S. 2d 487 (West. Sup. 2007).

cccvii. People v. Two Wheel Corp., 71 N.Y. 2d 693, ___N.Y.S. 2d___, ___N.E. 2d___ (1988).

cccviii. People v. Beach Boys Equipment Co., Inc., 273 A.D. 2d 850 (___Dept. 2000).

cccviii. People v. Wever Petroleum Inc., ___Misc. 2d___, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op 26414 (Albany Sup. 2006).

cccix. People v. Chazy Hardware, Inc., 176 Misc. 2d 960 (Clinton

Sup. 1998).

cccix. Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 175 Misc. 2d 951, 673 N.Y.S. 2d 281, 282 (1998).

cccxi. Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 175 Misc. 2d 951, 673 N.Y.S. 2d 281, 282 (1998).

cccxii. Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 175 Misc. 2d 951, 673 N.Y.S. 2d 281, 283 (1998).

cccxiii. In McCord v. Norm's Music, 2008 NY Sip Op 52181(U) (N.Y.A.T. 2008).

cccxiv. Evergreen Bank, NA v. Zerteck, 28 A.D. 3d 925, 813 N.Y.S. 2d 796 (3d Dept. 2006).

ccc xv. Perel v. Eagletronics, New York Law Journal, April 14, 2006, p. 20, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ.).

231. Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 175 Misc. 2d 951, 673 N.Y.S. 2d 281, 283 (1998).

ccc xvii. On the issue of preemption see Eina Realty v. Calixte, 178 Misc. 2d 80, 679 N.Y.S. 2d 796 (1998)(RPAPL § 711 which permits commencement of litigation by landlord within three days of service of rent demand notice is preempted by Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692)).

ccc xviii. Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 175 Misc. 2d 951, 673 N.Y.S. 2d 281 (1998).

ccc xix. Dudzik v. Klein's All Sports, 158 Misc. 2d 72, 600 N.Y.S. 2d 1013 (1993).

ccc xx. Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 175 Misc. 2d 951, 956-957, 673 N.Y.S. 2d 281 (1998).

ccc xxi. Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 2 Misc. 3d 1003(A), 784 N.Y.S. 2d 921 (N.Y. Sup. 2004).

ccc xxi. Davis v. Rent-A-Center of America, Inc., 150 Misc. 2d 403, 568 N.Y.S. 2d 529 (1991).

ccc xxi. Sagiede v. Rent-A-Center, New York Law Journal, December 2, 2003, p. 19, col. 3 (N.Y. Civ. 2003).

cccxxiv. **Perel v. Eagletronics**, New York Law Journal, April 14, 2006, p. 20, col. 1 (N.Y. Civ.).

cccxxv. **Cirillo v. Slomin's Inc.**, 196 Misc. 2d 922 (N.Y. Sup. 2003).

cccxxvi. **Malul v. Capital Cabinets, Inc.**, 191 Misc. 2d 399, 740 N.Y.S. 2d 828 (2002)

cccxxvii. **Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse**, 175 Misc. 2d 951, 673 N.Y.S. 2d 281 (1998).

cccxxviii. On the issue of preemption see **Eina Realty v. Calixte**, 178 Misc. 2d 80, 679 N.Y.S. 2d 796 (1998)(RPAPL § 711 which permits commencement of litigation by landlord within three days of service of rent demand notice is preempted by Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1692)).

cccxxix. **Dudzik v. Klein's All Sports**, 158 Misc. 2d 72, 600 N.Y.S. 2d 1013 (1993).

cccxxx. **Shaw-Crummel v. American Dental Plan**, New York Law Journal, March 31, 2003, p. 34, col. 6 (Nassau Dist. Ct.)

cccxxxi. **Meachum v. Outdoor World Corp.**, 235 A.D. 2d 462, 652 N.Y.S. 2d 749 (1997).

cccxxxii. **Vallery v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc.**, 141 Misc. 2d 395, 532 N.Y.S. 2d 965 (1988).

cccxxxiii. **Pellegrini v. Landmark Travel Group**, 165 Misc. 2d 589, 628 N.Y.S. 2d 1003 (1995).

cccxxxiv. **People v. P.U. Travel, Inc.**, New York Law Journal, June 19, 2003, p. 20 (N.Y. Sup.).

cccxxxv. Dickerson, False, Misleading & Deceptive Advertising In The Travel Industry, at www.classactionlitigation.com/library/ca_articles.html

cccxxxvi. Dickerson, The Cruise Passenger's Rights & Remedies at www.classactionlitigation.com/library/ca_articles.html; Dickerson, The Cruise Passenger's Dilemma: Twenty-First-Century Ships, Nineteenth-Century Rights, 28 Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 447-517, No. 2, Summer 2004.

cccxxvii. Dickerson, Hotels, Resorts And Casinos Selected Liability Issues at
www.classactionlitigation.com/library/ca_articles.html

cccxxviii. Stone v. Continental Airlines, 10 Misc. 3d 811, 804 N.Y.S. 2d 652 (2005).

cccxxix. Rottman v. El Al Israel Airlines, 18 Misc. 3d 885, 849 N.Y.S. 2d 431 (2008).

cccxl. Fallsview Glatt Kosher Caterers Inc. v. Rosenfeld, New York Law Journal, January 19, 2005, p. 20, col. 1 (Kings Civ. 2005).

cccxli. Tal Tours v. Goldstein, 9 Misc. 3d 1117(A) (Nassau Sup. 2005).

cccxlii. Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P. 3d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)(unsolicited advertizing sent to cellular telephone user in the form of text messaging violates Telephone Consumer Protection Act).

cccxliii. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 USC § 227.

cccxliv. Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F. 3d 335 (2d Cir. 2006).

cccxlv. Weiss v. 4 Hour Wireless, Inc., New York Law Journal, September 7, 2004, p. 18, col. 1 (N.Y. App. Term 2004).

cccxlvi. Kaplan v. First City Mortgage, 183 Misc. 2d 24, 28, 701 N.Y.S. 2d 859 (1999).

cccxlvii. Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle, 266 A.D. 2d 848, 698 N.Y.S. 2d 799 (3rd Dept. 1998).

cccxlviii. Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 268 A.D. 2d 174, 710 N.Y.S. 2d 368 (2000). Compare: Charvat v. ATW, Inc., 27 Ohio App. 3d 288, 712 N.E. 2d 805 (1998)(consumer in small claims court has no private right of action under TPCA unless and until telemarketer telephones a person more than once in any 12-month period after the person has informed the telemarketer that he or she does not want to be called).

cccxl ix. Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 211 Ariz. 325, 121 P. 3d

831 (2005).

cccl. Stern v. Bluestone, 47 A.D. 3d 576, 850 N.Y.S. 2d 90 (2008).

cccli. See e.g., Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Ltd. v. Telecommunications Premium Services, Ltd., 156 F. 3d 432 (2d Cir. 1998)(Congress intended to divest federal courts of federal question jurisdiction over private TCPA claims); International Science & Tech. Inst., Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F. 3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997); Murphey v. Lanier, 204 F. 3d 911 (9th Cir. 2000); United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. F.C.C., 2000 WL 33350942 (D. Ariz. 2000).

ccclii. Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F. 3d 335 (2d Cir. 2006)
(" we conclude that Congress did not intend to divest the federal courts of diversity jurisdiction over private causes of action under the TCPA....We also vacate the (trial court's judgment) dismissing (the) claim under New York (G.B.L.) § 396-aa for lack of supplemental jurisdiction in light of our holding that the district court has diversity jurisdiction over his TCPA claim ").

cccliii. Utah Division of Consumer Protection v. Flagship Capital, 125 P. 3d 894 (Utah Sup. 2005)(" Close examination of the Utah laws showed that they are not in conflict with the TCPA, not do they stand as an obstacle to the accomplishments and full objective of federal law...The telemarketing standards set by our legislature are stricter than, but do not directly conflict with the federal standards. A telemarketers who complies with the Utah standards will have little difficulty complying with the federal standards ").

cccliv. Miller and Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 Federal Communications Law Journal, 667, 668-669 (2000)(" The TCPA presents ' an unusual constellation of statutory features '. It provides a federal right to be free from certain types of telephone solicitations and facsimiles (faxes), but it does permit a victim to enforce that right in federal court. The TCPA's principal enforcement mechanism is a private suit, but the TCPA does not permit an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party, as do most other private attorney general statutes. The TCPA is practically incapable of forming

the basis of a class action...").

ccclv. Kaplan v. Life Fitness Center, Rochester City Court, December 13, 1999.

ccclvi. 47 USC § 227[b][3].

ccclvii. Antollino v. Hispanic Media Group, USA, Inc., New York Law Journal, May 9, 2003, p. 21, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup.).

ccclviii. See Glaberson, Dispute Over Faxed Ads Draws Wide Scrutiny After \$12 Million Award, N.Y. Times Sunday National Section, July 22, 2001, p. 18 (" The basic damages were set by multiplying the six faxes received by the 1,321 recipients by \$500—and then tripling the amount ").

ccclix. Rudgayser & Gratt v. Enine, Inc., 2002 WL 31369753 (N.Y. Civ. 2002).

ccclx. Rutgayser & Gratt v. Enine, Inc., 4 Misc. 3d 4 (N.Y. App. Term 2004).

ccclxi. Bonime v. Management Training International, New York Law Journal, February 6, 2004, p. 19, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. 2004).

ccclxii. Stern v. Bluestone, 47 A.D. 3d 576, 850 N.Y.S. 2d 90 (2008).

ccclxiii. Kaplan v. First City Mortgage, 183 Misc. 2d 24, 701 N.Y.S. 2d 859 (1999).

ccclxiv. Kaplan v. First City Mortgage, 183 Misc. 2d 24, 701 N.Y.S. 2d 859 (1999).

ccclxv. Kaplan v. Life Fitness Center, Rochester City Court, December 13, 1999.

ccclxvi. See 13 telemarketers accept fines for violating No Not Call law, The Journal News, March 10, 2002, p. 3A (" In most cases the settlement is for \$1,000 per call, compared with a maximum fine of \$2,000 per call. More than 200 more companies are being investigated...More than 4,000 complaints have been field and nearly 2 million households have signed up to bar calls from telemarketers nationwide ".)

ccclxvii. Rudgayser & Gratt v. Enine, Inc., 4 Misc. 3d 4 (N.Y.

App. Term 2004).

ccclxviii. Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc., 2007 WL 1703469 (Conn. Sup. 2007).

ccclxix. Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp., 436 F. 3d 335 (2d Cir. 2006)
(" We also vacate the (trial court's judgment) dismissing (the) claim under New York (G.B.L.) § 396-aa for lack of supplemental jurisdiction in light of our holding that the district court has diversity jurisdiction over his TCPA claim ").

ccclxx. Weber v. U.S. Sterling Securities, Inc., 2007 WL 1703469 (Conn. Sup. 2007).

ccclxxi. DeFina v. Scott, New York Law Journal, February 24, 2003, p. 21, (N.Y. Sup.).

ccclxxii. Barry v. Dandy, LLC, 17 Misc. 3d 1109, 851 N.Y.S. 2d 62 (2007).

ccclxxiii. Murphy v. Lord Thompson Manor, Inc., 105 Conn. App. 546, 938 A. 2d 1269 (2008)

ccclxxiv. Bridget Griffin-Amiel v. Frank Terris Orchestras, 178 Misc. 2d 71, 677 N.Y.S. 2d 908 (1998).

ccclxxv. Jacobs, Bride Wins Lawsuit Over a Switch in Wedding Singers, New York Times Metro Section, Sept. 10, 1998, p. 1.

ccclxxvi. Andreani v. Romeo Photographers & Video Productions, 17 Misc. 3d 1124, 851 N.Y.S. 2d 67 (2007).

ccclxxvii. See Sternlight & Jensen, "Using Arbitration To Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice Or Unconscionable Abuse?", 67 Law and Contemporary Problems, Duke University Law School, Winter/Spring 2004 Nos. 1 & 2, pp. 77-78

(" Companies are increasingly drafting arbitration clauses worded to prevent consumers from bringing class actions against them in either litigation or arbitration. If one looks at the form contracts she received regarding her credit card, cellular phone, land phone, insurance policies, mortgage and so forth, most likely, the majority of those contracts include arbitration clauses, and many of those include prohibitions on class actions. Companies are seeking to use these clauses to shield themselves from class

action liability, either in court or in arbitration..

.numerous courts have held that the inclusion of a class action prohibition in an arbitration clause may render that clause unconscionable (reviewing cases) “).

ccclxxviii. See e.g., **Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle**, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 156 L. Ed. 2d 414 (2003)(class wide arbitration permissible unless expressly prohibited in arbitration agreement; remand for arbitrator's decision on whether class action procedures are available); **Green Tree Financial Corp. V. Randolph**, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S. Ct. 513, 148 L. Ed. 2d 373 (2000)(arbitration clause which is silent on fees and costs in insufficient to render agreement unreasonable); **Shearson American Express, Inc. V. McMahon**, 482 U.S. 220, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 96 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1987).

ccclxxix. See e.g., **Ball v. SFX Broadcasting, Inc.**, 165 F. Supp. 2d 230 (N.D.N.Y. 2001)(costs of arbitration would preclude enforcement of statutory claims); **Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.**, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)(consumers not bound by arbitration agreement in software agreement); **Lewis Tree Service, Inc. V. Lucent Technologies, Inc.**, 2000 WL 1277303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)(named plaintiff's claims dismissed; arbitration agreement enforced).

ccclxxx. See e.g., **Tsadilas v. Providian National Bank**, 2004 WL 2903518 (1st Dept. 2004)(“ The arbitration provision is enforceable even though it waives plaintiff's right to bring a class action...The arbitration provision alone is not unconscionable because plaintiff had the opportunity to opt out without any adverse consequences...Arbitration agreements are enforceable despite an inequality in bargaining position “); **Siegel v. Landy**, 34 A.D. 3d 556, 824 N.Y.S. 2d 404 (2d Dept. 2006)(dispute over contract for interior design assistance; arbitration agreement enforced); **Sharpe v. Mann**, 34 A.D. 3d 959, 823 N.Y.S. 2d 623 (3d Dept. 2006)(arbitration agreement in contract for the construction of a custom home enforced notwithstanding reference in contract to G.B.L. § 777-a); **Brown & Williamson v. Chesley**, 7 A.D. 3d 368, 777 N.Y.S. 82, 87-88 (1st Dept. 2004)(“ Consistent with the public policy favoring arbitration, the grounds for vacating an arbitration award are narrowly circumscribed by statute “), *rev'g* 194 Misc. 2d 540, 749 N.Y.S. 2d 842 (2002)(trial court vacated an arbitrator's award of \$1.3 billion of which \$625 million was to be paid to New York attorneys in the tobacco

cases); **Ranieri v. Bell Atlantic Mobile**, 304 A.D. 2d 353, 759 N.Y.S. 2d 448 (1st Dept. 2003)(class action stayed pending arbitration; “ Given the strong public policy favoring arbitration...and the absence of a commensurate policy favoring class actions, we are in accord with authorities holding that a contractual proscription against class actions...is neither unconscionable nor violative of public policy “); **In re Application of Correction Officer's Benevolent Ass'n**, 276 A.D. 2d 394, 715 N.Y.S. 2d 387 (1st Dept. 2000)(parties agreed to class wide arbitration in interpreting a clause in collective bargaining agreement providing military leaves with pay); **Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.**, 246 A.D. 2d 246, 676 N.Y.S. 2d 569 (1st Dept. 1998)(arbitration and choice of law clause

enforced; arbitration before International Chamber of Commerce was, however, substantively unconscionable); Hackel v. Abramowitz, 245 A.D. 2d 124, 665 N.Y.S. 2d 655 (1ST Dept. 1997)(although the issue as to the arbitrability of the controversy is for the court, and not the arbitrator, to decide, a party who actively participated in the arbitration is deemed to have waived the right to so contend); Heiko Law Offices, PC v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., 6 Misc. 3d 1040(A) (N.Y. Sup. 2005)(motion to compel arbitration clause granted); Spector v. Toys “R” Us, New York Law Journal, April 1, 2004, p. 20, col. 1 (Nassau Sup.)(motion to add credit card issuing bank as necessary party denied; arbitration clause does not apply); Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 2 Misc. 3d 1003 ((A)(N.Y. Sup. 2004)(class bound by unilaterally added mandatory arbitration agreement and must submit to class arbitration pursuant to agreement and Federal Arbitration Act); Rosenbaum v. Gateway, Inc., 4 Misc. 3d 128(A), 2004 WL 1462568 (N.Y.A.T. 2004) arbitration clause in computer “ Standard Terms of Sale and Limited Warranty Agreement “ enforced and small claims court case stayed); Flynn v. Labor Ready, Inc., 2002 WL 31663290 (N.Y. Sup.)(class of employees challenge propriety of “ receiving their wages by...cash voucher “ which could only be cashed by using the employer’s cash dispensing machine and paying as much as \$1.99 per transaction; action stayed and enforced arbitration clause after employer agreed to pay some of the costs of arbitration); Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 189 Misc. 2d 721, 734 N.Y.S. 2d 389 (Richmond Sup. 2001)(arbitration clause in consumer contract not enforced) Berger v. E Trade Group, Inc., 2000 WL 360092 (N.Y. Sup. 2000)(misrepresentations by online broker “ in its advertising and marketing materials, knowingly exaggerated the sophistication of its technology and its capacity to handle its customers transactions “; arbitration agreement enforced); Hayes v. County Bank, 185 Misc. 2d 414, 713 N.Y.S. 2d 267 (N.Y. Sup. 2000)(unconscionable “ payday “ loans; motion to dismiss and enforce arbitration clause denied pending discovery on unconscionability); Carnegie v. H & R Block, Inc., 180 Misc. 2d 67, 687 N.Y.S. 2d 528, 531 (N.Y. Sup. 1999)(after trial court certified class, defendant tried to reduce class size by having some class members sign forms containing retroactive arbitration clauses waiving participation in class actions), *mod’d* 269 A.D. 2d 145, 703 N.Y.S. 2d 27 (1st Dept. 2000)(class certification denied).

ccclxxxix. **God’s Battalion of Prayer Pentecostal Church v. Miele Associates, LLP**, 6 N.Y. 2d 371, 2006 WL 721504 (Ct. App. 2006) (“ we reiterate our long-standing rule that an arbitration clause in a written agreement is enforceable, even if the agreement is not signed, when it is evident that the parties intended to be bound by the contract “).

ccclxxxix. **Ragucci v. Professional Construction Services**, 25 A.D. 3d 43, 803 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (2005).

ccclxxxiii. Baronoff v. Kean Development Co., Inc., 12 Misc. 3d 627 (Nassau Sup. 2006).

ccclxxxiv. D'Agostino v. Forty-Three East Equities Corp., 12 Misc. 3d 486, ___N.Y.S. 2d___ (2006).

ccclxxxv. Tal Tours v. Goldstein, 9 Misc. 3d 1117(A) (Nassau Sup. 2005).

ccclxxxvi. Kamnetzky v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, New York Law Journal, June 14, 2006, p. 32, col. 3 (West. Sup.)

ccclxxxvii. Mahl v. Rand, 11 Misc. 3d 1071(A)(N.Y. Civ. 2006).

ccclxxxviii See 3 Weinstein Korn & Miller [2d Ed] New York Civil Practice, CPLR, Section 901.06[4], Lexis-Nexis (MB), 2009. See also Tsadirius v. Providian National Bank, 13 A.D. 3d 190, 786 N.Y.S. 2d 468 (1st Dept. 2004)(motion to stay class and enforce arbitration agreement enforced; “ The arbitration agreement is enforceable even though it waives plaintiff’s right to bring a class action “); Raneri v. Bell Atlantic Mobile, 304 A.D. 2d 353, 759 N.Y.S. 2d 448 (1st Dept. 2003)(“ given the strong public policy favoring arbitration...and the absence of a commensurate policy favoring class actions, we are in accord with authorities holding that a contractual prescription against class actions...in neither unconscionable nor violative of public policy “).

ccclxxxix. There was a much needed effort by some Courts to analyze the process by which consumer agreements are entered into and the appropriate standards of proof regarding the disposition of disputes that arise therefrom such as summary judgment motions made by credit card issuers [see Citibank [South Dakota], NA v. Martin, 11 Misc. 3d 219 (N.Y. Civ. 2005)], confirmation of arbitration awards [MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 15 Misc. 3d 1148 (N.Y. Civ. 2007); MBNA America Bank, NA v. Straub, ___ Misc. 3d ___, 2006 NYSlipOp 26209 (N.Y. Civ.)], deceptive practices used by lenders in home equity loan mortgage closings

[see Bonior v. Citibank, N.A., 14 Misc. 3d 771, 828 N.Y.S. 2d 765 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2006), changing the price in the middle of the term of a fixed-price contract [see Emilio v. Robinson Oil Corp., 28 A.D. 3d 418, 813 N.Y.S. 2d 465 (2d Dept. 2006); People v. Wilco Energy Corp., 284 A.D. 2d 469 (2d Dept. 2001)] and improper debt collection methods [see People v. Applied Card Systems, Inc., 27 A.D. 3d 104, 805 N.Y.S. 2d 175 (3d Dept. 2005)].

cccx. Debt Weight: The Consumer Credit Crisis in New York City and Its Impact on the Working Poor available at

cccxcii. New Report on New York City's Consumer Credit Crisis, NCLC Reports, Debt Collection and Repossessions Edition, Vo. 26, November/December 2007, p. 11.

cccxciii. New York State Unified Court System Press Release June 18, 2008, Chief Judge Kaye Announces Residential Foreclosure Program available at www.nycourts.gov/press/pr2008_4.shtml

cccxciiii. See e.g., 5-Star Management, Inc. v. Rogers, 940 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); FNMA v. Youkelstone, 755 N.Y.S. 2d 730 (App. Div. 2003); Guyertzeller Bank A.G. v. Chascona, NV, 841 N.Y.S. 2d (App. Div. 2007); Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, National Association v. Mastropaolo, 837 N.Y.S. 2d 247 (App. Div. 2007); U.S. National Bank Association v. Kosak, 2007 WL 2480127 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2007); Wells, Fargo Bank, NA v. Farmer, 2008 WL 307454 (N.Y. Sup. 2008); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. V. Castellanos, 2008 WL 123798 (N.Y. Sup. 2008); Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. V. Taylor, 843 N.Y.S. 2d 495 (N.Y. Sup. 2007); Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Clouden, 2007 WL 2709996 (N.Y. Sup. 2007); U.S. National Association v. Merino, 836 N.Y.S. 2d 853 (N.Y. Sup. 2007); U.S. Bank National Association v. Bernard, 2008 WL 383814 (N.Y. Sup. 2008); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Davilmar, 2007 WL 2481898 (N.Y. Sup. 2007).

cccxcv. LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Shearon, 19 Misc. 3d 433, 850 N.Y.S. 2d 871 (2008); Alliance Mortgage Banking Corp. v. Dobkin, 19 Misc. 3d 1121, 2008 WL 1758864 (2008).

cccxcvi. Citibank (South Dakota), NA v. Martin, 11 Misc. 3d 219, 807 N.Y.S. 2d 284 (2005).

cccxcvii. MBNA America Bank, NA v. Straub, ____ Misc. 3d____, 2006 NYSlipOp 26209(N.Y. Civ.).

cccxcviii. MBNA America Bank, NA v. Nelson, 15 Misc. 3d 1148 (N.Y. Civ. 2007).

cccxcix. MBNA America Bank NA v. Pacheco, 12 Misc. 3d 1194 (Mt. Vernon Cty Ct 2006).

cccxcix. Arbor Commercial Mortgage, LLC v. Martinson, 18 Misc. 3d 178, 844 N.Y.S. 2d 689 (2007).

cd. Oxman v. Amoroso, 172 Misc. 2d 773, 659 N.Y.S. 2d 963 (Yonkers Cty Ct 1997).

cdi. Posh Pooch Inc. v. Nieri Argenti, 11 Misc. 3d 1055(A), 2006 WL 435808 (N.Y. Sup.).

cdii. Studebaker-Worthington Leasing Corp. v. A-1 Quality Plumbing Corp., New York Law Journal, October 28, 2005, p. 28, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup.).

cdiii. Boss v. American Express Financial Advisors, Inc., 6 N.Y. 3d 242, 811 N.Y.S. 2d 620 (2006).

cdiv. Brooke Group v. JCH Syndicate 488, 87 N.Y. 2d 530 (1996).

cdv. Glen & Co. v. Popular Leasing USA, Inc., New York Law Journal, May 18, 2006, p. 25, col. 3 (West Sup. 2006).

cdvi. Scarella v. America Online 11 Misc. 3d 19 (N.Y. App. Term. 2005), *aff'g* 4 Misc. 3d 1024(A) (N.Y. Civ. 2004).

cdvii. Gates v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 2003 WL 21375367 (N.Y. Sup. 2003).

cdviii. Murphy v. Schneider National, Inc., 362 F. 3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2004).

cdix. Great American Insurance Agency v. United Parcel Service, 3 Misc. 3d 301, 772 N.Y.S. 2d 486 (2004).